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ABSTRACT 
The European Neighbourhood Policy can be considered the most comprehensive 
articulation of a European Union policy in the southern Mediterranean.  Much of 
the credibility of the EU as a regional actor is linked to its capacity to influence, 
integrate and stabilise its immediate neighbourhood. The advent of the Arab 
Spring has undermined these objectives and tested EU strategy in the region. 
This study aims to address the rationale and the implementation process of the 
ENP in Egypt, prior to events of January 25th 2011. It aims to question the 
‘normative’ character of EU power and to assess its capacity to ‘shape’ its 
neighbourhood, and specifically, to induce change and reforms in Egypt. Through 
detailed elite interviews and extensive documentary analysis, this thesis 
contributes to knowledge on the ENP in Egypt by examining policy tools, 
processes and mechanisms, and their actual impact on the ground.  
Given the difficulty of analysing the ENP from one approach alone, this study 
has adopted an eclectic theoretical framework. Theoretical explanations of the 
ENP need to take into account the different and multiple dimensions of the 
policy, thus affecting our understanding of the EU as a regional actor. In 
particular, this thesis critiques ‘normative power Europe’ explanations of EU 
external action. According to this study, the normative power thesis finds 
strong supporting evidence in official documentation and public speeches by 
EU leaders but is far less apparent in the implementation process ‘on the 
ground’. In the context of Egypt, policy cycles, sectors and motivation have 
emerged as determining factors in the different explanations of EU 
international behaviour. This study has also demonstrated that although the 
European Neighbourhood Policy holds the tools and mechanisms to induce 
transformation and change in third countries, their practical application is 
often weak.  The ENP in Egypt has been only partly successful in promoting 
change and reforms, with the success being selective, modest and sector-
oriented. The study has also highlighted the limits of Egypt as a third country, 
to absorb and adopt certain norms and values.   
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INTRODUCTION:  
The advent of the Arab Spring in 2011 has raised important questions about the 
rationale of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the Mediterranean 
and arguably, about the credibility of the European Union (EU). To an extent, 
we can say that the Arab Spring was exactly the phenomena that the ENP was 
designed to prevent from happening. The civil protests and revolts from 
Tunisia to Egypt against the ruling regimes and their economic record and 
absence of reform were outcomes that a successful ENP should have 
prevented.1 The objectives of the ENP in the Mediterranean are primarily to 
achieve regional stability and economic development through the promotion of 
reforms and change in the socio-economic and political domains (European 
Commission: 2004). So why did the EU agenda in the Mediterranean fail?  The 
case of Egypt is particularly interesting due to the country’s historical and geo-
political role in the region and importantly, due to its relevance for EU strategic 
interests. Egypt is the most populous country in North Africa and the Middle 
East and until the fall of the Mubarak regime at least, the second largest 
beneficiary of EU financial support in the Mediterranean2 (Devco-Europeaid, 
Country Cooperation, 2014). Despite this substantial investment of material 
and human resources, EU support for domestic reforms was unable to prevent 
socio-economic and political conditions deteriorating to the point of civil unrest 
and the eventual fall of Mubarak. Hence, we could argue that the so called Arab 
Spring is both the manifestation of deteriorating domestic socio-economic and 
political conditions, as well as the confirmation that the regimes in power had 
lost much of their legitimacy. In this context therefore, one should ask what 
have been the objectives and impact of EU cooperation with Egypt? More 
specifically, this study addresses the question of:  
                                                          
1
It is important to note at this stage that this study can be defined as Euro-centric in that it aims to focus on EU efforts in Egypt 
through the ENP in a vacuum. The study does not account for any similar effort by other international actors such as the U.S 
and/or the U.K.  for instance, simply because the interest of this study which is purely focused on the effectiveness of the EU 
policy instruments under the ENP and less so on the process of change and reform in Egypt. 
2
 Under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (MEDA programmes 1996-2006) Egypt received €1286m compared with 
Morocco’s  €1600m, while allocations for Tunisia were at €935m and Jordan €500m. Under  the ENP (NIP  2007-2010 and 2011-
2013) total figures for EU financial allocations were as follows: Egypt €1007m, Morocco €1230m, Tunisia €540m, Jordan €488m 
(the OPT received €4.26b from 1994 to 2009 while Israel €13.5 under NIP only) (Devco-Europeaid, Country Cooperation, 2014).  
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How effective has the ENP been in Egypt as a policy for change and reforms? 
 
This study will focus on the ENP in Egypt during the period 2007-2011 and up 
until the fall of the Mubarak regime.  Reflections on the post-Mubarak period 
will be included in the study but is important to clarify that the focus on the 
research spans only in the period indicated above. The choice of Egypt as a 
case-study was driven by the country’s relevance to the EU. Egypt represents 
for the EU a complex and difficult example of bilateral relations under the 
framework of the ENP due to its domestic and regional political history and the 
legacy of specific institutions within the state, namely the armed forces, the 
security apparatus and the presidency.  Traditionally, Egypt has held a leading 
role in the region due to its size and influence, particularly in modern times 
where Cairo was seen as the centre and inspiration for Arab nationalism under 
the leadership of Nasser. The advent and influence of Nasser has been a pivotal 
factor in the developments which have characterised the Arab-Israeli conflict 
over time and to this day, Egypt maintains a crucially influential role in the 
conflict. Importantly, the Nasser-era could be seen as having shaped both 
Egyptian political culture as well as the centralised nature of the Egyptian state 
and state institutions to date. These domestic conditions have proven to be a 
substantial challenge for the promotion of democracy and political reforms by 
the EU. Maybe more than any other ENP partner in the Mediterranean, Egypt 
remains a crucial and at the same time problematic partner for the EU, creating 
for Brussels a true dilemma in terms of priorities: security and stability or 
democratisation?   
 
Since the advent of Nasser in 1952, the Egyptian political system has been 
highly centralised, controlled and repressive towards any form of political 
competition.  Under the twenty years of the Mubarak regime, the security 
apparatus gained unprecedented draconian powers and control over political 
dissidents, mainly Islamists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and 
El Jamaa El Islameya during the 1980s. Additionally, the Egyptian military 
apparatus has gradually become more independence and self-sustained from 
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state resources by developing a parallel military economy which eventually, has 
been integrated into the national economy with all its related problems. Hence, 
we could argue that in principle at least, these conditions make Egypt a highly 
problematic partner for the EU but also a very interesting case study in the 
context of the objectives and aims of the ENP. From a theoretical perspective in 
fact, Egypt provides a crucial testing ground for the EU normative power thesis. 
The centralised nature of the state and the power of particular institutions 
within it and the nature of the economy and economic activity make Egypt an 
interesting case-study when evaluating the transformative power of the EU 
(ENP) as understood in this study, i.e. change and transformation at policy, 
polity and political levels.  
 
The main hypothesis of this study will argue that the ENP has been only partly 
successful in promoting change and reforms and that this success has been very 
modest and sector-oriented. This thesis will demonstrate that the EU promotes 
certain norms and values in a selective manner. Moreover, evidence collected 
from the ground will show the limitations of the Egyptian administration and 
system to adopt certain norms and values.  
 
The study will provide evidence that a degree of reforms and change have 
taken place under the ENP in the domain of trade and in some aspects of the 
socio-economic sector. However, political reforms under the ENP have been at 
best minimal. This has important implications for theoretical explanations 
about EU behaviour internationally and in particular for the normative power 
thesis. The important point to clarify with regards to the hypothesis is that the 
ENP manifests shortcomings with regards to the motives associated with 
political reforms, i.e. the lack of political will both by the EU and Egypt to 
promote and engage in a reform pathway in the sector. In contrast, this study 
will also argue and provide evidence to sustain the argument that the policy 
mechanisms do in fact hold the potential for the transfer of various norms and 
processes in partner states. Thus this study will argue that the tools and 
instrument for cooperation under the ENP provide the mechanisms for norms 
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transfer even though the implementation of these tools has often been 
relegated to specific sectors and/or have been applied cosmetically.  
 
It is  important to note that this study has been characterised by a strong 
ethnographic approach whereby the dual role of the researcher has allowed the 
analysis to benefit from a good degree of reflexivity which has strongly 
influenced the epistemology. This point will be further developed in the 
methodological section below. 
 
THE STUDY OF THE ENP IN EGYPT: DE-CONSTRUCTING THE 
PROBLEM  
Officially, the ENP has been described as a policy to engage countries that do 
not have the prospect of membership (European Commission, 2003, p. 4). 
Nevertheless, this study will provide evidence to sustain that the ENP embodies 
numerous elements of the normative power thesis and tools that operate along 
the mechanisms of socialisation and conditionality and that therefore, are 
conducive to promote change and reforms. In primis is the statement that 
relations under the ENP framework are based on the commitment to shared 
values understood as democracy, the respect of human rights and the rule of 
law. Importantly, the promotion of these values is not seen as the ultimate goal 
of the EU but rather, as the means to attain the strategic regional objectives of 
stability and prosperity (Pace, 2009, p.42). This also implies the explicit 
attempt by the EU to promote certain type of values and norms as conditions in 
its external environment and through its foreign policy, which are 
fundamentally similar to the criteria for accession. As Manners noted (2002, pp. 
353-4), the characteristics of the EU in international relations are to be found in 
its recent experience which is also the experience of its member states and 
thus, in its collective identity in foreign policy. Based on the experience of the 
EU and a specific set of identifiable values, norms, practices and images of the 
world that derive from that experience, the EU is seen as able to shape and/or 
influence as what it sees as normal in the international arena and therefore, 
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able to exert normative power (ibid.). This assertion emphasises a 
conceptualisation of the EU as a stabilising force in international affairs derived 
by its historically developed and formed values and principles and, by a foreign 
policy inspired by an ‘ethic of responsibility’ towards others (Manners and 
Lucarelli, 2006, p.4). The concept of normative power here is understood here 
as the ability of the EU to project its rules, standards, values and institutions in 
third countries in its immediate periphery (Pace, 2007b, p.662). However, 
evidence of the application of normative power remains weak in the 
Mediterranean region. From the Maghreb to the Mashreq the emphasis on 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in EU foreign policy can be 
considered as ever-present rhetorically but largely ineffective and non-
influential in practice (Pace, 2007, p. 1055).  
 
This study aims to investigate the degree of norm-transfer under the 
framework of the ENP in Egypt and the EU-Egypt Action Plan (EEAP) and thus, 
question the constructivist/normative explanation of the ENP. Arguments 
supporting the EU normative power thesis tend to rest theoretically and 
empirically on the evidence provided by enlargement policy. A number of 
factors are to be considered here. Firstly, that the enlargement process has so 
far exclusively taken place with states that could be considered as part of a 
European conceptual space, both geographically and historically. Importantly 
then, with partners that do not hold the prospect of accession the empirical 
evidence of a normative power model are not as strong in comparison. 
Secondly, the economic variables associated with the process of enlargement 
(prospect of full market integration, market proximity and economic 
characteristics of potential member) could all be seen as conducive for 
approximation with the EU and thus, provide evidence of EU normative power 
in this regard. The nature of most Mediterranean economies and the lack of 
prospect for full economic integration are all factors that provide a challenge to 
normative power theories for the EU in the region. Finally and most 
importantly maybe, normative power arguments tend to emphasise the 
projection of EU interests in its foreign policy by focusing on language and 
discursive rhetoric for empirical evidence. However, the implementation of 
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policy-related aspects, particularly with regards to policy prioritisation 
(ideational) and resource allocation (material), seems to be neglected. This is 
an important point to make since the aim of this study is to address this 
apparent gap by explicitly focusing on these neglected areas: i.e. the 
Europeanisation of sectors, the instruments of cooperation and related 
mechanisms for norms transfer and adoption (conditionality and socialisation) 
in practice, partner’s response and the perceptions and opinions of 
practitioners. In particular, the interest in this research stems from an apparent 
gap in the literature (and knowledge) specifically on the implementation of the 
ENP in Egypt. In fact, much of the literature on the ENP in Egypt has been void 
of empirical evidence related to the implementation process, with most of the 
analysis relying on formal documentation and secondary data (e.g. 
Comelli:2010; Zafar:2011).  
 
This study on the other hand, will attempt to explain and unpack the 
implementation of the ENP in Egypt by focusing the analysis on the operational 
and decision-making structures of the policy, i.e. addressing how the policy 
works on the ground and in practice and which tools and instruments are 
applied, how and with what degree of success. This will entail understanding 
and explaining how (if at all) positive and negative conditionality are applied 
through the ENP in Egypt and how do policy practitioners perceive the process 
itself.  In this context, the researcher’ position could be said to have been a 
privileged one since during the data collection period the researcher was in 
employment at the EU Delegation in Cairo. This has been a deliberate choice in 
order to experience and better understand the internal workings of the policy 
processes, organisational culture and perceptions of practitioners, despite the 
obvious ethical challenges associated with this dual role of researcher and 
practitioner (this latter point will be covered more extensively below).   
 
By broadening the focus of the analysis from EU intentions and rhetoric in 
foreign policy to include the actual implementation of policy objectives, as well 
as reactions, opinions and expectations of policy-practitioners on the ground, 
we are potentially able to: a) verify the extent of normative elements and 
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priorities in the formulation and expectations of EEAP, b) identify and trace the 
application of normative power in its implementation by sector and thus, 
evaluate the EU ability to change/transform what could be considered as 
priority domestic environments and c) enrich in depth and quality the analysis 
with supporting evidence of policy practitioners.  
 
The development of an eclectic theoretical framework is seen essential and able 
to provide alternative explanations by focusing on the motivational drivers at 
the various policy stages, at different sectors and within different processes of 
the ENP in Egypt. The analysis in this study will relay on discourse as a method, 
focusing on content analysis and thus, allowing each of the three theoretical 
approaches to provide a specific set of explanations and perspectives. Thus, by 
engaging with a number of different theoretical perspectives on the basis of 
their tenets and test them against the evidence on the ground, we can aim to 
falsify or confirm one or more of these theoretical models. In many cases, more 
than one theoretical explanation might also be applicable.  
 
The table below briefly outlines the assumptions for the three theoretical 
perspectives and their respective implications for both the ENP in Egypt and for 
the EU as  regional actor:  
 
 CONSTRUCTIVISM  REALISM   LIBERALISM 
MAIN  
ASSUMPTIONS  
 
The international 
system is socially 
constructed.  
Actors’ identities 
and interest are 
the main 
determinant of 
social 
construction.  
Agent-structure 
relations are 
mutually 
constituent.  
Emphasizes the 
The 
international 
system is 
anarchic and 
conflictual.  
Power and 
survival are 
the main 
determinant 
of actors 
behaviour.  
The centrality 
of the state is 
emphasized.  
The international 
system is 
anarchic but can 
be mitigated 
through 
cooperation. 
The international 
system is 
characterized by 
mutual 
dependence.  
Centrality of the 
state and of 
power.  
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role of  ideational 
factors.  
Values, rules and 
norms as 
motivational 
forces.   
Skeptical of 
cooperation 
in situations 
of 
asymmetry. 
Emphasizes 
the role of 
material 
interest and 
material 
power.   
Power is 
conceptualized in 
broader and 
more abstract 
terms, 
emphasizing 
economic power.  
International 
institutions are 
key for forging 
shared interests 
and cooperation.  
 
WHAT DOES 
APPROACH TELL 
US ABOUT THE 
ENP AND ITS 
IMPLEMETATION 
IN EGYPT  
A policy envisaged 
to influence the 
domestic 
(political) 
environment in 
partner states.  
A tool for 
normative 
transfer.  
Rests on 
socialization and 
negative 
conditionality as  
mechanisms for 
persuasion.  
 
 
A policy 
driven by self 
interests and 
envisaged to 
secure EU 
interests.  
EU security 
and stability 
is the primary 
policy 
objective.  
Characterised 
by 
asymmetrical 
power 
relations. 
Instrumental 
and strategic 
use of norms. 
Reinforces 
status-
quo. 
  
 
 
A policy driven by 
mutual interests 
(and 
dependence).  
Prioritizes 
economic 
interests.  
Rests on 
technical/positive 
conditionality 
and socialization. 
Enhances for a 
for bilateral 
dialogue and 
cooperation. 
Highly 
institutionalized 
policy and 
processes.  
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WHAT DOES 
APPROACH TELL 
US ABOUT THE 
ROLE OF THE EU 
AS A REGIONAL 
ACTOR (ALSO 
MS) 
Ontologically 
normative, 
prescriptive 
behaviour.  
Perceives a role of 
historic 
responsibility. 
Characterised by 
the concept of 
normative power.  
Driven by 
self-interest 
and 
pragmatism.  
Characterised 
by the pursue 
of regional 
(structural) 
power and 
influence vis-
à-vis other 
actors.   
Motivated by 
the pursue of 
resources 
and public 
goods. 
Hegemonic 
economic 
actor and 
anchor.  
Driven by a neo-
liberal agenda.  
Emphasizes the 
role of EU 
institutions.  
Expansion of EU 
governance.  
Characterised by 
the concept of 
soft power.  
Asymmetric 
economic actor.   
Table 1 
 
In the context of the ENP the normative power thesis could be tested on three 
levels. Firstly, by evaluating if key policy documents (formulation) reflect the 
ethical and constitutive factors outlined above we can evaluate to what extent 
is the normative agenda a priority in Egypt and thus, to what extent EU foreign 
policy is driven by its historical experience and derived ethical tenets. Secondly, 
by evaluating on the implementation of the policy objectives (operational) on 
the ground we can identify the extent, ability and willingness of the EU to 
behave according to these tenets. Here, the focus will rest on political will, 
priority sectors and tools/instruments for cooperation. By focusing on the 
opinions, expectations and understanding of key foreign policy EU actors we 
can understand the extent of their individual identification and thus, 
applications of these tenets in their daily work. Therefore and in order to 
address the above gap and challenge the normative power thesis, this study will 
provide an eclectic theoretical framework which will allow for alternative and 
additional explanations.  
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Moreover, the empirical evidence will be collected from a number of sources 
including official documentation, observations and interviews with key policy 
practitioners. As already mentioned, the ethnographic perspective to this study 
has allowed to dwell into more in-depth questions related to ENP practitioners’ 
perceptions and expectation of the policy and of its implementation in Egypt. 
Resting on Bourdieu’s concept of Participant Objectivation (2003), this study 
has relied on the researcher personal experience and personal history both as a 
policy practitioner working for the EU in Egypt, but more importantly, as 
someone that strongly identifies with Egypt and that has spent all of his 
forming years there. This privileged  position, has naturally solicited a more 
open and at times even confidential response from Egyptian participants to this 
study, thus enriching it with invaluable insights and personal perspectives. 
Importantly, it has influenced the data analysis process by having influence the 
researcher’s presuppositions:  
 
“[…] idiosyncratic personal experiences methodically subjected to sociological 
control constitute irreplaceable analytical resources, and all that mobilizing one’s 
sociological past through self-socio-analysis can and does produce epistemic as 
well as existential benefits” (Bordieu, 2003, p1).  
 
CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTING DEBATES  
The contribution of this research to existing knowledge rests on a number of 
points both at the theoretical and operational level (i.e. policy implementation). 
From a theoretical perspective, the study will initially present the argument of 
EU normative power theory (Manners: 2002) before addressing the validity of 
the approach against additional and alternative theoretical explanations.  
Hence, this research will not start from one specific theoretical approach but 
will rather employ an eclectic starting point which facilitates the investigative 
spirit of the work. The intention is to consider various possible explanations of 
motives in EU international behaviour by engaging with and testing the various 
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theoretical models against empirical evidence from the ground. The concepts of 
norms, normative transfer, (EU-induced) change, power, cooperation and 
interests will all provide the areas of interests and debate from the various 
theoretical perspectives. Additionally and through the concept of 
Europeanisation, the mechanisms of conditionality and socialisation will also 
be evaluated both theoretically and empirically. Despite a critical treatment of 
normative power theory, this study does not aim to be theoretically exclusive 
but rather, to enrich the understanding and explanations of the subject matter 
by complementing the theoretical debate with additional and often, mutually 
reinforcing theoretical perspectives. Therefore, this study will juxtapose 
various theoretical perspectives against the policy implementation processes, 
its cycles and the actors that characterise policy interaction.  
 
On the policy implementation level this research will investigate the rationale 
and effectiveness of the ENP in Egypt vis-à-vis its stated objectives. It will 
identify the declared policy objectives before focusing on the implementation of 
these and the opinions and understanding of policy practitioners on the subject. 
This will entail focusing on the rationale and the objectives of the EEAP, 
identifying priority sectors in the latter, understanding and explaining the 
communication channels and structures for cooperation under the ENP and 
unpacking and evaluating the rationale of the instruments and tools (also 
defined as ‘delivery methods’) available under the ENP. Importantly, this study 
will argue that these tools and instrument provide the mechanisms and 
processes for the promotion of certain regulatory, constitutive and prescriptive 
norms to non-member states. It will be argued that tools such as Sector Budget 
Support (SBS), Twinning, TAIEX and to an extent, Project Approach, are all 
conducive to the promotions and adoption of certain processes which promote 
change at various institutional, legislative, procedural and individual levels. In 
this context, this study will attempt to make an original contribution to 
knowledge and provide a more in-depth and empirical evaluation of the policy 
implementation on the ground.  
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This study will contribute to existing debates related mainly to 1) the nature of 
the EU in International relations, 2) the modalities of its foreign and 
cooperation policy, 3) the impact and responses to the ENP by a partner 
country with the domestic complexities and regional weight such as Egypt. In 
fact, the subject of EU foreign policy has raised much scholarly debate and 
many questions related to the nature of the EU as an international actor, the 
nature and application of its foreign policy and specifically, the formulation and 
implementation processes. Hence, this research will attempt to address these 
questions by evaluating the formulation and implementation of the ENP in 
Egypt and, the potential of the policy for inducing domestic change and 
reforms.  The relevance of the ENP derives from its comprehensive and all-
encompassing framework and thus, by the fact that it is not just another policy 
but rather, the primary (and most telling) articulation of EU foreign policy in its 
immediate neighborhood. Focusing the research on the south Mediterranean 
and on Egypt, will allow us to investigate and evaluate EU foreign policy 
rational and behavior across a specific time-frame and in a well-defined geo-
strategic region and contribute to the literature in this regard. The choice of 
Egypt as a case-study becomes even more relevant in the wake of the events 
that marked the Arab Spring and provides an interesting case of an important 
and equally challenging actor for the EU, one that historically has proven to be a 
difficult partner.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN  
This section will outline the methodology and design developed in this study.  It 
must be noted that the methodology has continuously evolved and changed 
throughout the research process. That said, the methodology of the research 
will predominantly rest on an interpretative approach, while maintaining a 
qualitative focus  throughout the analysis. This section will firstly outline what 
are the aims of the research, its objectives and the main research questions 
being address. Secondly, it will clarify and justify both the ontological and 
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epistemological positions of the study before finally outlining the research 
design and the ethical considerations that have emerged. 
   
Aims, objectives and research questions 
The aims of the research:  
a. To identify, analyse and explain the instruments and mechanisms of the 
ENP;  
b. To evaluate whether the ENP is a policy conducive to effecting change in 
Egypt through the transfer of specific (EU) norms, values, principles and 
practices;  
c. To use the case-study of the ENP in Egypt to inform and understand the 
nature of EU foreign policy and of EU power in international relations;   
 
The objectives of this research are:  
 
i) To explore alternative conceptualizations of the ENP and explanations of  
its rationale; 
ii) To evaluate the objectives and impact of the ENP in Egypt (expectations 
– reality gap analysis);  
iii) To evaluate the effectiveness of ENP tools in Egypt; 
iv) To identify and explain the conditions and processes conducive to 
change/resistance in Egypt; 
v) To evaluate different theoretical explanations of the ENP against the 
empirical evidence on the ground and, to contribute to the theoretical debate 
on EU behavior and power in international relations.  
 
The two main questions of this research are:  
 
I. To critically examine the implementation of the ENP in Egypt 
II. How does the above shed light on the EU’s behavior as a Regional actor?  
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Methodology: 
As mentioned by Furlong and Marsh (2010, p.184), the theoretical and 
methodological approaches of any study are shaped by the research’s 
ontological and epistemological positions (Furlong and Marsh, 2010, p.184). 
Under the current conceptualization of this study the research methodology 
manifests some complexities. Firstly, the epistemological approach aims to 
identify and understand unobservable structures of knowledge (through the 
focus on practitioners’ experiences/relations). Additionally, the nature of the 
data and the position of the researcher in this study solicits a clear 
interpretative approach. Epistemologically, the paper has acknowledged and 
attempted to factor the role of the researcher and his relation with the data, the 
subjects and the impact on related issues of subjectivity. Attempting to address 
issues related to the position of the researcher has facilitated the emergence of 
an anthropological perspective with a strong emphasis on the writings of 
Bourdieu (2003, 1992) on the reflexivity of the researcher and in particular the 
concept of participant objectivation.  
 
Reflexivity in the analysis has arguably influenced this research immensely. 
Following on from Bourdieu work, it could be argued that it is the reflexivity of 
the researcher’s social word and the knowledge that constitutes it, that have 
strongly contributed and affected the outcomes of this study. Bourdieu (2003, 
p.1) has emphasized the important of the researcher personal experience and 
history for research noting that:  
 
“[…] idiosyncratic person experiences methodologically subjected to sociological 
control constitute irreplaceable analytical resources, and that mobilizing one’s 
social past through self-socio-analysis can and does produce epistemic as well as 
existential benefits”.  
 
The author  (Bourdieu, 2003, p.2) acknowledges the debates about the dual role 
of researcher, both as objects and subject and the difficulties that it entails. 
However, the argument he presents is that  it is exactly this dual role, loaded 
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with social and historical experience, that can provide important analytical 
insights. According to the author, by participant objectivation is meant “[…] the 
objectivation of the subject of objectivation, of the analyzing subject, in short, of 
the researcher” (Bourdieu, 2003, p.2). In essence, participant objectification 
does not aim to explore the lived experiences of the researcher but rather the 
“effects and limits” of that experience to the analysis (ibid.). The observations 
provided in fact can be said to be both influenced and equally informed by the 
social world that provides the structure of interaction between the researcher 
and the subject matter.  
 
The complexity of the methodology became particularly evident when 
evaluating the criteria of the research. Qualitative researchers in fact, contest 
and reject the criteria used by quantitative researchers when evaluating their 
work. For instance, instead of relying on concepts such as reliability, validity 
and generalizability, qualitative researchers have developed alternative criteria 
responsive to their specific research ideals and encompassing various 
dimensions of rigor, ethical integrity and artistry (Finlay, n.d., p.7). Overall and 
in the specific context of a naturalist ontology and interpretative epistemology, 
Finlay (n.d., p.14) defines the criteria for qualitative research in the following 
terms: a shared concern for trustworthiness and rigor, a widespread emphasis 
on relevance, including the impact and contribution of the research. Here, 
Finlay (ibid.) argues that reader responses are seen as important and artistry 
may be highlighted as an important criteria. For instance, a particularly well 
written piece of research is likely to have extra power to touch readers and to 
persuade.   
Research Design 
The aims of the research design are to draw insights from the application of the 
various International Relations paradigms to the study of EU foreign policy by 
providing alternative conceptualisations and explanations of the ENP. The 
various theoretical paradigms will consequently allow for different evaluations 
of the impact of the ENP, evaluations which will then be empirically tested in 
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the case of Egypt utilising primarily qualitative data complemented by 
quantitative data (triangulation). The research design will rest on a sub-case or 
in-case-study model (Gerring: 2000) in order to help define the analytical 
categories. The qualitative data which will form the main body of the analysis, 
will then substantiate the initial quantitative findings by specifically focusing on 
ideational factors, i.e. the role and opinions of EU and Egyptian practitioners 
with the aims to add depth and understanding to the analysis.  
The research design will thus rest on an eclectic theoretical framework 
compromising various theoretical interpretation and explanations of the ENP. 
The aims of the theoretical framework are twofold: to theoretically allows us to 
define the ENP and explain its rationale and impact from different theoretical 
perspectives. The framework will outline the theoretical tools associated with 
each approach and point to their usefulness to the analysis. It can be argued 
that an eclectic theoretical framework can in fact, provide a holistic and diverse 
theoretical basis for testing and evaluating the empirical evidence. Importantly, 
it will also provide a diverse interpretation and treatment of various 
intellectual concepts such as: norms, normative-transfer, power, interests and 
cooperation.  In this context, the research design will follow a deductive 
approach to the enquiry. 
Although the research design will reflect a mixed and sequential approach, the 
emphasis will be predominantly on qualitative research. Quantitative data and 
analysis will provide a preliminary picture of the implementation of the ENP 
focusing on a number of indicators. Qualitative data and analysis on the other 
hand, will provide the main insights into ideas, opinions and perceptions of 
policy practitioners with regards to the implementation of the ENP in Egypt. 
Practitioners are seen as interacting within a specific context (ENP 
implementation) and therefore, the data is to be collected and analyzed taking 
into consideration a specific contextual reality.  
 
The analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, will mainly rest on discourse as 
an analytical tool to asses actions and documents in order to understand and 
reflect on the interpretations and meanings that practitioners ascribe to the 
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implementation and achievements of the ENP in Egypt and, to what they and 
others, say and do in this context. Here we need to be aware that the  concept of 
knowledge is crucial in order to understand individuals’ personal experiences 
and interaction with the Egyptians counterparts and within the workings of the 
EU internally.3 How these interpretations and meanings are formed and why, 
will also constitute an important aspect of the enquiry.  
 
The data will comprise primary data collected from interviews and personal 
communications, while secondary data will include official policy papers, 
speeches and other media sources and literature (newspapers and interviews). 
Quantitative data will mainly but not exclusively comprise economic data and 
trade figures, legislation, institutional, regulatory and procedural changes and, 
will be used to complement (triangulation) qualitative data collected form 
practitioners. The process of qualitative data collection will rely on a sampling 
strategy compromised of both a core and a peripheral sample groups (Davies, 
2007, pp.143-4). The core sample of the primary data will consist of interviews 
with EU officials both in Brussels and in Cairo at the EU Delegation and with 
Egyptian officials at sub-ministerial level (ENP sub-committees). In this context, 
it is important to clarify that the policy practitioners interviewed all held high 
and decision-making position both within the Egyptian administration and at 
the EU Delegation. The core sampling group in fact includes all the members of 
the upper management staff at the EU Delegation as well as other officials from 
Head Quarters while from the Egyptian side the sampling focused on the 
members of the team of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement Steering Bureau 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other members of the EU Relations Office.  
Qualitative data will also include extensive insights collected by the researcher 
throughout his role as a member of the Commission staff at the EU Delegation 
in Cairo and will include reflections on privileged access to EU actors, 
procedures, institutional hierarchies, internal documentation, as well as 
personal knowledge and understanding of the implementation of the ENP. Most 
                                                          
3
 Knowledge at both an individual and a cultural level is treated as socially constructed. This implies that all 
knowledge is, at least to some degree, interpretive, and hence, dependent on social context. It is also shaped by 
the personal perspective of the researcher as an observer and analyst. 
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but not all of this data is collected and recorded in a daily journal drafted 
during the researcher’ time at the EU Delegation. Interviews with European and 
Egyptian members of civil society and prominent socio-political figures will 
compromise the peripheral sampling group.    
 
The process of data analysis will contribute to an in-depth understanding of 
personal feelings and experience of the various subjects (Davies, 2007, p.190-
1), i.e. the policy practitioners. The analysis will aim to investigate the ideas, 
expectations and opinions of policy makers with regards to the impact of the 
ENP in Egypt and, attempt to understand their influence in the policy process 
and thus, their contribution to the evaluation of the main questions addressed 
by the research. The status that the researcher attaches to the data is key in 
identifying the most appropriate methodology (be it discourse analysis or 
hermeneutics for example) and analytical strategy.4  Moreover, the insights 
gained will allow the research to substantiate the findings of the quantitative 
data. 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
The main ethical issues associated with this research stem from: a) the 
sensitive and problematic nature of some of the data and the potential 
implications for participants and, b) the role of the researcher both as an 
academic and as a policy practitioner.  
It is important to clarify at this stage that the nature of the data utilised for this 
research comprises problematic and non-problematic data. The type of data 
that are considered non-problematic include a number of different documents 
and sources. For instance, this study has relied extensively on an array of 
official documentation related to the subject matter that are available in the 
                                                          
4 One important aspect here is whether we want to have a ‘realist’ or a ‘narrative’ approach to the analysis. The former 
considers the data as a true reflection of the participants’ reality while the latter approach is more conducive to understanding 
the data as a narrative of reality. Here the reality is seen as ‘filtered’ through the eyes of the participant. The process of data 
analysis by the researcher adds another ‘filter’ to a reality already filtered, so to speak (double hermeneutics). The role of the 
researcher is seen as a key factor in the interaction with the respondent and thus, challenging the idea that “[…] words of the 
subject can be interpreted in isolation from the nature of the interaction between two people” (Davies, 2007, p.166). Having a 
reflexive interpretation of the interview-data consequently has to question the status that we attach to that data (Silverman, 
2005, p.155). 
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public domain. Moreover, the study has also relied on a number of interviews 
which are made public by various media outlets. Finally, non-problematic data 
includes the interviews collected specifically for this research which form the 
bulk of the empirical data collected through the field work. In this context, all 
the main precautions were taken by the researcher to:  a) secure the formal and 
written consent-form from each participant and b) to guarantee the anonymity 
of the individuals involved.  
 
Problematic data on the other hand, includes all the data collected without 
prior consent of actors (here also seen as participants), data that is not made 
public as well as records collected by the researchers’ own reflections and 
experience as an employee of the European Commission. In this context it 
should be noted that the data collection and data analysis process has been 
highly influenced by an ethnographic approach and specifically, by participant 
observations conducted by the researcher. Ethnographic methods were not 
originally envisaged at the outset of the research process but gradually became 
an inevitable tool and perspective to be used in this study. Interaction with 
different actors at the place of work, including policy practitioners and 
decision-makers, has inevitably complemented the process of data collection, 
allowing us to regard actors as the creators as well executants of their own 
meanings. In this sense, being a constituent part of the environment and subject 
under study, while simultaneously experiencing an intense degree of 
interaction with the latter, has had a substantial impact on the subjectivity of 
the representation and analysis of the researcher, one that has been 
systematically reported. 
 
Throughout the period of field work in fact, the researcher has maintained a 
journal outlining daily work tasks and reflections relevant to the main 
questions the study aimed to address. The journal has also contributed with 
evidence, albeit subjective, to a better understanding of the perceptions, 
opinions and meanings of key policy practitioners in the context of EU-Egyptian 
relations under the ENP.   From an ethnographic perspective, the journal could 
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be conceptualised in the same sense as a field notes account for a specific 
period of time which was analysed and interpreted in a subsequent phase.  
Field notes are a common analytical tool under ethnography although a number 
of ethical safeguards need to be taken into account. In this regard, it must be 
noted that the ‘population’ under observation was aware of the research under 
way although they were not informed that a continuous observation process 
was underway. With regards to the identity of the individuals under 
observation, the study does not intend to identify any individual person as 
such. In fact, the purpose of the journal was not to identify characteristics 
related to individual behaviour and/or opinions but rather, reflect on the 
behaviour, opinions, extent and type of interaction and general working culture 
of the community under observation as a whole, i.e. the members of the 
European Commission working in Cairo and responsible for the 
implementation of the ENP Action Plan and EU cooperation in general in Egypt. 
The period under focus in the journal covers from September 2008 until 
September 2009. That said, the researcher has also been working for the 
European Commission in Cairo  from May 2011 until August 2013. Hence, 
although the journal covers a specific period of time as recorded, the 
experience and interaction with what should be considered the subject of study 
is an on-going one.  
 
Hence and in order to address the issue of safeguarding participants, the nature 
and the source of the data will remain unknown to the public. Although all of 
the participants were offered anonymity, some explicitly wanted to be quoted. 
It must be noted that  my direct superiors were aware that as part of my work I 
had access to sensitive data and had trusted me with responsible use  through 
what could be described as an unwritten agreement. 
 
The second issue of ethical concern is the relationship between the participants 
and the researcher. In 2008 I spent one year working at the EU Delegation in 
Cairo where most of the primary and secondary data was collected. This dual 
position has proved to be of great advantage for the study but also poses some 
methodological and ethical challenges. As Finlay notes (n.d., pp. 18-19), in the 
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realist tradition the researcher’s task is to remain objective and provide a 
transparent methodological account.  In contrast, a   researcher adopting a 
relativist (interpretative) perspective would focus reflexively on how the 
researcher’s presence and positioning might have influenced the research 
process and its outcomes.  In the context of this study’s ethnographic approach, 
the latter follows on from Bourdieu’s work on the researcher reflexivity (2003, 
1992). The approach has allowed to add value and in-depth observation to a 
study that by definition, could not make definite claims of objectivity. As a 
result, resting on Bourdieu’s approach of reflexive ethnography has allowed the 
study to mitigate these ethical issues and on the contrary, to make them the 
strength of the study. The author argument is based on the criticism and 
limitation of claims of objective research in positivist methodology (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992, p.246). The personal cognitive experience of the 
researcher as well as the social world which constitute the former, are seen as 
intrisingly linked in the construction and analysis of the subject matter (ibid.). 
According to Bourdieu and Wacquant in fact:  
 
“It is the double truth, objective and subjective, that constitute the whole truth of 
the social world” (1992, p.255).  
Regarding this study, the main advantages of being inside the research have 
been the privileged access to relevant data, people and institutions. This 
position allows for access to internal documentation, to decision-makers, 
practitioners and, for observations and analysis of the subject under study in a 
relevant context and social and professional environment. The working 
experience alone is crucial for the understanding of internal EU processes and 
procedures and ENP dynamics and cycles. The personal experience of working 
along and living amidst policy practitioners has also proven invaluable. This 
closeness with the subject matter has prompted reflections over an 
anthropological perspective to the study. Importantly, it has allowed the 
researcher to benefit (in general terms) from a degree of enhanced trust from 
participants and thus it is hoped, from deeper personal insights. Accordingly, 
observations of subjects (actors), practices and attitudes, mechanism, discourse 
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and administrative culture amongst others can, if well planned and integrated 
in the paper, contribute immensely and enrich the final findings of the project.   
 
Despite the emphasis on the reflexivity of the researcher, they study has 
attempted to pursue a degree of rigor and triangulation and to follow a 
transparent and methodological enquiry. For instance, the process of data 
collection with regards to interviews has rested on a standardized practice with 
all of the participants:  i) inform the participants about the aims of the project, 
ii) ask for their written consent for interviews and their participation in the 
research through an already formulated consent form, iii) explain to 
participants that anonymity and confidentiality will be guaranteed and the 
identities of specific individuals will not be disclosed in the text of the research 
project. Similarly, the process of data analysis has rested on recorded data 
alone, including interviews and the personal journal and has followed an 
inductive line of enquiry. That said, the interaction with various actors and 
across institutions in my professional environment and the way this process 
might have influenced my opinion and the conclusions of this study is to be 
considered as an added value of this research.   
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This study is divided into six main chapters including the introduction and the 
conclusion. The above Introduction has presented the context and the problem 
the research is aiming to address: namely, evaluating the capacity of the EU to 
induce reforms and change in Mediterranean partner states through the ENP. 
Egypt here provides an interesting case-study and a difficult and complex 
partner for the EU. The Introduction has also outlined the contribution that this 
research hopes to provide both to knowledge and to broader debates regarding 
the nature, the tools and the capacity of the EU in external relations. Focusing 
on Egypt will allow us also to make inferences on actors’ behaviour in 
International Relations and evaluate actions-reactions under the framework of 
the ENP in Egypt.  The Introduction has explicitly outlined the aims and 
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objectives of the research as well as the main sub-questions that it aims to 
address. Finally, the methodology has been explained and justified. In 
particular, the final section has been devoted to explaining the difficulties faced 
with regards to ethical issues due to the dual position of the researcher 
throughout most of the undertaking of this study.  
Chapter One will investigate how the ENP is represented in the literature, 
including from a development and security perspective and arguing that 
conventional literature conceptualises the policy as an instrument for change 
and transformation. It will demonstrate that the ENP is often conceptualised 
and analysed in relation to its capacity to induce domestic change in partner 
states and, to the degree of influence attained. The literature review will thus 
explore debates related to the potential transfer of norm under the ENP and 
will outline how these arguments support an EU normative power thesis. In 
this regard, the debate surrounding the process of Europeanisation and its 
related mechanisms will be considered as central to this study. The concept of 
Europeanisation will be defined and applied to the study of the ENP in Egypt 
and to our purposes in this research.  This chapter will also outline the debates 
related to the relevance of the ENP for EU external relation and foreign policy 
defined in broad terms, i.e. including but also going beyond foreign and security 
policy. Finally, this chapter will outline the Egyptian political and socio-
economic environment in order to highlight the relevance of Egypt as a case-
study and, to provide a contextual background for the analysis.  
Chapter Two is the main theoretical chapter. The chapter aims to provide 
additional theoretical explanations for the ENP in the Mediterranean by 
broadening the scope for analysis beyond normative power arguments and 
provide additional explanations. In order to do so, this chapter will initially 
outline the international structure and the changes that have occurred since the 
end of the Cold War.  The chapter will then explore the understanding of the 
concept of security in general while also focusing on both an Egyptian and EU 
perspective of security. The second section of the chapter will thus provide an 
eclectic theoretical framework in which norms and normative transfer are 
conceptualised from different approaches, namely: constructivism which is 
considered in this study as the conventional explanation of the ENP, but also 
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realism in its various forms, and finally liberalism. The role of norms and values 
and their interpretations in the context of the ENP will remain a central 
element of the various theoretical models.  
Chapter Three will define and identify EU norms promotion in the literature 
and official documentation related to the ENP in Egypt. The aim is to identify 
what norms the EU claim to promote in the context of the ENP and though the 
EEAP. This chapter will briefly outline the EU Mediterranean agenda and EU-
Egyptian cooperation over time in order to identify the historical areas of 
priority and the how they compare to the ENP. Secondly, the chapter will 
outline the ENP in its institutional, political and operational structure. This will 
entail focusing on the ENP structures and outlining the policy funding/financial 
instruments and mechanisms. The third section of this chapter will specifically 
focus on EU-Egyptian cooperation under the ENP. The section will focus on the 
EEAP and on the three pillars structure. The section will go on to explain who 
the main interlocutors in the Egyptian administration and the EU Delegation 
working under the ENP are and their respective functions. Importantly, this 
section will also explain how the various policy tools operate and how they 
contribute to the process on norms-transfer. The main concept here is that of 
delivery methods utilised by the Commission whereby allocation of funds is 
delivered through various processes and with specific conditions. Finally, this 
chapter will then focus on the operational and implementation aspects of the 
policy by identifying the sectors prioritised for cooperation and their financial 
allocation. In essence, Chapter Three aims to identify the norms promoted 
under the ENP in Egypt and identify policy instruments and tools conducive to 
norms-transfer. 
Chapter Four will consist of the main analytical chapter of the study and 
consists of four sections. The first three sections will cover the three pillars 
within the EEAP and namely: Trade, Socio-economic and Political. The 
structure of the three sections is similar in that each section addresses the same 
following three questions: 1) In which area is the EU pushing for 
reforms/norms transfer? 2) What is the response of the government of Egypt 
and what is the extent of political will manifested? What evidence is available? 
3) What are the limitations of EU efforts/strategy in Egypt? It must be noted 
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that the analysis in each pillar has only focused on the most prominent 
sectors/programmes or on those which absorb the largest amount of funding. 
Considering the very broad and all-encompassing nature of the EEAP it would 
have been impossible (and not very useful either) to focus on each and every 
action of the Action Plan within the limits of this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
 
THE ENP IN THE LITERATURE AND THE TRANSFER OF 
NORMS: A CONTEXT FOR THE STUDY 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to emphasise the relevance of the ENP in EU 
external relations and foreign policy5 and to outline the policy’s main guiding 
principles and mechanisms. The case study of Egypt will provide an excellent 
testing ground for the main theoretical and empirical questions posed by the 
study. The aims of this chapter are three-fold:  1) to provide an overview of the 
mainstream academic literature on the ENP and the dominant representations of 
the policy; 2) to define and understand how to study norms transfer under the 
ENP and the main challenges associated with the exercise; 3) to argue for the 
relevance of Egypt as a case study and outline the complexities and 
contradictions of the relationship between the EU and Egypt.  
The main issues of contention here are: the relevance of norms in the ENP and 
the contradiction between norms and interests, which is inherent to the policy. 
The concept of Europeanisation will allow us to both theorise and analyse 
empirically the process of norms transfer, i.e. by identifying and tracing norms 
and the process of norms-transfer relevant to the context of the ENP in Egypt.  
The focus of this research is the role and nature of the EU as a regional and 
international actor and, more specifically, the Union’s capacity to influence its 
immediate neighbourhood through the transfer of norms. The case of Egypt will 
provide the locus of the analysis and the empirical evidence in this regards. The 
basic assumptions driving this research are the following: 1) the ENP is 
conceptualised as a policy for the transfer of certain EU norms, 2) the tools and 
                                                          
5 This study will conceptualize EU external relations as related to practical cooperation frameworks. EU foreign policy on the 
other hand is conceptualized as comprising both cooperation and political aspects.  
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implementation modalities of the ENP rest on the logic of Enlargement policy 
and in particular, on the mechanisms of socialisation and conditionality, 3) the 
EU can be studied as a unitary actor in foreign policy and, 4) that Egypt provides 
a suitable case-study to test the process of normative transfer under the ENP due 
to its domestic characteristics and geo-political role.  
This literature review will thus take into consideration three main perspectives 
with regard to the ENP: a) the nature and rationale of the ENP in general and 
specifically in the Mediterranean, b) the debate surrounding the relevance of 
norms and their promotion in international relations and, c) the debate 
surrounding the EU as an international player and d) the nature of EU power in 
international relations.  
The first part of this chapter will provide an overview of conventional 
explanations of the ENP and will outline the rationale for the formulation of the 
policy.6  Two important themes emerge in this section: firstly, the potential 
contradiction between guiding principles outlined in the formulation of the 
policy and the process of conditionality that underpins the logic of 
implementation; secondly, the nature of the ENP-related discourse, be it in 
official documentation, speeches, public records and so on, provides a rich 
source of evidence for framing the formulation cycle, i.e. what the policy is, and 
what its purpose is intended to achieve (motivations). The second part of this 
chapter will focus on norms and the concept of norms-transfer, with specific 
reference to the implementation of the ENP in Egypt. Here the aim is to provide 
documentary evidence to the argument that values and norms are central to the 
ENP discourse and to the definitions of EU power in International Relations (IR). 
The concept of Europeanisation will be explained and defined as a central 
process in the articulation of EU external power.  Importantly, the concept of 
Europeanisation will serve as an analytical tool facilitating the identification of 
priorities and, thus, the identification of hierarchical relations between the 
                                                          
6 Conventional explanations in so far that authors in this review tend to rest on official ENP documentation and EU discursive 
priorities and conceptualisations. Formulation refers to how is the ENP understood and conceptualised, but also to what are 
considered to be the policy’s objectives and guiding principles and, what are its perceived limitations. 
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relevant norms, policy priorities and policy sectors in the context of the 
implementation of the ENP in Egypt. Finally, this section will outline the 
importance of conditionality and socialisation as the mechanisms for norms 
transfer and, thus, theoretically and meta-theoretically relevant in the 
explanation of processes.  The third part of this chapter will outline the political 
and socio-economic characteristics of the Egyptian context prior to the advent of 
the January 25, 2011, uprising. The section on Egypt will emphasise the complex 
and challenging nature of the Egyptian socio-economic and political 
environment, as well as the linkages between domestic and foreign domains and 
policies. This will allow us to contextualise and problematize the implementation 
of the ENP. Here the aim is to identify and understand the domestic conditions in 
Egypt in order to evaluate the locus and origins of areas of resistance and non-
resistance to the process of norms transfer. Policy instruments can also help us 
understand the intended impact of the EU but we also need, however, to account 
for the degree of political will, institutional capacity and other domestic factors, 
shaping and constraining decision-making in partner countries. 
  
THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY IN THE LITERATURE  
 
The majority of authors agree that the ENP was conceptualised in response to 
the round of enlargement in 2004 and as an alternative to further enlargement 
for the newly independent states (NIS) in the East (Smith, 2005, p.757; Del Sarto 
& Schumacher, 2005, p.18; Johansson-Nogues, 2004, p.241; Biscop, 2005, p.5; 
Dannreuther, 2006, p.183, Kelley, 2005, p.32; Bogutcaia, Bosse & Schmidt-
Felzmann, 2006, p.120). Evidence for this argument is to be found in the large 
numbers of key individuals from the Directorate General (DG) for Enlargement 
that initially dominated the design of the ENP, as opposed to individuals from the 
DG External Relations (RELEX) (Del Sarto & Schumacher, p. 27, 2005; Kelley, 
p.32, 2006).7  Both Dondini and Fantini (2006) as well as Kelley (2006) argue 
                                                          
7 From a theoretical perspective, Kelley explores further the theoretical implications for institutional learning and path 
dependency based on  her argument that ENP has adapted a number of mechanisms from enlargement (2005, p.7).  
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that the ENP draws heavily on integration and enlargement approaches which in 
turn, rested on intensified and progressive political and economic integration. 
Essentially, it is seen as a policy with a similar approach to Enlargement but with 
a weaker and more limited incentive than accession. Writing from an economic 
perspective, Dondini and Fantini (2006, p. 508) argue that:  
“The rationale for this initiative was the realization that, while successive EU 
enlargements have been a powerful instrument of political and economic 
stabilization, the need to preserve the functioning of the EU institutions makes 
enlargements beyond those already foreseen unlikely for the time being.” 
Moreover, Johansson-Nogues (2004, p.242) notes that, in its Eastern dimension, 
the ENP has been promoted quite overtly as a generous integration scheme 
designed to stave off new accessions in the near to medium term.   
The ENP manifests various contradictory dimensions in its emphasis on deeper 
political and economic integration (harmonisation and approximation), while at 
the same time being conceived as a policy designed to delay accession from the 
East. What is evident is that with the 2004 round of enlargement, the EU had to 
rethink its foreign policy and external relations approach in its new regional 
environment.  
According to Dondini and Fantini (2006, p.509), the ENP was also a response to 
fears that following the 2004 enlargement the EU would neglect relations with 
its Mediterranean and set up new barriers on its borders, turning itself into 
fortress Europe. Addressing the issue of new borders for the EU meant re-
thinking relations with new and old neighbors and maintaining a balance 
between its inclusive nature and its domestic interests, while facing new external 
challenges such as stability, peace and prosperity in the immediate European 
neighbourhood.  Smith (2005, pp. 757-8) argues that since the end of the Cold 
War the issue of EU borders had become more relevant. The issue of EU borders 
in fact, is a question still open for debate and there is no doubt that what is 
termed ‘enlargement fatigue’ has resulted in a certain degree of ambiguity on the 
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issue and has presented the EU with an inclusion/exclusion dilemma8 (Smith, 
2005, p.757). This ambiguity can be seen at the heart of the ENP. Del Sarto & 
Schumacher (2005, p.26), add that the ENP was envisaged to blur borders, 
almost as if driven by a buffering logic. According to the authors (ibid.), the idea 
here is to conceptualise the EU as fading out towards its external borders and, 
thus, depending on the level of integration between the EU and any single 
partner, to have almost specific, virtual borders with individual partner states. 
The inclusion/exclusion dilemma becomes even more complex in the case of the 
ENP in Egypt due to the lack of the prospect of accession. For Southern 
Mediterranean partners, the ENP could be said to blur the parameters of 
conventional bilateral cooperation and seem to want to set the degree and 
intensity of engagement with partners.  
The ENP’s guiding principles: benchmarking, differentiation and 
joint-ownership 
 
The Commission can be said to have been the architect of the ENP and has 
defined the objectives of deeper and greater cooperation and integration with 
partners as follows:  
“[T]o define a set of priorities, whose fulfilment will bring them [neighbours] closer 
to the European Union. These priorities will be incorporated in jointly agreed 
Action Plans, covering a number of key areas for specific action: political dialogue 
and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a 
stake in the EU’s Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, 
information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy 
and people-to-people contacts” (European Commission, 2004, p.3).  
Importantly, the document states:  
“The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to 
common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the 
                                                          
8 See also S. Stetter (2005), Theorising the European Neighbourhood Policy: Debordering and Rebordering in the Mediterranean, 
addresses this debate and theorises on the implications of ENP for EU regional governance.  
31 
 
respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good 
neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable 
development. Commitments will also be sought to certain essential aspects of the 
EU’s external action, including, in particular, the fight against terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as abidance by international 
law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution” (European Commission, 2004, p.3).  
Smith (2005, p.763) summarises the policy as one that offers an extended or 
deeper partnership which falls short of membership. It offers a stake in the EU’s 
internal market and closer political cooperation as well as increased economic 
integration, both of which are conditional to progress on set benchmarks.  These 
will be set in the Action Plans (AP) which, in turn, will be used to evaluate 
progress. New benefits will only be offered to reflect progress made (ibid.). The 
country-tailored AP are the central elements of the policy and they characterise 
the ENP by two key principles: differentiation and joint ownership. Dondini and 
Fantini note (2006, p.510), that the ENP has an explicit reform agenda when 
compared with similar foreign relations frameworks and thus, offers the chance 
to its neighbours to benefit (economically) from a closer relation with the EU 
(2006, p.510). They seem to agree with Del Sarto and Schumacher (2005) when 
they note that progress in the relation between the EU and its neighbours as well 
as integration in certain sectors, will depend on progress towards basic EU 
political values and on implementation of economic and institutional reforms 
(Dondini and Fantini, 2006, p.12). 
Thus, the policy offers a privileged relationship to partners conditional on the 
attainment of certain benchmarks across a number of sectors. Benchmarks in 
turn, are based on the abovementioned values and principles. In this context, we 
can identify a clear process of prioritisation of actions associated with the 
promotion of certain norms/values and, a relatively explicit process of norms-
transfer and norms-adoption by partner states. Sectors are key for 
understanding the process of prioritisation. However, these processes should be 
seen as problematic since they are influenced and affected by a number of 
variables and factors (endogenous and exogenous) at different levels: policy, 
institutional, and individual.  
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Benchmarking 
 
Benchmarking should be seen to lay at the heart of the ENP processes and policy 
implementation methods and monitoring process. Benchmarking itself is a 
process which implies certain actions and reactions and which form the basic 
logics underpinning the policy and related cooperation agreements between the 
EU and third parties. It serves therefore, as a tool to measure progress on a set of 
bilaterally agreed objectives. To quote Del Sarto & Schumnacher (2011, p.936):  
“[A]ny benchmarking effort presupposes clear and pre-defined indicators or 
benchmarks, which provide quantitative and/or qualitative measurement criteria.”  
Hence, benchmarks allow the EU to set specific targets and observe progress 
towards them. They also set a path-way/method for the application of 
conditionality, be it technical and/or political. Benchmarks are normally set on 
international standards and conventions but under the ENP they could be seen 
as supporting reforms and integration, i.e., approximation towards European and 
EU standards, structures and regulations as outlined in the acquis. However, 
benchmarks are not always measurable. They can also imply specific actions to 
be taken by a partner government for instance, i.e. boxes to be ticked. We will see 
that in the context of the ENP, the nature of the benchmark depends on the 
nature of the sector it is applied to (e.g. horizontal such as governance where 
reforms are needed –actions-, or vertical such as education where attendance 
and/or gender figures could be the benchmarks).  
A benchmarking approach in the ENP has been perceived by Del Sarto and 
Schumacher (p. 23, 2005) as the intention by the EU to move from passive to 
active engagement in the Mediterranean. They add that the Commission 2003 
Paper on the ENP is clearly and surprisingly very assertive in acknowledging the 
ambition of the EU to act as a normative power (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, 
p.24).  That said however, Del Sarto & Schumacher (2011, p.935) are very critical 
of the benchmarking approach within the ENP in the Southern Mediterranean:  
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“[W]ithout providing any definitions or clear criteria, the terms ‘democracy’, ‘the 
rule of law’ and ‘good governance’ are used interchangeably in the Action Plans, 
while the Action Plans are also based on an arbitrary and largely useless selection 
of pseudo-benchmarks. These factors not only question the scope and effectiveness 
of the EU’s alleged benchmarking efforts in the realm of democratization, but also 
raise serious doubts about the EU’s commitment to promote democracy in its 
neighbourhood in the first place”. 
The authors add (ibid.) that benchmarking is theoretically well-suited to monitor 
processes of regime transformation. Yet, basing a leverage approach to 
democratization on benchmarks is, perhaps unsurprisingly, analytically not a 
particularly easy task.  
Del Sarto and Schumacher (2011, p.946) go on to argue that ENP Action Plans 
cannot be considered examples of intelligent benchmarking as they do not 
comply with any of the prerequisites that such a process requires. Action Plans in 
fact are seen as lacking precise criteria, time-frames and a clear data collection 
methodology (ibid.). Although we could argue that the above conclusions can be 
applied to all ENP partners, the specific application of ENP benchmarks in Egypt 
will be further analysed in chapters three and four.  
Emerson, et al, (2007, pp. 1&7) note that the EU has performed poorly in some 
areas and, particularly, with regards to the promotion of democratisation and 
human rights. Moreover, the formulation of the Action Plans and dialogue in 
general between partners and the EU has been seen as exclusive and with little 
participation of civil society or opposition forces. The authors (Emerson, et al, 
2007, p.15) note that this weak performance of the ENP in the field of democracy 
comes at a high cost to the political credibility and reputation of the EU in the 
Mediterranean region. The EU’s refusal to deal with Hamas after democratic 
electoral success in 2006, for instance, was seen as a message of political 
insincerity throughout the region.  
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Differentiation  
In 2007 President Barroso stated that differentiation was a fundamental 
principle of the ENP:  
“When we launched the policy, we had to make it clear that the offer on the table 
was the same for everyone, with no discrimination. But as we get further and 
further away from the starting line, I expect we will see a more and more varied 
landscape, with as many different types of relationship developing as we have 
partners, but always within the common framework of the ENP. It will be clear that 
there is a very different relationship between the EU and each of its neighbours, 
reflecting how close we are to each other in implementing the common values we 
share, the specific nature of each partner’s economy, and the desires and 
aspirations you have for your relationship with the EU” (Quoted in ENP 
Conference, Brussels, 3 September, 2007). 
The ENP Strategy Paper (2004) defines the principle of differentiation as follows:  
“[P]riorities agreed with each partner will depend on its particular circumstances. 
These differ with respect to geographic location, the political and economic 
situation, relations with the European Union and with neighbouring countries, 
reform programmes, where applicable, needs and capacities, as well as perceived 
interests in the context of the ENP. Thus the Action Plans with each partner will be 
differentiated” (European Commission, 2004, p.8).  
In the literature, the principle of differentiation is seen generally as a positive 
innovation.  Del Sarto and Schumacher argued that (2005, p.28) differentiated 
and bilateral relations with Mediterranean partners would give the EU greater 
opportunity of exerting its power, both in economic terms and politically. 
Equally, differentiation would also suit Mediterranean states as they would be 
able to voice their individual and differentiated concerns (Del Sarto & 
Schumacher, 2005, p.29). This view is also sustained by Dannreuther (2206, pp. 
191-3) who welcomes this approach in the Mediterranean where, he argues, the 
EMP has failed to deliver on local politico-economic reforms and has proved an 
overly ambitious policy. He adds (Dannreuther, 2006, p.193) that even if we take 
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the two exceptions to the rule - Morocco and Tunisia – economic progress has 
been matched by deteriorating local political freedoms.  
Dondini and Fantini (2006, p.526) also consider the principle of differentiation 
to have a positive effect on trade relations with neighbouring countries. They 
add that even though this will mean the risk that some countries might have 
better access to the market and this could potentially divert trade from less 
equipped neighbours, differentiation presents more of an incentive for those 
countries to fully engage with the ENP. In fact, not all partners will engage with 
the same level of commitment resulting in differentiated integration-
differentiated commitment to reforms (Dondini and Fantini, 2006, p.526).  
 
Although Johansson (2004, p. 244) sees the principle of differentiation in 
positive terms in that it could re-ignite the dynamics of EU-Mediterranean 
relations, the author also notes that the bilateral nature of the ENP seems almost 
a step backward from Barcelona as the dependent and asymmetric relation 
between the EU and its Mediterranean partners still remain. Del Sarto & 
Schumacher also argue (2005, p.21) that ENP does not complement EMP as the 
Commission claims. The authors (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, p.22) argue 
that, the principle of regionalism which was so inherent in the Barcelona Process 
was being replaced through the ENP and APs by differentiated bilateralism. The 
ENP through the APs operates on individual basis and rewards those states that 
are most advanced politically and economically or those who are willing to 
undertake serious reforms.  
 
Emerson, Noutcheva & Popescu (2007, p.6 & 7) argue that if the principle of 
differentiation is to be applied effectively, then  the ENP will need differentiated 
policy packages. They add (ibid.) that a strategy that is geared towards 
encouraging the willing partners should also consider the impact on reluctant 
partners and address the latter accordingly. In this context, the application of 
positive and negative conditionality become all the more relevant to the 
implementation of the ENP. 
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Joint-ownership 
 
With regard to the principle of joint ownership, the Commission stated that:  
“Joint ownership of the process, based on the awareness of shared values and 
common interests, is essential. The EU does not seek to impose priorities or 
conditions on its partners. The Action Plans depend, for their success, on the clear 
recognition of mutual interests in addressing a set of priority issues. There can be 
no question of asking partners to accept a pre-determined set of priorities” 
(European Commission, 2004, p.8).  
For Del Sarto & Schumacher (2005, p.28), the principle of joint ownership is seen 
in positive terms as it allows for more intensive involvement of partners in the 
definitions of priorities under the AP. However, they (p.28) go on to argue that 
the difficulty with the principle of joint ownership will be to reconcile it with the 
principle of conditionality which is seemingly so pivotal to the logic and 
implementation of the policy.  Del Sarto & Schumacher (2005, p.23) note that the 
EU in the Mediterranean has been very inconsistent with regard to rewards for 
reforms –particularly in the field of human rights- and thus, in its application of 
conditionality (benchmarking). 
Policy limits outlined in the literature  
 
Beyond this review of the policy guiding principles and logic, the section below 
will look at the limitations of the ENP objectives as represented in the literature. 
Del Sarto & Schumacher identify a number of policy limits related to partners’ 
access to the internal market. With regards to the movement of people for 
example, they note that there are strong institutional and member states 
divergence on the issues, particularly members in the south concerned about an 
increased influx on migrants (2005, p.31). Moreover, access to the internal 
market would also mean aligning legislation to the acquis. For most 
Mediterranean states this would mean an enormous task of harmonisation with 
massive timelines and substantial material costs (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, 
p.34). In addition, the free movement of goods in certain sectors will certainly 
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deprive southern member states of their comparative advantage, for example 
agriculture and textile, steel, thus making negotiation for financial 
distribution/allocation more complicated (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, p.32). 
The allocation of financial resources are also seen as a problematic issue as it is 
difficult to reach consensus in Europe with regards to their distribution (Del 
Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, p.31). Obviously, new member states in the East are 
concerned about the allocation of development funds in favour of Mediterranean 
partners and initiatives at their expence (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, p.31). 
As most Mediterranean industries are characterised by a family framework of 
business, it is argued that they will need substantial financial and technical 
resources in order to meet the ENP expectations (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, 
p.35). One must also take into account budgetary pressure that the EU faces. The 
authors note that in  the long term, alignment with the acquis will be associated 
with prescribed EU economic policies which, together with deteriorating socio-
eco conditions and the budgetary constraints of most Mediterranean  states, will 
make this mission an impossible  one (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, p.35).  
Dondini and Fantini, (p.12, 2006) note that a number of limits are evident with 
regard to the objective of promoting economic reform and the ability of ENP to 
sustain economic convergence and legislative approximation in the neighbouring 
states. They conclude that, ultimately, the ENP’s fate will depend on the extent to 
which the incentives put forward compare to the costs of meeting the 
benchmarks and conditions that the EU sets (Dondini and Fantini, 2006, p.530).  
Emerson, Noutcheva & Popescu, (2007, p.6) argue that ENP has strong 
normative implications and that the policy emphasizes a value driven logic in the 
EU to export democracy and influence reform in human rights. Yet, they add, the 
ENP manifest an element of self-interest driven primarily by the quest for 
security (Emerson, Noutcheva & Popescu, 2007, pp.5-6). They add (ibid.) that the 
ENP lacks the membership perspective which by default, changes the nature of 
the EU’s involvement. Without a credible and tangible incentive, the application 
of conditionality becomes much more difficult to practice. In fact, the pre-
conditions for successful conditionality as we know them from the enlargement 
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context are absent in the neighbourhood. Under the framework of the ENP, the 
potential rewards are seen as neither sizable, nor credible, nor achievable within 
the foreseeable future, and the conditions on which they would be delivered are 
neither precise nor clearly set (Emerson, Noutcheva & Popescu, 2007, p.8).  
Similarly, Smith (p.764, 2005) notes that the benefits of ENP are very vaguely 
summarised and are not directly linked to objectives and priorities set in the 
documents. Moreover, the author adds that how progress will be judged remains 
unclear (ibid.).   
The above review has focused on the main aspects of the ENP from the rationale 
of its formulation to the implementation logic and guiding principles. In regard to 
the principles of differentiation and joint ownership, most of the authors 
referenced above seem to agree on the innovative aspects they could bring to the 
ENP. On paper at least, both these principles address some of the shortcomings 
identified in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and seem to 
point to a more selective cooperation process based on shared interests. Much 
criticism has also been expressed over the capacity of the EU to promote political 
reforms, particularly in the fields of democratisation and human rights. A 
number of arguments presented above in fact, criticise the policy logic and the 
benchmarking mechanisms that is at the heart of the implementation process. 
Consequently, questions have also been raised with regards to the capacity of the 
EU to consistently and seriously apply positive and negative conditionality under 
the ENP. The application of conditionality is linked directly to the incentive on 
offer and under the ENP the latter seems to be substantially weak and not clearly 
articulated. What has been missing for the above review however, is empirical 
evidence for the implementation process and how the ENP actually works on the 
ground. It remains unclear from the literature reviewed what are the challenges 
for the implementation process and for the application of conditionality for 
instance. Importantly, what are partners’ perceptions of the policy and of 
principles of differentiation and joint ownership? 
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Security and values in the ENP: implications for EU external 
behaviour?   
 
Although shared values are difficult to define, we need to broaden our 
understanding of the concept beyond its more conventional definition of human 
rights, democracy, good governance and the rule of law to include values such as 
security and stability. From the literature reviewed above we can observe that 
the concept of shared values including security and stability is implied, rather 
than explicitly articulated. Security and stability however, are central objectives 
of the ENP which can be seen to complement the objectives of economic and 
political integration.  
Biscop (2005, p.1) for instance, defines the ENP as part of the wider security 
framework of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and as a policy that has 
implications for the role of the EU as global and regional actor. The author argues 
(Biscop, 2004, p.2) that in the Mediterranean in particular, the EU deems it has a 
specific responsibility for peace and security, and aspires to a directly leading 
role. Biscop (2004, p.5) believes that the ENP could succeed where EMP has 
failed, specifically in achieving an area of shared prosperity and values and in 
creating close partnerships and relations which will lead to shared responsibility 
for conflict prevention in the region. According to Biscop (2004, p.5), the ENP has 
five key objectives: 1) conflict prevention and 2) conflict management, 3) 
establishing closer economic and political partnerships based on shared values, 
prosperity and security, 4) more control over migration and organized crime, 5) 
protecting EU citizens abroad. The ENP is thus seen as having a stabilizing and 
preventive scope (ibid.).   
Bremberg Heijl (2007, p.2) also focuses on EU interests and Mediterranean 
security and in his analysis. Bremberg Heijl argues (2007, p.7) that with regards 
to the Mediterranean, we need to investigate  two separate security complexes: 
one under the title of ‘EU Regional Security Complex’ characterised  by members 
states and supranational institutions and another, the ‘Middle Eastern Regional 
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Security Complex’ defined as state-centric and more susceptible to military-
political conflict formation (Bremberg Heijl, 2007, p.7).9 In discussing and 
comparing European efforts through the EMP and the ENP, the author notes 
(Bremberg Heijl, 2007, p.10) that the constraints that were inherent to the EMP 
might be alleviated by the new policy framework. However, the narrow focus of 
the ENP suggests that the EU will not be able to develop a coherent, coordinated, 
and realistic policy towards the Mediterranean.  
 
Dannreuther (2006, p.197) argues that in explaining EU external behaviour, 
strategic concerns are predominant over the normative agenda. In particular, he 
notes that the Union’s energy dependence on its neighbourhood might explain 
Brussels’s relative acquiescence to authoritarian regimes in North Africa 
(Dannreuther, 2006, p.197-8). The author notes that the ENP raises the issue of 
EU grand strategy as the policy reaffirms Europe’s conviction in liberal-
democratic values in its external behaviour. Dannreuther (2006, p.201) adds that 
the EU needs to be braver in promoting its transformative agenda with security 
issues such as immigration, terrorism and energy. He concludes that without this 
conceptualisation, the ENP transformative potential, and the EU’s ambitions to 
be a serious global actor, will be greatly reduced (Dannreuther, 2006, p.201), 
thus linking EU security to values and potential implications for EU external 
behaviour and credibility.  
 
From this perspective, Del Sarto & Schumacher (2005, p.27) argue that the ENP 
has flagged a shift in the way the EU behaves regionally. They note that 
enlargement has resulted in a re-evaluation of EU relations in the region and a 
reassessment of its capabilities. Importantly, enlargement has also changed the 
way the EU perceives itself regionally and internationally10 (Del Sarto & 
Schumacher, 2005, p.27). Del Sarto (p.68, 2007) argues that the EU has taken a 
                                                          
9 See Buzan et al: 1998 
10 Theoretically we find evidence of this in the centre-periphery approach of the ENP as opposed to the south-north and south-
south approach of the EMP. This is clearly much more assertive and confident EU behaviour/policy in the regional/international 
arena, albeit still predominately soft, civilian and normative (Del Sarto &Schumacher, 2005, p.27).  
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more ambitious and assertive role in the Mediterranean with the ENP despite the 
challenges Brussels face in terms of its credibility as an impartial broker in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  
 
The latter point is an important one with regards to EU credibility in the region 
and in Egypt in particular. It raises the need to analyse the concept of EU 
credibility in international relations in general and the challenges associated 
with the promotion of human rights and democracy under the ENP. Former 
Commissioner Prodi stated that the ENP’s goal was to “extend a set of principles, 
values and standards which define the very essence of the EU” (Quoted in 
Bogutcaia, Bosse & Schmidt-Felzmann, 2006, p.120).  Using the term ‘extending’ 
here implies a degree of credibility in foreign policy in order to be able to 
transfer values, standards and principles to third party.  
 
Emerson et al. (2005, p.176) note that the ENP clearly appears to be formulated 
along the same normative foundations and normative framework as the 
accession process. They add that these foundations may vary between them in 
intensity of pressures and incentives for compliance but that in all cases, the 
policy documents give first place to the objective of convergence on democratic 
values and the rule of law (Emerson et al., 2005, p.176). Notwithstanding the 
differences in intensity and pressure for compliance with EU norms, the primary 
objective of the ENP is achieving convergence and proximity with EU institutions 
and values through the processes of approximation and convergence. In terms of 
visualising these differences in intensity and pressure to adopt and align with EU 
norms and value, Emerson et al. (2007, p.176) notes that Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement Processes could be considered a first derivate from 
accession, while the ENP can be seen as second derivate, even though accession 
prospects are not included in the latter.  
It is evident from the section above that the difficulty in undertaking the analysis 
in this study is the multi-dimensional nature of the ENP and, as we will see, the 
extent of the areas and sectors covered by the policy.  As outlined above, the ENP 
is a policy that promotes reforms and transformation across a variety of sectors 
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and through a number of instruments. The ENP objectives, in fact, cover 
economic development and reforms, democratisation, good governance and 
security amongst others.  Theoretically, we could conceptualise the ENP from 
different perspectives, each emphasising specific assumptions and motivations 
in the pursuit of these objectives. For instance, the conventional explanation of 
the policy would focus on EU normative power thesis and argue for a degree of 
ethical motivations in EU external relations in its neighbourhood (Manners: 
2002). This thesis would naturally overlap with liberal and institutional 
explanations, albeit with clear ontological differences. From a security 
perspective, the ENP could be evaluated from an instrumental and self-
interested approach such as the pursuit of power. Therefore, in order to have a 
comprehensive and well-rounded and holistic picture of the dynamics that 
characterise the implementation of the ENP in Egypt, this study will adopt an 
eclectic theoretical framework. The various theoretical perspectives are needed 
to help us better understand EU behaviour and the implementation of the ENP in 
Egypt from different perspectives, but also because theoretical eclecticism will 
allow us to focus on assumptions and motivations in different policy-cycles and 
different sectors. That said, it is important to note that despite the theoretical 
variation, the relevance of norms and the associated process of normative 
transfer will be considered as a common and constant assumption. In this regard 
and borrowing from the school of European Studies, the concept of 
Europeanisation will prove to be a useful tool both theoretically and analytically.  
EUROPEANISATION 
 
Devoid of the membership ‘carrot’ but similar to enlargement policy, the ENP 
offers incentives to partners in return for demonstrating shared values, 
implementing domestic reforms and harmonising domestic legislation with parts 
of the EU aquis (Commission, 2003, p.4). This process is also known in the 
literature as Europeanisation and is based on a benchmarked approach. 
Traditionally, the process of Europeanisation is associated with the process of 
integration applied to accession countries, (Shimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2005, p.5-6; Featherstone, 2003, p.3). Therefore, Europeanisation implies a 
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degree of change or/and domestic transformation attributed to EU intervention 
and interaction with partner states and, thus, is considered a central theoretical 
and analytical tool in the context of this study.  
 
The definitions of Europeanisation remains problematic, having taken various 
forms in the literature. This is even more the case when applied to EU external 
relations rather than internal-integration processes. Europeanisation has been 
defined narrowly as the adoption and implementation of EU legislation. More 
broadly, it has involved explanations of policy transfer and institutional learning, 
having been conceptualised as the up-loading by member states of norms, values 
and interests towards EU institutions and also as the down-loading of EU 
regulations and instructional structures to the domestic level (Howell, 2002, 
pp.2-6). Emerson (2004, p.2) defines Europeanisation as the process of political, 
economic and societal transformation involved in European integration. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005, p.7) define Europeanisation as a process 
in which states adopt EU rules. Others, such as Börzel (2009, p.2), define the 
concept as the impact of the Union on politics, polity and policies of non-Member 
states,  while Barbé et al. (2008, p.1) have simply put it as the EU’s capacity to 
promote change beyond its borders. The process of Europeanisation has been at 
the heart of enlargement policy and is bound to the role of the EU as a regional 
and international actor.  
Wong (2006) has categorised Europeanisation under the following three schools 
of thought: national adaptation, national projection and identity construction 
(Wong, 2006, p.7). The national adaptation school argues for a process of 
transformation of national foreign policies as a result of EU norms and practices, 
ultimately manifested by the re-orientation of foreign policy by member states 
towards the EU (Wong, 2006, p.7). This school of Europeanisation is mainly 
associated with institutionalist explanations and is seen as a top-down process. It 
thus implies a degree of foreign policy convergence both in substance and 
process (Wong, 2006, p.8), considering adaptation by member states within the 
constraints of EU structures. The second school, national projection, 
conceptualises member states as the primary agents of change and as proactive 
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actors in the promoting process, projecting their preferences, policy ideas and 
models to the European Union (Wong, 2006, pp.8-9). This bottom-up approach 
allows us to consider the impact of certain member states on the nature and 
shape of EU policies such as the ENP and, allows us to identify why and how 
some member states can benefit from projecting their interests at the EU level. 
This school of Europeanisation has many similarities with inter-governmental 
explanations of EU integration and rests on rationalist and self-interested 
assumptions. Finally, the third school associated with constructivist 
Europeanisation theories emphasises the role of European institutions in 
shaping the preferences and politics of member states (Wong, 2006, p.10). This 
approach rests on the assumptions related to processes of socialisation of 
political elites through increased dialogue and interaction between member 
states and EU officials, bureaucratic re-organisation and institutional 
concentration (Wong, 2006, p.10). For the purpose of this study the first and 
third models will be the most relevant to the analysis in so far that they will 
allow us to identify and trace the promotion of specific norms by the EU and the 
eventual adoption by Egypt, following a top-down and institutional perspective.  
For Emerson et al. (2005, p.169), the conceptualisation of the EU as a set of 
values, norms and institutions implies a strong presence of normative and 
democratic elements in the process of Europeanisation, one that is directly 
linked to the empowerment of European institutions and  to the nature of the 
Union as a polity in international relations. According to Emerson (2004, p.2), 
Europeanisation works in three domains, with changes seen to take place 
through: 1) legal obligations in the political and economic domains of states 
willing to join the EU, as well as membership in the Council of Europe and 
adherence to its Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 2) 
objective changes  in economic structures and interests as a result of EU 
membership and 3) subjective changes in beliefs, interests, identity and 
expectations of individuals (Emerson, 2004, p.2).  Emerson (2004) argues that 
Europeanisation provides the explanation for the success of enlargement policy 
and for the application of mechanisms favourable to the development and 
enhancement of economic and democratic transitions, i.e. the transformative 
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capacity of the EU. However, it is worth remembering that although the ENP is 
conceptualised as following the same policy-logic and with a similar ‘tool-box’ as 
enlargement, it lacks the fundamental incentive of eventual membership. 
Focusing on the ENP, Börzel (2009, p.2) notes that the impact of 
Europeanisation--the impact of the EU on partners’ domestic structures--is 
differentiated. According to the author (Börzel, 2009, p.6), effective impact 
depends on three key factors emanating from the domestic environment: 1) the 
costs of adaptation, 2) the capacity and 3) the willingness of domestic actors to 
deal with these costs. Although the costs of adaptation constitute a challenge to 
all domestic actors, capacity and willingness to respond will vary (ibid.). Börzel 
(2009, p.7) notes that with regards to the neighbourhood countries in particular, 
the impact of Europeaninsation will be highly dependent on the democratic 
quality of the regime. The less democratic and weaker a state, the higher the 
costs of Europeaninsation and the lower the capacity and willingness of 
governmental and other actors to deal with them. In this context, the capacity of 
the state and non-state actors “[P]lays a crucial role in mitigating the 
transformative power of Europe” (Börzel, 2009, p.7). From this perspective, we 
could argue that the effective process and mechanisms of socialisation depend 
on the willingness of partner states to align and/or converge domestic policies 
with those of the EU. Hence, not only do partner states find themselves 
constrained in their choices in terms of capacity and costs (rational 
explanations) but also in terms of  the degree of democracy, making the 
internalisation of certain values and norms crucial.  Börzel (2009) explicitly 
points to the role of state and non-state actors in mitigating the transformative 
power of the EU.  
Focusing on Central and Eastern Europe, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005, 
pp.7-8) differentiate between the degree of rule adoption in the process of 
Europeanisation. They note (ibid.) that formal, behavioural and discursive 
conceptions of rule adoption all constitute an indication of rule-conforming 
behaviour. The authors introduce three explanatory models for rule adoption, 
each underpinned by either a rationalist or a sociological explanation. The EU-
induced model (external incentives model) is characterised by an active and EU-
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driven rule adoption rationale which aims to capture the dynamics of 
conditionality and cost-benefit calculations. A second model (social learning 
model) considers alternative explanations for rule adoption such as internalised 
identities, values and norms, emphasising the identification of non-member 
states with the EU (Shimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p.9). This distinction 
between the two models above is one which reflects the debate between 
rationalists and constructivists with regards to the logics of action followed in 
rule adoption (Shimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p.9). Finally, a third model 
(lesson-drawing model) emphasises rule adoption as a remedy to the domestic 
needs and policy challenges of non-EU members. This explanation differs from 
the first in that it is not EU-induced and does not follow a cost-benefit logic but a 
need-based one (Shimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p.10).  
For Barbé et al. (2008, p.8) Europeanisation refers to the adoption by 
neighbouring partners of 1) parts of the aquis communitaire, 2) specific and 
problem-oriented aspects of the aquis politique and 3) norms of a constitutive 
nature related to EU human rights, economic and social rights.  The authors 
justify this narrow definition by pointing out the dangers of considering “[A]ll 
EU-driven transfers of rules and practices as Europeanisation” (ibid.). Barbé, et 
al. (2008, pp.8-9)  add that the regional promotion of economic, political and 
social values also happens through other actors and international organisations, 
stressing that the use of the term Europeanisation  should be confined to cases in 
which we can identify well-codified EU norms and practices adopted by 
neighbours. For the authors (Barbé et al., 2008, pp.8-9) Europeanisation is seen 
as a ‘one-way street’ relationship in which the EU exports the products of 
integration. In this sense, the role of the EU as a carrier of ideas and ideals 
(integration and shared experience) acts as a model or a normative template for 
non-EU states (Barbé, 2008, p.9). 
Escribano (2006) on the other hand focuses on the ENP in the Mediterranean 
and conceptualises Europeanisation as ‘Europeanisation without Europe’ since 
the prospect of membership is not on offer. Escribano (2006) works from a 
political-economy perspective and analyses the viability of the policy’s offer to 
partners in the Mediterranean. Essentially, he poses the question of whether 
47 
 
access to the European Single Market is a realistic offer, considering the politico-
economic environment of Mediterranean partner countries. Moreover, Escribano 
(2006) questions the conceptualisation of Europeanisation in the ENP states as 
practically a process of (economic) modernisation. The author notes (Escribano, 
2006, p.15) that the ‘Europeanisation of economics’ in southern Mediterranean 
states is not easily attainable since the ENP has failed  so far to mobilise 
positively domestic leaderships and societies in their demand for convergence 
with EU law and economic institutions. The incentives offered within the current 
ENP structure are seen as little more than cosmetic with regards to key sectors. 
The sectors of agriculture and manufacturing, for example, remain areas of great 
contention between the EU and Mediterranean non-member countries as 
concerns remain in Brussels regarding the impact of increased competition on 
some EU member states. Even though the various EU Association Agreements 
with Mediterranean partners have contained provisions to incrementally open 
the EU markets to competition, member states’ interests and policies such as the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have limited the potential beneficial impacts 
of preferential tariffs in sectors which MNC consider as key for their economy 
(Gomez and Christou, 2004, p.191; Parfitt, 1997, p.866-79; Licari, 1997, p.29). 
Escribano (2006, p.15) remains skeptical of implementation of economic 
reforms and across-the-board liberalization, arguing that the exporting of 
economic institutions is not a mechanical process, but rather a context-related 
one that follows path-dependency.  
For our purpose, the concept of Europeanisation will be conceptualised as the 
impact of the EU policies on a partner’s domestic, sector-specific environment. 
Hence, with regards to the implementation of the ENP in Egypt, Europeanisation 
will be seen as top-down process for domestic change and transformation by 
focusing on the ENP as the primary policy-instrument in the transfer of EU 
norms, values, practices and institutions, i.e. the independent variable.  
Borrowing from Börzel (2009) and Shimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), the 
domestic environment will provide us much of the explanation for the degree of 
Europeanisation and the motives for its adoption or the lack of adoption.  
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Norms, conditionality and socialisation  
Europeanisation can be conceptualised as the transfer of certain EU values, 
norms and ideas. Emerson et al. (2005, pp.175-6) points to the Europeanisation 
model as underpinned by two mechanisms for the transfer of norms:  
conditionality and socialisation. Theoretically, conditionality and socialisation 
can be respectively related to two different approaches and explanations of 
change: rational explanations and sociological explanations (Emerson, 2004, 
p.2). In the first instance and through policies of conditionality, change can be 
conceptualised as exogenously imposed or as a result of an influencing agency. 
Here, change is expected to take place in the short and/or medium term and 
based on rational cost-benefit calculations of the policy-recipients. Social 
learning or socialisation on the other hand, implies long-term changes which 
affect individuals’ identity and interests and, consequently, their behaviour 
(Emerson, 2004, p.2). In both cases, change will result from a process of transfer 
and one of adoption, be it as a result of cost-benefit calculations or because 
agents have been socialised into identifying with a specific norm.  The nature of 
these norms becomes a key factor for understanding the mechanisms for 
transfer and adoption. Although both conditionality and socialisation are seen as 
simultaneously at work in the process of Europeanisation, their fundamental 
assumptions and, thus, respective explanations of  EU transformative power are 
contested in International Relations literature, the main distinction being 
ontological and related to assumptions of constitutive relations in the latter and 
of casual explanations in the former.  
Norms  
Defining specific values and norms can be a complex matter but is an essential 
exercise for the purposes of this project. We have seen that the process of 
Europeanisation is conceptualised as producing changes in various domestic 
domains such as the political, the social and the economic but also as producing 
subjective changes within individuals’ interests and identities (Emerson, 2004, 
p.2).  The conventional definition of a norm is “an accepted standard or way of 
behaviour” (Cambridge Dictionary). Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. (1998, pp.891-
2) note that there are three types of norms: 1) Regulative norms, which are seen 
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as constraining  behaviour, 2) constitutive norms, which are seen as creating 
new actors/interest/categories for action and finally, 3) evaluative/prescriptive 
norms. The first two types of norms could be related to various legislative 
obligations and changes, economic policies and structural reforms. The third 
type of norms are seen as different as it is precisely their quality of oughtness 
that sets them apart from other rules (Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K., 1998, pp.891-
2). Because they also involve a standard of proper/prescriptive behaviour, 
evaluative/prescriptive norms have to be discussed by taking into account their 
inter-subjective and evaluative dimensions (ibid.).   
One could argue that the adoption of the first two types of norms are more easily 
explained through a rational-choice framework, while the third type falls under 
the framework of sociological constructivism. Although the latter are the most 
difficult to evaluate, they  are central to the analysis in this study in so far as they 
relate to debates surrounding the nature and impact of identity in EU external 
behaviour. In this context and particularly with regards to the ENP, Bretherton 
and Vogler (2004, p.2) note that constructivism is particularly appropriate to the 
study of the norms and values and their impact to external behaviour since the 
focus is on shared understandings which, shift and are susceptible to change. 
This becomes essential as the Union can also be seen as a political system under 
construction and, hence, under constant change (Bretherton and Vogler, 2004, 
p.2). The authors note that the focus on identity in constructivist analyses 
facilitates study of the EU as an actor sui generis, thus avoiding (implicit or 
explicit) reference to the state as comparator when studying EU policy 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2004, p.2). The authors note that the interaction 
between values, identities and interests are never simple or linear but that, 
rather than determining interest, identities perform a mediating function 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2004, p. 8). They add that identity is influential in 
shaping EU action and offering, or circumscribing, the roles available to the 
Union as an actor (Bretherton and Vogler 2004, p.9). They conclude that the 
hybrid identity of the Union will expectedly produce inconsistencies of role and 
behaviour and add that:   
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“Through its practices, [the EU] maintains links between the exclusive and the 
inclusive facet of its identity—demonstrating for example, a comprehensive 
approach to security and using its economic power to impose conditionality in the 
sphere of human rights and environmental protection” (Bretherton and Vogler, 
2004, p.39).   
 
Bogutcaia, Bosse & Schimdt-Felzmann (2006, p.118) also write from a social 
constructivist approach, focusing on the different meanings given to European 
values by partners countries, specifically in the field of democratisation and 
human rights. The authors reject the idea of fixed European values and question 
the extent to which neighbouring states are in fact willing to subscribe to the 
Union’s set of shared values (Bogutcaia, Bosse & Schmidt-Felzmann, 2006, 
p.117). The authors look at discourse not as a reflexive of some external political 
reality but rather, as constitutive and whereby European values are formed 
through speech acts; these acts are talked and written into existence by their 
respective political elites (ibid.).  
With regards to the first two types of norms, EU-Egyptian relations, for instance, 
are legally based on the framework of the Association Agreement (AA) which 
explicitly includes regulative and constitutive norms related to the establishment 
of a regional free trade area (FTA) based on reciprocal tariff liberalisation for 
both industry and agriculture. Importantly, Art. 2 (AA) also includes prescriptive 
norms by stating that:  
“Relations between the Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, 
shall be based on respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights 
as set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which guides their 
internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this 
Agreement” (EU-Egypt Association Agreement, 2004, p.5).  
Conditionality 
Conditionality is a central concept for the identification and analysis of 
normative transfer. The concept rests primarily on rational, cost-benefit 
calculations and explanations of norms adoptions.  Even though conditionality 
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has been traditionally associated with aid assistance, since the end of the Cold 
War it has taken a more politico-normative dimension.  Stokke (1995, p.2) notes 
that conditionality is not an objective per se but rather an instrument used by 
donors to achieve certain foreign policy objectives. First generation 
conditionality refers to the promotion of economic reforms and initiatives by 
international financial institutions (IFIs) aimed at structural adjustment and 
market liberalisation, also referred to as technical conditionality. Second 
generation conditionality on the other hand, refers to the promotion of political 
reforms  and generally to policies aimed at promoting democratisation, good 
governance and the respect of human rights (Stokke, 1995, p.1). There are 
various levels of intervention through conditionality which range from high to 
low politics, i.e. they include both technical and political conditionality (Stokke, 
1995, pp.14-5).  
We could argue that the implementation of the EU agenda in the Mediterranean 
and particularly with regards to Egypt is mainly based on the exercise of 
conditionality and correlates with the objectives of the AP and the ENP in 
general. In fact, according to the EU-Egypt Action Plan: 
“The level of ambition of the EU-Egypt relationship, […] will depend on the degree 
of commitment to common values as well as the implementation of jointly agreed 
priorities to mutual benefits” (European Commission, 2007b, p.2).  
Under the title shared values the Commission specifically included: democracy, 
the respect of human rights and the rule of law, as set out within the EU in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (2003, p. 4). As we have seen, the ENP offers 
incentives such as a stake in the EU’s internal market and closer economic and 
political cooperation, conditional to progress on set benchmarks.   
The implementation of the EEAP, moreover, envisages the exercise of both first 
and second generation conditionality across sectors and levels. Smith (1997, p.4) 
notes that political conditionality entails the linking by a state (or by 
international institutions) of perceived benefits to the fulfilment of conditions 
relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic 
principles. Smith (1997, p.4) distinguished between positive and negative 
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conditionality as the reward for progress achieved in the former and the 
suspension and/or termination of benefits for lack of progress in the latter. Thus, 
within the framework of the ENP the EU exercises positive conditionality 
following a benchmarking logic where benefits are not suspended or terminated 
in case of no progress. On the contrary, the policy is designed in order to reward 
individual progress by partner states and progressively increase incentives hand 
in hand with domestic reforms achieved. 
Rationalist approaches to norm adoption are concerned with cost-benefit 
calculations that will eventually inform the adoption (or not) of a norm. From a 
rationalist perspective norms are seen as constraining the behaviour of actors 
and influencing their potential incentives (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, pp. 
909-912; Checkel, 1997, p.473). Schimmelfennig et al. (2006, pp.2-6) have 
defined international socialisation as a process in which states are induced to 
adopt rules of an international community. The notion of rule adoption is 
conceptualised here as the ability of the state and its institutions to impose 
domestic compliance with norms (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006, p.2). State 
behaviour is seen as constrained by international value-based norms of state 
legitimacy and proper state conduct. Rational-selfish state actors are seen to 
conform in order to reap the benefits of international legitimacy and, as 
instrumental actors, they are also seen as calculating the domestic  
disadvantages of conformity in an attempt to minimise them. Hence, according to 
the author (Shimmelfennig, 2000, p.9), international socialisation can be 
explained without having to assume the identification of actors with an 
international society (sociological constructivism) or the individual 
internalisation of norms, but rather through a rational cost-benefit calculation of 
norms adoption. Conditionality is central to this approach, since material and 
political incentives, as well as domestic costs, become the most important 
conditions for the effective impact of socialising agency (in the field of 
democracy for example) (Schimmelfennig, et al., 2006, p.6).   
It is important at this stage to take into account the structural underpinnings of  
EU-Egyptian relations when addressing debates on conditionality and adoption 
of norms. There is little doubt that EU-Egyptian relations are characterised by a 
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degree of asymmetry and dependency. Economically, Egypt relies heavily on its 
trade relations with the EU due to the size and importance of the latter as an 
economic bloc, as well as to its geographical proximity. Since the adoption of the 
Association Agreement in 2004 trade flows between the EU-Egypt have doubled 
to reach €20 billion in 2008. Today the EU is the primary trading partner of 
Egypt, accounting for 34% of all Egyptian trade (EC Delegation, Cairo). Politically, 
this asymmetry and dependency is less explicit, but present nevertheless. 
However, the capacity (and the willingness) of the EU to exercise political 
conditionality in the case of Egypt is much less obvious. Although Art.2 (AA) is 
very explicit on the nature of EU relations with third parties, it must be noted 
that it has never been invoked in the past.   
Exercising political conditionality poses a number of problems. Emerson et al. 
(2007, pp.20-1) note that without credible or clear incentives, applying political 
conditionality becomes increasingly difficult. High costs of adaptation and low 
incentives can combine to make the proposed alignment of policy, polity and 
politics (Börzel: 2009) too costly to sustain for both neighbouring states and 
societies (Emerson et al., 2007, p.6). Applying political conditionality also raises 
issues of legitimacy, since the process could be interpreted as interference with 
domestic affairs and as a challenge to state sovereignty (Smith, 1997, pp.4-5; 
Stokke, 1995, pp.34-6). Therefore, the objectives of conditionality may vary 
according to the levels of operation. The degree of donor’s legitimacy and 
credibility is also central to effective conditionality as some objectives related to 
the development agenda, for example, might be or be seen as being more 
legitimate than those seemingly reflecting or relating to the donor’s  interests 
and values (Stokke, 1995, p.15; Emerson et al., 2007, p.20).  Thus, thinking of 
conditionality in terms of a process for the adoption of certain norms requires 
that the distinction between the type of norms in question (regulatory, 
constitutive and prescriptive norms) be clarified (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 
pp.891-2).  
Following Shimmelfennig’s (2000, 2005, 2006) conceptualisation of norm- and 
rule-adoption, the formulation and implementation of new legislation--as well as 
the creation of new institutions can be used as indicators in this regard. In fact, 
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the Commission’s annual report on the implementation of the ENP relies 
precisely on new legislation and legislative reforms, along with the 
establishment of new institutions as indicators (see Guidelines on the ENP 
Report). In this context, the Action Plan (AP) with Egypt could be conceptualised 
as a long to-do list which includes the formulation of new legislation and 
reforms, as well as the formation of new institutions in various areas, from the 
economic to the political and the social. Let us not forget that the EEAP has 160 
priorities for action’ which cannot all be addressed simultaneously and, thus, 
should be considered in the process of evaluation. As stated by an EU official:  
“The EEAP is a  large shopping list with around 160 priorities, which is the same 
as having no priorities at all […] common practice is to choose and to focus only 
on 2 priorities in the NIP” (Personal communication, N.14, 2009). 
Implementing the priorities outlined in the document results in both benefits 
and costs for a country like Egypt. In the economic domain, for example, the 
Egyptian government’s monetary and fiscal policy is encouraged to reflect neo-
liberal norms and practices such as improving macroeconomic stability and 
reducing its public deficit figures (European Commission, 2007b, pp.21-2). This 
has resulted in governmental measures to reduce fuel and food subsidies in 
2008, which, according to the Commission’s Annual Report on the 
implementation of the AP, is seen as a positive development (2008, p.10). 
Domestically, however, these fiscal measures resulted in the abolition of 
subsidised bakeries and, for the poorest sections of society, it meant unexpected 
bread shortages sparking the so-called ‘bread riots’ in 2008 in the vast majority 
of Egyptian cities (El-Sayed, 2008). This example is very useful in identifying a 
number of issues related to the domestic costs of norm adoption. Firstly, 
although a norm might be adopted by the political elite, it might still find strong 
resistance from the wider population and within the wider political system. 
Secondly, the political costs related to the bread riots in Egypt are not simply 
domestic. Although the legitimacy and the democratic nature of the government 
were questioned domestically, thus giving a strong platform for political 
opposition, such actions have also potential implications beyond domestic 
stability that concern Egypt’s regional and international role and reputation. 
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Finally, costs that might arise from the adoption of specific norms within the 
economic domain easily spill over into the political arena with unpredictable 
consequences.  
Socialisation  
From a sociological perspective, the process of norms transfer and adoption is 
defined as:  
“The process by which principled ideas held by individuals become norms in the 
sense of collective understandings about appropriate behaviour which then leads 
to changes in identities, interests and behaviour” (Risse and Sikkink, 1999, p.11).  
Socialisation or social learning refers to the process whereby agents’ preferences 
and interests change through interaction with other agents (Checkel, 2001, 
p.220), not by enforcement through incentives. The process of socialisation is 
mainly concerned with the effect of prescriptive norms on the formation of 
preference within actors. Of interest from this perspective is the notion of 
oughtness associated with norms and the effects that norms have on shaping 
identities and consequently behaviour11 (Checkel, 1997, 1999; Finnemore and 
Sikkink: 1998, Risse and Sikkink, 1999).  Key factors at the heart of the process of 
socialisation are language and communication, particularly insofar as these are 
used as the mechanisms of persuasion and argumentation.12 Checkel (2001, 
p.221) notes that argumentative persuasion is a social process of interaction that 
involves changing attitudes and preferences in the absence of coercion: the 
process of convincing someone - i.e. changing their ideas, beliefs and preferences 
- based on principled and argumentative persuasion. With regards to 
Europeanisation, Checkel notes (2001, p.225) that is the quality of the contact 
with institutions such as the Commission which renders socialisation possible 
and not merely the quantity of such contact.  Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K., 1998, 
                                                          
11 This explanation follows the sequencing ‘spiral model’ for norms diffusion advocated by Risse and Sikkink (1998, pp.4-9).  
12 The former can also take the form of manipulative persuasion as opposed to argumentative persuasion and is clearly devoid 
of socialisation and has been used by ration-choice scholars under the umbrella of strategic socialisation  (Checkel, 2001, 
p.221).   
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pp.891-2) argue that norms can be identified only indirectly as we can recognise 
norm-breaking behaviour and norm-conforming behaviour. The element of 
oughtness in norms however, helps us identify justifications for 
actions/behaviour and leaves a trail of communication amongst actors that we 
can study (Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K., 1998, p.892). The authors add that as we 
endeavour to study the impact/effect of norms on state behaviour, we must 
operationalise a norm as distinct from the behaviour/actions (state and non-
state) that is desired to explain. In order to evaluate/examine by how many 
actors and, in which conditions norms are accepted, we need to analyse the 
agreement process of actors in the life cycle of norms. The authors argue that we 
can identify a tipping point beyond which norms are more easily agreed and 
accepted (Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K., 1998, p.892). Similarly to Finemore and 
Sikkink (1998) Mauersberger (2006, p.2) adopts a spiral model for the study of 
the promotion of human rights in Egypt by focusing on the EMP.  
The ENP’s institutional structure, with its various joint committees and the 
intensified and systematic interaction between partners, seems to be ideal for 
the promoting the process of socialisation. Kelly (2006, p.44), in fact, argues that 
socialisation is a main feature of the ENP, as it was in other contexts for 
enlargement, adding that the emphasis in the ENP is heavily on soft-diplomacy 
and on contacts at multiple levels. Hence, the promotion of certain EU norms, 
values and practices within the ENP could also be seen as linked to or a derivate 
of an institutional learning process and institutional path dependency. In this 
context, the sub-committees could be conceptualised as issue-specific forums 
aimed at increasing the quality of dialogue and communication between policy 
experts and officials from both the EU and partner states. The quality of this 
interaction could be evaluated in terms of the depth of issues covered by the sub-
committees. Moreover, the incremental inclusion of issues such as democracy 
and human rights within the framework of the political sub-committee within 
the framework of EU relations is evidence that a degree of argumentative 
persuasion has already produced results.  For Egypt, for example, the political 
sub-committee marks a new level of openness in its dialogue with the EU as 
discussion over the above-mentioned issues is considered acceptable and no 
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longer deemed as interference in domestic affairs. However, the degree to which 
these specific norms are imbedded in society or internalised by Egyptian elites 
remains to be evaluated.  
The Europeanisation of values and identity in EU external behaviour: 
An argument for normative power Europe?  
Much has been written on the developing nature of the EU in international 
politics and on its approach to external relations. What seems to emerge is the 
understanding that the EU is a distinct polity in world politics characterised 
(arguably), by a normative agency. This conceptualisation of the EU implies a 
benign, ethical and normative actor. Explanations have ranged from definitions 
of a post-modern entity and polity (Cooper:1996), to arguments in favour of a 
shift in the nature and exercise of power in international relations, pointing to 
the soft and persuasive nature of the EU (Nye: 1997, 2004; Keohane and 
Nye:1989).  More recently, Manners (2002) elaborated on the concept of 
normative power Europe arguing for a constitutive, distinct and value-laden 
approach that seems to characterise EU behaviour internationally (Manners and 
Lucarelli: 2006). From a similar theoretical position others have since addressed 
the normative power paradigm and evaluated the notions of EU ‘actorness’ and 
of EU region-building or region-construction (Diez and Pace: 2007; Bretherton 
and Vogler:2006; Adler and Crawford: 2004). The notion of normative power 
Europe has also contributed to fuel the debate on the role of international 
institutions in the promotion of international norms and practices, the EU being 
the primary example (Finnemore and Sikkink:1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink: 
1999). From this perspective, the EU is seen as able set the criteria for would-be 
members of its selective club, e.g. democratic states with a good record in human 
rights (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink: 1999). Moreover, the study of the process of 
Europeanisation has given weight to the arguments in favor of the EU’s capacity 
to change would-be members in terms of their political and legislative systems 
and, in turn, sparked debates regarding the development of European normative 
power (Noutcheva:2008; Pace:2007; Emerson, Noutcheva and Popescu:2007; 
Manners and Lucarelli:2006; Bicchi:2006; Bretherton and Vogler:2004; 
Manners:2002;).  
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The ENP, being a policy formulated and implemented on the same logic of 
enlargement, is central to the above debate. As Noutcheva (2008, p.3) notes: 
“The design and implementation of the enlargement policy by EU institutions can 
be viewed as an expression of the Union’s own identity”. As Emerson, Noutcheva 
and Popescu (2007, p.7) note, the ENP includes in its rationale and objectives 
both normative aspects, such as the apparent pre-conditions set to partners to 
demonstrate the acceptance of shared values in the politico-economic sphere 
and self-interest/strategic aspects such as the creation of a stable zone and a ring 
of friends. Hence, in terms of the benefits offered to partners, the ENP was not 
simply conceived to export some of the material benefits of the Union but also to 
export a set of democratic values and norms as well as institutional practices of 
governance.13 This implies a policy rationale which in essence conceptualizes EU 
interests as directly linked to its identity, one defined by very specific normative 
characteristics in international relations. Thus, the process of Europeanisation 
can be seen at the core of EU external policies and bound up with the role of the 
EU as a regional and international normative actor.  
  
THE CONTEXT AND RELEVANCE OF EGYPT AS A CASE-STUDY  
 
The choice of Egypt as a case-study was dictated by the country’s relevance to 
the EU both in theoretical and in geo-political terms. More importantly for this 
study, Egypt represents for the EU a complex and difficult example of bilateral 
relations under the framework of the ENP due to its domestic and regional role 
and history.  Egypt has held a leading role in the region due to its size and 
influence, particularly in modern times where Cairo was seen as the centre of 
and inspiration for Arab nationalism under the leadership of Nasser (1954-
1970). The Nasserist-era not only shook regional power dynamics at the time, 
                                                          
13 With regards to values underlining the process of Europeanisation, Emerson (2004, p.2) notes that although a definition 
remains “personalised”, a ‘list’ of ten values can be identified as European. These include: 1) democracy and human rights, 2) a 
common legal basis for the four freedoms, 3) social model, 4) multi-nationality and rejection of nationalism, 5) secular multi-
culturalism, 6) multi-tier governance, 7) multilateralism, 8) anti-hegemony and anti-militarism, 9) openness and 10) gradual and 
evolutionary frontiers for the EU (2004, p.3). See also Manners’ (2002, p.252) definition of EU constitutive values.  
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but could also be seen as having shaped Egyptian political culture at the time as 
well as the nature of the Egyptian state and state institutions to this date. From a 
theoretical perspective, then, Egypt provides a crucial testing ground for the EU 
normative power thesis. The centralised nature of the state, the power of 
particular institutions within it and the nature of the economy make Egypt an 
interesting case-study when evaluating the transformative power of the EU 
(ENP) as understood in this study, at policy, polity and politics levels. 
EU-Egyptian relations need to be evaluated in the context of domestic variables 
as well as regional dynamics.  Egypt plays an important geo-political regional 
role in both African affairs and in Middle Eastern politics, while for the EU Egypt 
is also seen as a Mediterranean country.  
Overview of Egypt’s environment 
Egypt is the most populous country of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region and is traditionally considered the cultural and political centre of the Arab 
world. The modern Egyptian regime was originally established following a 
military coup in 1952 under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The impact of 
Nasser’s nationalism and anti-imperialist discourse at the time engulfed most of 
the Middle East and parts of the Arab peninsula and, projected Egypt as the 
undisputed Arab regional leader. As Rogan (2009, p.289) notes: “No Arab leader 
has exercised such influence on the Arab stage before or since, and few would 
match Nasser’s impact on world affairs”. Nasser’s nationalism together with the 
historical place held by Egyptian civilisation has left a legacy within the current 
Egyptian political culture. Egyptian political elites have consistently displayed a 
rhetoric and behaviour reinforcing Cairo’s central role in both Middle Eastern 
and African politics according to their national role conception. It could be 
argued that Egypt has historically perceived itself the leader of the Arab 
moderate bloc and attempted to hold sole ownership in the process of mediating 
the Palestinian-Israeli issue.  
From 1979 up until the fall of the Mubarak regime, this has resulted in a foreign 
policy orientation which maintained a moderate line towards Israel and a pro-US 
and pro-Western stance while at the same time supporting Arab solidarity and 
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Arab regional identity (Dessouki, 2008, p.181). Mubarak’s foreign policy 
orientation was non-confrontational at the regional level and specifically focused 
on domestic national needs such as economic development and modernisation 
albeit, consistently aware of the implications of reforms for national security in 
the country (Dessouki, 2008, p.181). Policy orientation towards the EU has 
increasingly been primarily seen in terms of economic modernisation and 
integration in the global market, with less emphasis on political issues 
(Bayoumi:2007). In this context, US military and political support has been a 
crucial element for maintaining the political status quo within Egyptian politics.  
The legacy of Nasser’s nationalisation and centralised economy are seen to have 
contributed negatively to the pace of socio-economic development. It was 
President Sadat, in fact, who in the mid-1970s embarked on a slow process of 
policy-reversal through opening (infitah) in terms of public policy and 
international political economy. The Egyptian economy could be described as 
having developed over the years from a planned economy to one based on 
aspects of a rentier economy, its main GDP entries being from the Suez Canal, 
tourism and remittances from foreign workers. Under Mubarak, the economy 
transitioned into a semi-capitalist system characterised by clientelism and the 
blurring of lines between political and business elites (Soliman, 2011). Soliman 
argues (ibid.) that one of the motives for opening to the private sector in this way 
was the budgetary deficit since so many state resources under Mubarak were 
directed at maintaining the regime in power and at ensuring the survival of the 
Nasser state system from Islamist political challenges. Importantly, the advent of 
Nasser has made the military and security establishments two of the most 
powerful institutions in the Egyptian system. To this day the military controls a 
hefty portion of the Egyptian economy, remaining unchecked and fully 
independent of any scrutiny (Abul-Madg, 2013, p.2). The security establishment, 
on the other hand, has systematically played a crucial role in preventing political 
competition and, moreover, has been the main instrument for repression and 
control of Islamist political forces.  
Culturally, the country is the home of al-Azhar university, which is considered 
the hub of Sunni Islam and is the birthplace of influential figures such as Hassan 
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el-Banna and Sayyed Qutb, considered the founding fathers of political Islam 
(Kepel, 2002, pp.81-8). Importantly, the influence of Islamist opposition has been 
a constant variable in the domestic political scene, one that has been consistently 
dealt with by the authorities through systematic repression. As a result, the 
regime in Egypt has adopted an authoritarian style of ruling characterised by the 
lack of rotation of power and of shortcomings in the areas of democratisation, 
human rights and fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, 
organisation and to an extent, freedom of worship.  
In essence--and when looking at the potential for norms transfer and norms-
adoption--we need to look at the conditions present in Egypt which would 
facilitate and/or obstruct those processes. Importantly, the limitations of the 
space for norms transfer have also to be seen in the context of the link between 
domestic and regional dynamics. Two important points in this regard will be 
explored further below: the socio-economic challenge (demographic dimension) 
and the role of the military. Both can be seen as affecting the norms-promotion 
and adoption at a number of levels such as individual, socio-economic and 
political.   
Domestic political environment: the regime, the military and the 
businessmen 
The regime in Egypt under Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) can be defined simply as 
authoritarian (Kienle: 2000; Soliman: 2011). The term authoritarian applies 
because of the systematic tampering with elections by state organs, mainly the 
security apparatus, the extension of the state of emergency, the limits on 
freedom of expression and association and the systematic detention of bloggers 
and journalists and generally, the lack of any accountability by state organs to 
elected representative, but rather to the president who enjoys absolute power 
(Soliman, pp.25-26, 2011). Soliman (pp.25-30, 2011) defines authoritarian 
regimes as able to monopolise power both through repression and the security 
apparatus and through a clientelist system that controls and distribute most 
resources. As stated by Soliman (p.26, 2011): “The Egyptian authoritarian 
regime is based on violent instruments on the one hand and on soft mechanisms 
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on the other in its manipulation of power”. Authoritarianism is in fact, a constant 
variable from the 1952 revolution under Nasser, through Sadat and Mubarak. 
Although changes occurred with each president, the fundamental authoritarian 
nature of the regime in power remained unchanged (ibid.).  The clientelist nature 
of the Egyptian state also stems from the time of Nasser whereby resources were 
distributed to obtain political stability and establish a barter between social 
rights such as labour and health and the right of the state to provide them (ibid., 
p.27). Under Mubarak, we could argue that the same clientelist logic persisted 
but the barterer had changed from dealing with societal rights as expected under 
a pseudo-socialist regime, to dealing with a different clientele, the military, the 
security apparatus and the new capitalists.  
The arrival of Mubarak to the Presidency in the early 1980s coincided with the 
rise in influence of the Egyptian military (Abul-Magd, p.1, 2013).  The secrecy 
surrounding anything to do with the military in Egypt makes it difficult to 
quantify this influence but a few hypothesis have been advanced. Following the 
Peace Treaty signed by Sadat with Israel in 1979, it has been argued that 
Mubarak needed to secure the loyalty of a disgruntled military and that he did so 
by increasing the military budget exponentially (Soliman, pp.61-2). Moreover, in 
the decade that followed, the armed forces began investing heavily in certain 
civilian and commercial sectors, thus gaining financial independence from an 
increasingly precarious national budget and establishing themselves as key 
economic players (ibid.). Despite the lack of hard statistics on the nature of the 
economic activities of the armed forces, the main sectors of commercial activities 
included the food and retail sectors, manufactured goods and electrical 
appliances (Soliman, p.63, 2011). Moreover, in the same period the Ministry of 
Defence established its economic arm called the National Service Product 
Organisation (NSPO) which contributed to public infrastructure works (Abul-
Magd, p.1, 2013). Importantly, throughout the Mubarak regime, numerous 
members of the military elite were gradually appointed to key institutional 
positions within the state and/or state-run enterprises (Alexander, p.548, 2011). 
By 2011 in fact, 18 out of the 27 provincial governors were retired military 
generals (Abul-Magd, p.2, 2013).  
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In the 1990s, as the phenomenon of militant Islam was on the rise, the security 
apparatus in Egypt in the form of the Ministry of Interior became one of the state 
organs with the largest budgetary allocation (Soliman, p.63, 2011). Militant Islam 
has always been seen as a threat to the secular military regime ruling the country 
as well as being a threat to the economic security of the tourism sector. Hence, 
with large budgetary allocations and almost half-million conscripts serving 
within the security forces as their obligatory military service (thus cheap 
labour), the Ministry of Interior under Mubarak became one of the most 
powerful and feared institutions in Egypt, answering only and directly to the 
President (ibid.). Political Islam in Egypt has held a historical place in the 
domestic political scenario and has been systematically  repressed since 1952. 
This practice has clearly left the government vulnerable to  questions by the 
international community, including the EU, related to the legitimacy of the 
electoral process and democracy, the degree of independence of the judiciary, 
practices of torture  and the respect for human rights in general (Commission, 
2007, pp. 8-9). Human Rights Watch in its 2009 Report on Egypt summarised the 
situation as follows:  
“Egypt continues to suppress political dissent in 2009 […] Authorities harassed 
rights activists, and detained journalists, bloggers, and members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood […] Authorities used lethal force against migrants and refugees 
attempting to cross into Israel, and forcibly returned asylum seekers and refugees 
to countries where they could face torture” (2009, para.1-2). 
From an EU perspective, the Annual Progress Report 2009 on the 
implementation of the Action Plan stated that:  
“Concerns remain on the pace of the implementation of reforms in the field of 
democratisation and human rights, although the Government seems increasingly 
convinced of the need to tackle governance issues as part of its domestic reform 
agenda” (European Commission, 2010, p.2). 
It could be safely argued that under the Mubarak regime the security and 
stability of the country (and of the regime) were seen as being constantly under 
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threat and potentially further compromised by political reforms and the process 
of political liberalisation. According to an Egyptian official, implementation of 
political reforms as outlined in the EEAP might not happen at all if the conditions 
to do so were not ripe (Personal Communication, 2009, N.20). The security-
stability argument has in fact been consistently sustained by the Mubarak 
administration in order to justify its repressive domestic policies and lack of 
democratic reforms over time (Hamzawi and Dunne, 2010).  It could be argued 
that the EU, along with the broader international community, has been receptive 
to this security-based rhetoric that was adopted by the Mubarak regime and that 
it seems to have had little leverage and/or little political will to change the 
situation. 
The third crucial feature of the Egyptian domestic system is the presence of a 
particular class of business men blurred between capitalist and political elite. 
The National Democratic Party (NDP) was for the Mubarak regime what the 
Socialist Union Party was for Nasser: “[A] centralised dominant party run from 
the top and whose key figures are appointed not elected” (Soliman, p.148, 2011). 
Mubarak was the party Chairman while Safwat El Sharif (ex intelligence) 
remained Secretary General until the uprising of 2011 (Soliman, p.148, 2011). 
Gamal Mubarak, the son of the president, was the head of the Party Policy 
Committee, a strong body that steered national policy along a neo-liberal 
economic path with a strong determination to integrate Egypt into the global 
economy (Soliman, p.149, 2011). As Soliman notes (ibid.), free-market ideology 
dominated the mentality of the Egyptian elites of the Mubarak regime so with  
the support of Gamal Mubarak, the capitalist class in Egypt was able to slowly 
gain a piece of the pie and become the ruling class. With time, this capitalist class 
became part of the government establishment, which was transformed into an 
alliance between the military, the security apparatus and the businessmen 
(Soliman, p.168, 2011).  
Socio-economic situation 
The socio-economic context of Egypt can be traced to the foundations laid by the 
Nasserite state which resulted in the emergence of an economic system 
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characterised by a large public sector, an extensive network of subsidies and a 
vast bureaucracy (Rutherford, 2008, p.197). Slow and timid attempts to reform 
the system were initiated by President Sadat’s policy of infitah, but it was only by 
the early and mid-nineties that Egypt agreed to embark on the IMF’s Structural 
Adjustment Policies (SAPs) (ibid., p.199). However, the real turning point came 
with the ‘new thinking’ within the National Democratic Party (NDP) attributed to 
the dynamism of the President’s son Gamal Mubarak. The appointment of Gamal 
Mubarak to the party’s General Secretariat in 2000 was both the beginning of a 
political path marked by aggressive liberalisation and neo-liberal reforms and 
also the culmination of a long period of lobbying by a number of influential 
figures in the private sectors. Many of these same figures would soon themselves 
become key political actors in the NDP, signalling the emergence of a new 
political-business elite in Egypt which implemented their goals by shaping the 
path of Egypt’s economic reforms (ibid, pp.218-224). Ultimately however, it was 
exactly the policies and corruption of new business-oriented NDP guard that 
proved the catalyst for the 2011 uprising.   
Egypt is the most populous country in the region with an estimated 80 million 
people of which one-fourth are young men and women between the ages of 18 
and 29 (UNDP, 2010, p.vii). Historically poor socio-economic conditions and the 
large gap in terms of earnings and job opportunities have also contributed to 
resentment, particularly amongst the young and disillusioned. Such resentment 
increased the popularity of the most radical Islamic political organisations 
(Pfeifer, 1999, p.27; Parfitt, 1997, pp.869-70). Between 2002-2008 social and 
poverty indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality and access to 
improved water sources improved at a faster rate than the regional average. 
However, the very low rates of literacy (66% of the population in Egypt against 
73% for the MENA region) is indicative of the scale of the problem faced by the 
government (World Bank, 2008). Another negative indicator for Egypt is the high 
percentage of the population living below the upper poverty line which over the 
periods between 1990-2002 was at an estimated 44% (Commission, 2007a, 
p.11), although it has since improved to an average of 18% of total population for 
the period 2000-2007 (UNDP:2010). Unemployment also remains a major 
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problem, with a rate of 10% in 2007 (European Commission, 2007a, p.11). 
Although, according to the UN, the efforts of the Egyptian government to reduce 
poverty have been successful in reaching its Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG), the impact of the financial and economic crisis of 2008 resulted in a 
renewed upward poverty trend, thus confirming that poverty in Egypt is linked 
to economic performance (UNDP, 2010, p.25).  
The Egyptian economy has manifested an incremental rise in the GDP percentage 
in particular since the advent of the reform-oriented government of PM Ahmed 
Nazif which resulted in an increase of GDP from 4.1% in 2004 to 7.8% in 2008 
(IMF:2010). The increased growth is seen as the result of domestic measures 
taken by the government such as reductions in tariffs, new trade facilitation 
measures and an overhaul of the custom administration. Importantly, the tax 
reforms introduced by the Nazif government in 2005 included cuts in corporate 
tax by 50% together with efforts to modernise the country’s tax administration 
(Ministry of Finance-Egypt, 2010, p.11). The main sources of GDP in Egypt are: 
tourism, the Suez Canal entries, remittances from the Egyptian Diaspora in the 
Gulf and energy exports. In this context and since the 1990s, attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has been the main macro-economic strategy for the 
Egyptian administration (Personal communication, Egyptian official, Cairo, 2009, 
July 22). In 2008, the global financial and economic crisis resulted in overall 
negative economic trends whereby FDI fell in Egypt by 40% , exports by 14% 
and remittances by 9% (Achi, 2010, para. 4). Nevertheless, the economy 
manifested a degree of resilience as growth remained comparatively robust, 
registering a drop from an average of 6.5-7% to 4.6% in 2009, counterbalancing 
the effects on the unemployment rates which according to official figure were at 
9.4% in 2009 (UNDP, 2010, p.28). The ability to maintain a respectable 
percentage of growth despite the crisis is seen by some as the result of the fiscal 
package introduced by government (equivalent to 3% of GDP) and by the 
decision of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) to cut lending rates six-fold (Achi, 
2010, para.4). In 2010, indicators remained relatively positive with an estimated 
growth rate of 5.2% (IMF:2010). However, and within the context of the financial 
and economic crisis, government spending remained high, mainly due a number 
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of large subsidised sectors including energy, contributing to a budget deficit of 
8% and a total debt expected to reach 75% of GDP in 2010 (Achi, 2010, para. 10). 
The energy sector remains an important strategic asset for Egypt. Traditionally, 
Egypt has benefited from the export of crude oil and oil products amounting to 
8% of GDP in 2003 and, 20% of GDP and 40% of total exports in 2005 (Selim, 
2006, p.1). In 2009 crude oil and oil products constituted 55.2% of total exports 
(Ministry of Finance-Egypt, 2010, p.37). The natural gas sector is the fastest 
growing in the Egyptian economy and it is understood that it could gradually 
replace declining oil-based exports (Selim, 2006, p.2). Having said that, the 
energy sector is characterised by a negative imbalance between production and 
demand due to high domestic needs and the heavy subsidies which have resulted 
in Egypt recently increasing imports of LPG, gasoil and gasoline (Ministry of 
Finance-Egypt, 2010, p.47).  
In the context of the modernisation and development of the Egyptian economy, 
the EU could be said to play an important role by being the major trading 
partner. In fact, the EU is the largest export market for Egypt, absorbing 33% of 
total exports (European Commission:2010). Trade between the EU and Egypt in 
2008 accounted for €20.66 billion but saw a decrease due to the global financial 
crisis in 2009 to €18.6 billion. Trade in services in 2009 was at €9.8 billion while 
FDI from the EU amounted to €20.2 billion, almost a 40% increase on 2007. 
(European Commission: 2010).  
According to the Commission, socio-economic problems are structurally related 
to the quality and access to education, literacy levels, gender gap and broadly, to 
problems of transport, energy and infrastructure (2007a, pp.11-12).  In its 
objectives for cooperation with Egypt under the CSP 2007-2013 the EU has 
acknowledged the areas of priorities identified by the Egyptian government and 
devised a response strategy based on the latter and on the concept of a 
comprehensive approach including political and socio-economic reforms and 
development (European Commission, 2007a, pp.19-21).  
68 
 
Foreign policy orientation  
Due to its historical and cultural legacy, Egypt has always had complex relations 
with its neighbours and in particular with Israel. Egypt was involved in four wars 
with Israel in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 before signing the Camp David Accords 
under President Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli peace in 1979 as the first Arab 
country to do so. To date, Cairo finds itself highly sensitive to developments in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact and due to the role traditionally played by Egypt 
in the region, the peace accords have translated into a cold peace rather than the 
normalisation of relations with Israel (Hillal Dessouki, 2008, p.192). The legacy 
of Nasser’s Arabism and the geographical proximity with Gaza meant that Cairo 
has always been susceptible to Arab reactions to its stance towards Israel and, 
importantly, to potential criticism from domestic political forces. This point was 
made evident following the Gaza crisis in January 2009 which resulted in 
thousands of demonstrators taking to the streets across Egypt and the region in 
support of the Palestinian people and condemning the Egyptian regime over the 
closure of the Rafah border and for its weak stance in the face of Israeli actions 
(Hussein, 2009, January).  
The legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as an Egyptian phenomenon and its 
links to the birth of Hamas in Palestine (Kepel, 2002, p.154) has made regional 
geo-political developments directly relevant to the stability of the regime 
domestically. Cairo has worked relentlessly in recent times to find a solution to 
the situation in Gaza and the West Bank and to mediate the intra-Palestinian 
situation. However, the deterioration of the already difficult relationship with 
Hamas has resulted in increased tensions with other regional actors, primarily 
Syria and Iran during the Mubarak regime. In this context, Cairo has been able to 
justify to the international community repressive domestic policies on the basis 
of international security projecting itself as a crucial partner in the Middle East 
Peace Process (MEPP) and as the sole mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
Egyptian interests in the region are also related to outcomes of political 
developments in Lebanon, Libya, Iraq and Sudan: areas in which Cairo could be 
seen as attempting to influence developments. With regards to Lebanon for 
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instance, the Hizballah-Syrian nexus posed a threat to Cairo in terms of regional 
stability and balance-of-power politics between Iran and the Gulf bloc, in 
particular Saudi Arabia (Ezzat, 2008 November). The same could be also said 
about Iraq, where contrasting the influence of Iran and access to primary 
resources such as oil, have provided the main reasons for Egyptian 
reconstruction efforts in that country (Hillal Desouki, 2008, p.190-2).  
Finally and regarding Sudan, two points seem to be of concern for Egypt. Firstly, 
and in the context of access to water from the Nile, relations with Khartoum 
remain important if Egypt and Sudan are to retain access to 90% of the Nile 
waters as stipulated by the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement signed under the British 
protectorate. Pressure from African states that rely on access to waters of the 
Nile resulted in 2009 in the signing of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) amongst the 
Water Ministers of all riparian states.14 Egypt has thus far refused to re-negotiate 
the terms of the NBI15 on the basis of national security and the country’s own 
water shortages despite strong opposition from African states (Mayton, 2010, 
April 26). Secondly and beyond the NBI, the domestic political unrest related to 
question of unity in Sudan could present Egypt with a civil conflict on its door 
step and the prospect of large waves of refugees. As a result Cairo has attempted 
to act as a mediator between the government and the rebel factions in an 
attempt to make sure that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 
2005 survives despite a traditional uneasy relation with Khartoum. Egyptian-
Sudanese relations have not been easy in the past due to the Islamist tendencies 
that have characterised various Sudanese administrations and allegations by 
Cairo of an Iranian-Sudanese attempt to assassinate President Mubarak in 1989 
(Fisk, 1995, June; Warburg: 1994).  
From the picture that emerges above we could conclude that during the last 
decade of the Mubarak regime there was an attempt to pursue a more pro-active 
                                                          
14 The signatory countries to the NBI were: Egypt, Sudan, Burundi, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda 
(Nile Basin Initiative: 2014).  
15 The objectives of the NBI were to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through an “equitable utilisation of, and 
benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources” (Nile Basin Initiative:2014). 
70 
 
Egyptian foreign policy in the region (Dessouki, 2008, p.192). In this context, it 
seems that the traditional role associated with Egypt’s legacy in the Arab world 
was being promoted from Cairo and, at times, that this role was increasingly 
perceived by some key neighbours as a legitimate one.  
With regards to Egyptian foreign policy towards the EU, the context of the early 
1990s is telling.  Chérigui (1997, p.159) notes that following the first Gulf War in 
1990-91, Egyptian foreign policy in the Mediterranean became more active, with 
the aim of establishing a leadership role for Cairo. A number of factors seem to 
have contributed to this re-orientation towards the Mediterranean. First, the Gulf 
War resulted in a stronger and explicit alliance by Egypt with the West and 
Europe, and with France and Germany in particular (Chérigui, 1997, p.160). 
Moreover, the return of the Arab League’s headquarters to Cairo, together with 
the presence of Egyptian personalities at the helm of other international 
organisations, such as U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghaly, was seen as 
a favourable strategic environment for the re-launching of Egyptian interests in 
the region and the promotion of Cairo in terms of its mediating role in the Middle 
East (Chérigui, 1997, p.160). Keen to prevent their isolation from the Maghreb 
and the already existing ‘Five Plus Five framework’, Mubarak aimed at 
counterbalancing the initiative by attempting to be fully integrated in the EU 
Mediterranean project (El-Sayyed Selim, 1997, p.70; Chérigui, 1997, p.160).  
Cairo had, in fact, proposed the idea of a Mediterranean Forum to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on November 11, 1991. 
President Mubarak identified its priorities as: economic cooperation among 
Mediterranean countries on intergovernmental basis, security cooperation 
driven by the aim of achieving a nuclear-free-zone in the Mediterranean, and the 
need to find a viable solution to the Arab-Israeli issue (El Sayyed Selim, 1997, 
pp.69-70). El Sayyed Selim (1997, pp.72-4) argues that although the security 
dimension of the Forum was an important element for Cairo, the immediate 
priority was seen as establishing a space for common cooperation on economic, 
technical and cultural bases. Chérigui (1997, pp.164-5) adds that although 
France was initially resistant to the proposal as it would conflict with its direct 
interests in the Maghreb, agreement over the establishment of the 
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Mediterranean Forum ultimately signalled and cemented  the Franco-Egyptian 
and Euro-Egyptian  rapprochement. The EMP presented the second component 
of Egypt’s Mediterranean policy at the time (El Sayyed Selim, 1997, p. 75). 
Nevertheless, the Egyptian administration responded positively to the proposal 
of association in the EMP even though a number of issues remained sticking 
points in the negotiations. Overall, however, the objectives of the EMP were 
deemed as complementary to Egyptian ones, particularly with regards to 
economic modernisation and development (El Sayyed Selim, 1997, p. 79).  
The U.S. variable 
 
Understanding US-Egyptian relations is central for the understanding of both the 
development of Egypt as a regional actor and of the nature of the country’s 
cooperation with the EU. President Mubarak worked throughout his 30-year rule 
towards regional stability with a clear Western alignment, resulting in U.S. 
President Obama describing him as a stabilising force in an otherwise volatile 
region (Diab:2009). Together with Saudi Arabia, Egypt has been the strongest 
U.S. Arab ally. This alliance has been dictated by pragmatic geo-political interests 
on both sides and has contributed to cementing the role of Cairo as the sole 
legitimate Arab mediating actor in the Palestinian-Israeli talks. Although is true 
that Egypt has gradually become more receptive in its relations with the EU 
(Gad:2003), this can be seen within the context of economic relations. The US, on 
the hand, continues to be perceived by Cairo as the major political player in the 
region (Bayumi:2007). This can be illustrated by the disparity in financial 
assistance and aid between the two foreign actors. Whereas the EU financial 
assistance package to Egypt for the period 2007-2013 fell just under €1 billion 
(NIP 2007-2010 €558 million and NIP 2011-2013 €449 million), with an 
average disbursement of just under €149 million p.a. (European 
Commission:2007a), US Agency for International Development (USAid) 
assistance was at a mere $200 million p.a. but  coupled with a staggering $1.3 
billion p.a. in military and security assistance (El-Naggar, 2009, para.6). El-
Naggar notes (2009, para.6) that military assistance is not envisaged to 
strengthen Egypt vis-à-vis regional security threats in the traditional sense, nor 
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to increase Israeli security by proxy, but rather as support to strengthen the 
regime’s stability and power domestically and its ability to confront populist 
Islamist opposition.  
 
The U.S. stance towards the Egyptian government has been one of support even 
if, at times, this position has been undermined by the lack of a genuine process of 
democratisation in the country. In fact, even if under the Obama administration 
major cuts in democracy promotion have been approved by Congress 
(McInerney:2010),16 in terms of public diplomacy and rhetoric, at least, we can 
identify a degree of condemnation of the Egyptian government, albeit a very soft 
one. The extension of the emergency law in Egypt provides a good example (Al 
Malky, 2010). The legislation, seen as highly obstructive for the democratic 
evolution of the imminent electoral process in the country, has been strongly 
criticised for both its content and its implementation by civil society and U.N 
bodies alike (Fisher, 2010). Officially at least, Washington remained critical of 
the extension of the state of emergency but was seen as having taken a rhetorical 
and soft stance on the issue. Rogin (2010, para. 4 & 6) notes that a number of 
officials from the previous U.S. Bush administration, as well as civil society 
activists, criticised the State Department for condemning the extension of the 
emergency law, while simultaneously negotiating a potential $4 billion 
endowment from Washington. This position has not only raised concerns 
amongst Egyptian civil society, but has also prompted a number of influential 
academics and policy experts to call for a more active support by the U.S. 
government for Egyptian efforts at democratisation (The Working Group on 
Egypt, Carnegie Endowment, 2010). 
 
Having said that, rhetoric from both the U.S. and the EU seems consistent in its 
dual form of international legitimisation and support for the Egyptian regime 
combined with the occasional negative note and public criticism of undemocratic 
practices. The indication that emerges is that US-Egyptian relations cannot be 
                                                          
16 Under the Obama administration, bilateral assistance and funding to Egypt for governance and democracy has been reduced 
from approximately $50 million to $20 million annually; the level of funding directly concerning civil society saw a staggering 
decrease from $32 million to only $7million, with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) adopting a stricter 
policy of only funding officially registered and approved NGOS (McInerney, 2010, p.1).  
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defined in clear patron-client terms but rather in client-centric or client-
prevalent terms. This implies a degree of independence and autonomy in policy-
making on behalf of the client without incurring any additional costs in terms of 
the relationship with the patron.   
CONCLUSION  
This chapter has aimed at outlining the conceptualisation of the ENP in the 
literature as well as finding a definition for the study of EU foreign policy in 
Egypt, providing  insight into the main theoretical concepts associated with the 
process of change and norms-transfer under the ENP and, then by outlining the 
context for EU policy in Egypt. 
The chapter has outlined what are understood to be the main elements that 
characterise the ENP, pointing to a policy that has borrowed much of its logic 
from the process of Enlargement and in which adherence by partner-states to 
specific values and norms is seen as central to its implementation. In this regard, 
we have seen how the architecture of the ENP is based on various principles such 
as ownership and differentiation but, more importantly, how its implementation 
relies on a benchmarking approach. This clearly implies that the ENP rests on the 
mechanisms of conditionality in various forms, positive conditionality but also 
including a dimension of negative conditionality. The emphasis on democratic 
values, for instance, cannot be underestimated and, interestingly, is seen as 
related to both the economic and political dimension of the ENP.  
 
Assessing the understanding of the ENP in the literature reveals that arguments 
in support of European normative power are generally dominant. This allows us 
to theorise about the nature of EU foreign policy and the nature of EU behaviour 
in the Mediterranean, with regards to Egypt in particular. Focusing on the ENP, 
we have seen how the ‘normative power’ paradigm (Manners:2002) rests on the 
assumption of a benevolent power which promotes its interests through the 
promotion of its ideas, principles and values in  external relations (Manners and 
Lucarelli: 2006). Moreover, we have seen how by applying the concept of 
Europeanisation to the implementation of the ENP in Egypt could allow us to 
trace and evaluate the mechanisms that are at the heart of the process of 
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normative transfer. As Wong (2006, p.12) notes: “Europeanisation is a bi-
directional process that leads to a negotiated convergence in terms of policy 
goals, preferences and even identity between the national and the supranational 
levels”. Applying the concept of Europeanisation to the above-mentioned 
problem can provide an analytical solution in terms of bridging the levels of 
analysis (Wong, 2006, p.6; White, 2004, p.20) and can explain both internal and 
external EU dynamics. With regards to the external application of 
Europeanisation, in particular,--conceptualising Europeanisation as an 
independent variable--the concept raises important questions about how norms 
are transferred and why they are adopted.  
 
As we have seen, opinion remains divided on the subject between rationalist and 
sociological accounts. Norms in fact, could be seen as either imposed and/or 
adopted through a rational logic of action and a cost-benefit calculation 
(conditionality) or, through a more subtle process of argumentative persuasion 
and a logic of appropriateness (socialisation).  Having said that, it must be noted 
that explanations of the ENP in the literature presented above provide what 
could be termed as the conventional view of the policy, that they reflect and 
reproduce EU official discourse and representations. Therefore, we could argue 
that they are characterised by a biased approach which does not take into 
consideration empirical evidence. Importantly, the majority of the authors in the 
review tend to conceptualise the EU and its external behaviour as ontologically 
benevolent and as a force for the greater good. The following chapter will 
attempt to address this biased position by providing an eclectic theoretical 
framework in which the ENP will be conceptualised from different perspective 
and its behaviour in foreign policy evaluated accordingly. In order to do so, this 
chapter has attempted to address the conceptual problems related to the study 
of the EU as a unitary actor.  
 
The case-study of Egypt is seen to be a suitable and, potentially, telling test with 
regards to the capacity of the EU to transfer norms through the ENP but also for 
EU bilateral behaviour. The chapter has attempted to outline the socio-economic 
and political characteristics of Egypt in order to highlight both the relevance of 
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the country to the EU, and in order to problematize that relationship in the 
context of this study. Here, the various issues emerge as part of a complex and 
problematic relationship in which, for instance, client-patron relationships are 
not very clear cut, where the concept of security can be seen as having various 
interpretations and where a number of variables and actors make the 
relationship all the more complex.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
AN ECLECTIC THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter aims to outline the concept of security in the study of international 
relations and to provide a theoretical framework for this analysis. Looking beyond 
conventional explanations of EU behaviour as seen in the previous chapter, different 
theoretical approaches can provide new perspectives for this study. They can also allow 
us to question the ontological foundation upon which the policy is built. Therefore, this 
chapter will argue that both EU-Egyptian relations and EU external behaviour cannot be 
accounted for by one single theory alone. 
 
This chapter will construct an eclectic theoretical framework in which norms and 
normative transfer are conceptualised from different theoretical approaches, namely: 
Constructivism, Realism and Liberalism. The ontology of this framework will be rooted 
in the discipline of International Relations and the study of foreign policy.  
 
Analysing the implementation of the ENP in Egypt from different theoretical 
perspectives will provide a type of litmus test with regards to Egyptian adoption of and 
resistance to the process of normative transfer. In this context, this chapter will provide 
evidence that a number of challenges are associated with this process.  The process of 
norms adoption, in fact, implies domestic political costs that emerge due to the different 
perceptions of security and interests. The role of a different political and cultural 
context and their associated value-system are also crucial in this regard. The main 
motives for considering alternative theoretical models stems from the changes that 
occurred in the international system in the 1990s, and form the subsequent changes to 
the perceptions of security in international relations. As a result, the understanding of 
the concept of security has become broader and more comprehensive, going beyond its 
traditional narrow understanding of military security.  The implications of this change 
have provided the opportunity to apply different analytical perspectives to the analysis 
of the ENP.  
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The theoretical framework will:  
 1) outline the study of foreign policy and the debates surrounding the study of 
EU foreign policy. In doing so, this section will outline the changing nature of the 
international system and how the understanding and perception of security has 
changed. This section will allow us to conceptualise the EU as a coherent actor in 
international relations;  
 2)present and apply alternative theoretical explanations to the ENP in Egypt. 
This section will start from the normative and constructivist conceptualisation of 
the ENP as represented in chapter one, before complementing it with alternative 
theoretical assumptions and explanations. The focus will remain on the ENP and 
EU relations with Egypt. The role of norms and values will also remain a central 
element of consideration within the various theoretical models. The rationale 
here is not to ignore mainstream explanations proposed by theoretical 
constructivism, but rather to open the theoretical ground to other approaches 
and related questions.  
 
This chapter will thus outline the theoretical tools associated with each approach 
and point to their usefulness in the analysis. Theoretical eclecticism can provide 
a holistic and diverse theoretical basis for testing and evaluating the empirical 
evidence. Importantly, it can also provide a diverse interpretation and treatment 
of various intellectual concepts such as norms, normative-transfer, power, 
interests and cooperation.   
THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE 
CONCEPT OF SECURITY  
 
Before starting any theoretical appreciation of alternative International 
Relations models with regards to the ENP in the Mediterranean and Egypt, it is 
important to clarify a) the current nature of the international structure and b) 
the changing conceptualisation of security.  These changes could be seen as 
having emerged from two landmark events: the end of the Cold War and the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the U.S. Understanding the altered natures of the 
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international structure and of the concept of security is important because this 
will allow us to better position and apply the various theoretical models to the 
study of the ENP in Egypt. Moreover, this will allow us to identify the degree of 
importance that the various theoretical schools attribute to the role of norms and 
values in international relations. As we will see, in the post-bipolar international 
context, the role of norms related to democracy and human rights has become 
more prominent in the articulation of foreign policy. Together with the 
seemingly contradictory promotion of neo-liberal market economics, these can 
be said to characterise the nature of the EU external behaviour.  
The changing international structure 
The period of the Cold War was characterised by bipolarity and by the threat of 
nuclear conflict. This reinforced the understanding of security in narrow 
strategic and military terms, conceptualising security mainly as state-centric. In 
this context, Realism emerged as the dominant paradigm in the study of 
International Relations (Baylis and Wirtz, 2002, pp.6-7; Waltz, 1954, p.238; Walt, 
1991, p.212). The events that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the 
beginning of the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar 
system (Nye, 1997, p.123; Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p.61). Huntington (2003, p.8) 
argued that the resulting international power structure was characterised by 
uni-multipolarity, i.e. a hybrid between one super-power (the US) with global 
interests and reach, and a number of other major powers such as the EU, China 
and Russia. Following a neo-realist logic then, the demise of the bipolar system 
resulted in the emergence of alternative poles of power and different dynamics 
of international competition and conflict (Huntington, 2003, p.3). Evidence of 
these changes were reinforced in November 1991 with NATO adopting its New 
Strategic Concept according to which potential threats were now seen as 
emerging as a result of instabilities caused by social, economic and political 
difficulties or by ethnic and territorial disputes, and not from calculated military 
aggression (Carr and Ifantis, 1996, pp.75-6). This new security environment, 
characterised by the lack of certainty and distinction between friends and foe, 
between primary and secondary conflict,  brought to the surface a new concept 
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of ‘risks’ as opposed to ‘threats’ (Biscop and Coolsaet, 2003, p.3).17 Within this 
context, values such as human rights and democracy were perceived as essential 
for stability and a functioning international order (Braizat and Schmid, 2006, 
pp.6-7; Biscop and Coolseat, 2003, p.3). The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 
2003 goes a long way in articulating the above argument and identifying the 
relevance of such values for European and global security. 
Since the end of the Cold War the EU has adopted a comprehensive approach to 
security in which the emphasis has been on addressing emerging risks through 
the promotion of development cooperation and democratic values (Biscop and 
Collseat, 2003, p.6). Whether this development reflected a genuine re-
conceptualisation of security by EU leaders or whether it was the result of the EU 
deploying its only means of power (understood as soft power) (see Kagan: 2002) 
remains debatable. Nevertheless, European soft-power remains an important 
tool for the promotion of democratic values in foreign policy. The deployment of 
EU soft power should translate into the implementation of various EU policies 
and related policy structures, instruments and operational tools. As we will see, 
deploying EU soft power rests in part on mechanisms adopted by Enlargement 
policy. Evidence for this argument can be identified in the various Stability Pact 
for the Balkans, the Association Agreements in the Mediterranean, the accession 
of Central and Eastern Europe and more recently, in the ENP (Braizat and 
Schmid, 2006, p. 7; Biscop and Coolseat, 2003, p.8).  
From an International Relation theory perspective, for instance, the logic upon 
which the EMP rested was clearly based on the tenets of democratic peace 
theory (see Doyle:1986) and on the assumption that increased economic 
liberalisation, political reform and cultural understanding within Mediterranean 
partners would enhance European security (Youngs, 2007, p.42; Braizat and 
Schmid, 2006, p.7). Youngs (2007, p.43) argues that faced with the rise of an 
anti-democratic force such as political Islam in the Southern Mediterranean, the 
aims of the EMP were to discreetly promote the precursors of democracy in 
                                                          
17 These new risks that were seen as potentially undermining EU security included drug trafficking, transnational organised 
crime, nuclear smuggling, transnational terrorism, legal and illegal migration, environmental risks and intra-state conflict 
(Biscop and Coolseat, 2003, p.3; Chryssochoou, et al., 1999, p.128). 
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order to mitigate the effects of political transition, essentially, promoting 
political and economic rights without making relations with Mediterranean 
partners conditional on the adoption of Western-style liberal democratic 
structures.  
The events of 9/11 reinforced the comprehensive security approach of the EU. 
On September 21st, 2001, the Council called for an in-depth political dialogue 
with countries where terrorism was present (The Council of the European Union, 
2001, p.3). The Council also called for the integration of all countries into a fair 
world system of security, prosperity and improved development (ibid.). The 
geographical proximity of the Middle East and the Mediterranean, as well as the 
European perception of insecurity, made the priority of promoting political 
reforms seem all the more important for European security (Braizat and Schmid, 
2006, p. 8). Braizat and Schmid (2006, pp.5-7) note that since 9/11 democracy 
promotion has become a common foreign-policy value of Western powers in the 
Middle East, and democratisation, an autonomous goal in itself.  
Different understandings of security: The EU and Egypt  
With the end of the Cold War, alternative understandings of security emerged in 
academic circles as a way to contrast the international conditions advocated by 
theoretical realism. The world order was rapidly becoming complex and 
interdependent, thus creating international conditions in which the use of force 
as the ultimate guarantor of security was irrelevant or unimportant as an 
instrument of policy (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p.27; Mc Sweeney, 1999, p. 46; 
Baylis, 1999, pp.13 & 15). Scholarly debates regarding the conceptualisation of 
security became divided under two main categories: traditionalists and wideners 
(Buzan, 1997, p.6-13). The contentious issue was the broadening of the security 
field of study to include non-traditional sectors beyond the military and the 
strategic and consequently, questioning the centrality of the state as the referent 
object of security (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p.8; Buzan, 1997, p.13). 
Although the traditionalist school attempted to justify its narrow definition on 
grounds of intellectual coherence, the arguments posed by the wideners seemed 
to best explain the post-cold War security environment.  Approaches from the 
Copenhagen School broadened the field of security to include the securitisation 
81 
 
of sectors such as the societal, the economic and the environmental without 
excluding traditional ones such as the military and the political (Buzan et al.: 
1998). Buzan (1997, p.13) noted that the Copenhagen School:  
 
“[C]onstructs a more radical view of Security Studies by exploring threats to 
referent objects and, the securitization of these threats, that are non-military as 
well as military […] It seeks [intellectual] coherence not by confining security to the 
military sector, but by exploring the logic of security itself, to find out what 
differentiate security and the process of securitization from what is merely 
political”.  
 
The analytical framework introduced by Buzan et al. (1998, pp.15-9) rests on the 
concept of security complex theory (SCT)18 and defines the process of 
securitization as:  
 
“[A] more extreme version of politization […] It is the inter-subjective establishment 
of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effect” 
(Buzan, 1997, p.14).  
 
By focusing on the referent object of security in specific sectors we are thus able 
to identify both the sources of insecurity and its related responses. The 
conceptualisation of democracy promotion as the securitization of democracy in 
the terms used above (Buzan: 1997; Buzan et al.: 1998) is very important when 
attempting to understand EU approaches to security. In the attempt to develop 
its own foreign and defence policy, the EU seems to have made the 
comprehensive approach to security its own (see ESS 2013) and one that is 
perceived as distinctly European in the promotion of security values (Biscop and 
Collseat, 2003, p.14).  
 
 
                                                          
18 Classical security complex theory (CSCT) posits the existence of regional sub-systems such as the Middle East and/or the 
Mediterranean as objects of security analysis and provides an analytical framework for dealing with those systems based on the 
primary of the state as a referant object of securtiy and by focusing on the political and military sectors (Buzan et a;., 1998, 
p.10-11).  
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Security from an EU perspective 
 
We could argue that a comprehensive approach to security opens the spectrum 
of analysis to other variables that were previously ignored. Essentially, it means 
that development cooperation, aid assistance, trade promotion and of course, the 
promotion of democracy are all seen as directly linked to European security. 
Consequently, we could deduce that the norms and values that inform these 
policies are also conceptualised as security-related values. 
 
Vennesson (2007, p.15) argues that the ESS reflects a neo-liberal and 
constructivist view of international relations and security. The strategy 
emphasises the globalised nature of the international system and identifies the 
challenges as stemming from an interdependent environment. Security 
challenges are conceptualised as non-military in nature (terrorism and regional 
conflicts) and identifies the root-causes of these challenges as originating from 
socio-economic factors such as poverty, under-development, scarcity of 
resources and access to energy  (Council of the European Union, 2003, pp.2-3). 
Effective responses are seen as resting on a comprehensive approach and based 
on a pro-active policy of conflict and threat prevention based on non-military 
instruments (Council of the European Union, 2003, p. 7). The vision of the ESS is 
to promote efficient multilateralism (Council of the European Union, 2003, pp.9-
10) as a way to address these challenges and, therefore, promote the rule of law, 
international institutions and spreading economic and democratic values as 
instruments of security: 
 
“The best protection for our security is a world of well governed democratic states. 
Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with 
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human 
rights are the best means for strengthening the international order” (Council of the 
European Union, 2003, p. 10).  
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Vannesson (2007, pp.19-23) notes that the EU has essentially formulated a post-
realist strategy informed from a neo-liberal institutionalist and constructivist 
view of international affairs.  
 
Although we could argue that EU security threats in the Mediterranean have 
been perceived in the above terms, emanating from the socio-economic 
conditions, we should remember that traditional security concerns are still 
present and highlighted by the increasing tensions over the Arab-Israeli conflict 
for instance (Spencer, 1998, p.136). Spencer notes (1998, pp.150-1) that EU 
efforts to tackle threats such as the rise of Islamic terrorism, as well as other 
softer issues such as migration and economic development through a 
comprehensive strategy, indicate a defensive and non-confrontational model of 
security. However, an important question to raise is to what extent this concept 
of security and its applicability is compatible with southern Mediterranean 
partners whose security is generally understood in traditional, narrow terms? 
Security from an Egyptian perspective 
 
In the context of Egypt, we could argue that the concept of security has 
historically been perceived within the Realist tradition and has been intrinsically 
linked to dynamics of domestic and regional security. Egyptian 
conceptualisations of security have remained narrow in scope and linked to the 
developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the rise of political Islam. 
Firstly, the legacy of Nasser’s Arabism and the geographical proximity with Gaza 
meant that Cairo has always been susceptible in its stance towards Israel in its 
domestic and regional reactions. As a result, the Camp David Accords in 1979 
have translated for Egypt into a cold peace rather than the normalisation of 
relations with Israel (Hillal Dessouki, 2008, p.192). Secondly, the historical 
development and legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as an Egyptian 
phenomenon and its links to the birth of Hamas in Palestine (Kepel, 2002, p.154) 
have made regional developments in the Middle Eastern Peace Process (MEPP) 
directly relevant to the stability of the regime in Cairo. The rise of the MB in 
Egypt and the appeal of the writings of Sayyed Qutb amongst others, meant that 
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the various Egyptian presidents have consistently been challenged by radical 
political Islam, be it in the form of the MB or the Jamaat El Islamaya during the 
1970s (Kepel, 2002, pp.81-8). Since the end of the Gulf War of 1991, Egypt has 
taken a more assertive role in the region and, in doing so, attempted to counter 
balance the increasing dominance of Iran. Cairo has been pro-active also with 
regards to Lebanese and Sudanese politics and recently attempted to contribute 
to the stabilisation of Iraq  (Hillal Desouki, 2008, p.190-2). Together with Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt has been the strongest U.S. Arab ally and the second highest 
beneficiary of U.S. military aid. However, is exactly this pro-Western and U.S. 
stance, coupled with the explicit exclusion of Islamist forces from the Egyptian 
political system that has legitimised the recent rise of political Islam.   
 
The current situation in the region emphasises even more the regional security 
dilemma Egypt faces. The advent of the Arab Spring, the crisis in Syria, the 
collapse of the Libyan state and more recently, the destabilising sectarian 
tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims so violently manifested by the 
emergence of the Islamic State for Iraq and Syria (ISIS), all point to hard, 
traditional security concerns to be addressed by the administration and the 
military in Cairo.  
 
Under these conditions, it is not easy to promote a comprehensive and soft 
approach to security as advocated by the EU. Security, the discussion above 
makes clear, is differently perceived and consequently acted upon in the EU and 
in Egypt. In the former, a comprehensive and interdependent approach 
characterises the concept of security. From an Egyptian perspective, security 
remains rooted in traditional conceptualisation of power-struggles and survival. 
The point of interest for this study is the interaction between the policy 
dynamics of the ENP and EEAP and the dichotomy that characterises the 
understanding of security for the EU and Egyptian policy makers.  
AN ECLECTIC THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK   
The aim of this section is to contribute to the theoretical evaluation of EU-
Egyptian relations in the context of the ENP and to apply an eclectic theoretical 
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framework to the study of EU-Egyptian relations and of EU external behaviour. 
The following section will firstly outline the dominant explanations and 
understandings of the ENP in Egypt. Secondly, it will introduce additional 
theories that are similarly applicable to the study of the ENP and able to provide 
us with alternative interpretations of the policy and, consequently, of EU-
Egyptian relations. The rationale for applying an eclectic theoretical framework 
rests on the argument that although the ENP has been mainly associated in the 
literature as an instrument of EU normative power, much evidence exists to 
contradict this assumption. This study will argue that this conceptualisation 
provides only a one-dimensional view of the relationship between the EU and 
Egypt and of the nature and behaviour of the EU in the region. On the contrary, 
this study contends that applying a number of alternative theories can contribute 
to a better understanding of EU behaviour in the region and provide us with a 
multi-dimensional understanding of the subject matter by introducing an 
element of eclecticism and theoretical plurality.   
The applicability of an eclectic theoretical framework including state-centric 
approaches such as Realism is possible on the grounds that EU policies such as 
the ENP can be conceptualised as a collective, representative and unitary set of 
objectives which have resulted from the convergence of the preferences of 
various driving EU actors. Importantly, a broader re-conceptualisation of 
security as outlined above allows us to mitigate the challenge posed by the 
application of Realism to the EU. From this perspective, security and interest can 
be conceptualised away from traditional state-centric understandings and 
applied in a post-modern fashion to EU policies in the Mediterranean. That said, 
this study does not marginalize traditional understandings of security. On the 
contrary, it endeavours to understand how different conceptualisations co-exist 
in the context of EU-Egyptian cooperation. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that in the following theoretical framework the relevance of ideational variables 
is not monopolised by constructivists’ theories. Neo-classical realism also takes 
into account variables such as culture, perceptions and ideas while neoliberal 
institutionalism focuses on the cultural context and understanding of individuals 
within institutional structures.  In fact, a pluralist conceptualisation of norms 
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allows us to bridge the various approaches with the parading of normative 
power Europe and to question the ontology of concepts such as norms, 
normative transfer, power, interests and cooperation. Thus, the rationale of the 
theoretical framework is to emphasise the value of all approaches outlined above 
and to recognise the shared agenda of complex-interdependence. The crux of the 
research will be concerned with the different explanations provided with 
regards to motives.  In this context, the various stages of the policy can provides 
us with different explanations. From the initial formulation and decision making 
process resulting in the establishment of the ENP as a policy in the 
Mediterranean, through the process of implementation of the Action plan in 
Egypt, theoretical eclecticism will allow us to make different inferences at 
different stages of the policy process. Here the concept of Europeanisation 
becomes important both as a conceptual and analytical tool.  
Normative Power and Constructivism:  
The concept of European normative power has been developed by Manners 
(2002), who conceptualised the Union as substantively (and ontologically) 
normative, having a distinctly collective identity in international relations. 
Manners argued (2002, p.252) that the substantive components which define the 
EU’s international identity are values such as democracy, respect for human 
rights, social justice and liberal pluralism, and which  are  to be found in EU 
treaties, regulations, criteria and policies developed over the past fifty years. 
This is evident, for example, in Art. 6 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) 
which codifies democracy, human rights and the rule of law as constitutive 
elements of the EU’s political community and in the Copenhagen criteria which 
are used as a benchmark for potential members (Noutcheva, 2008, p.253). 
Manners (2002, p. 353) notes that three elements characterise the EU in 
international politics: its hybrid polity, the nature of its political system and its 
historical experience which, in turn, is the experience of its combined members. 
Based on of these characteristics and particularly on the concepts of shared 
experience and collective identity, normative power is conceptualised as the EU 
capacity to shape and/or influence what is seen as ‘normal’ in the international 
arena (Manners, 2002a, p.254).  For instance, the EU’s international opposition 
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to the death penalty is used to highlight the international projection of EU values 
(Manners, 2002b, pp.37-43). On this note, Manners and Lucarelli (2006, p.2) 
have argued that the EU behaves internationally according to a set of dynamic, 
yet identifiable values, principles, and images of the world which are seen as at 
the root of the EU in world politics.  
Moreover, the authors add that the notion of historic responsibility is also often 
referred to with regards to EU foreign policy (Manners and Lucarelli, 2006, pp.2-
3). These assertions aim to highlight the perceived distinct nature of the EU in 
world politics, particularly with regards to two characteristics not often present 
in traditional state actors: a) a stabilising effect in international relations that 
Europe derives from its own history and historically-developed and formed 
values and principles and b) external relations inspired by an ‘ethics of 
responsibility’ towards others (Manners and Lucarelli, 2006, p.4).  
The thesis of EU normative power is theoretically grounded on the tenets of 
constructivism in International Relations, the main proponent being Alexander 
Wendt. Constructivism is primarily concerned with the sociological component 
of the systemic structure as opposed to solely focusing on explanations of 
rationality and material variables (Wendt, 1995, pp.71-3). To quote Checkel: 
“Constructivism is concerned not with levels per se but with underlying 
conceptions of how the social and political world work” (1998, p.325). From this 
perspective, the identity and interests of actors are seen as key in determining 
the social construction of the international system (Wendt, 1995, pp.78-81). 
Hence, the international system is conceptualised as being socially constructed 
and as reflecting actors’ knowledge thus, being a function of it. It logically follows 
that the systemic structure, agents’ interests and identity are mutually 
constituted (ibid.). In essence, the approach rests on two assumptions: a) that 
material structures are only meaningful if one takes the social context into 
account and b) that the constitutive nature of agent-structure relations questions 
the relation between identity and interests formation (Checkel, 1998, p. 326). 
Thus, constructivism allows us to identify normative elements which are 
constitutive to structures (social and institutional) and which are constituted by 
actors and their knowledge (Wendt, 1995, p.81 & Wendt, 1992, p.399).  
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Constructivists conceptualise institutions as normatively constructed structures 
which are codified in certain rules and norms and which could at times, act as a 
motivational forces “[…] in virtue of actors’ socialisation to and participation in, 
collective knowledge” (Wendt, 1992, p.399). From this perspective, Wendt 
regards institutions as cognitive entities that only represent the actor’s ideas of 
the world around them (1992, p.399). Here, the process of institutionalisation is 
seen as the internalization of new identity and interests, a process which is 
fundamentally cognitive rather than behavioural. Therefore, actors’ behaviour is 
understood within a context where “rule-governed action and logic of 
appropriateness prevail” (Checkel, 1998, p.325). The role of norms is seen as key 
in explaining the emergence of agents and in providing them with an 
understating of their interests (ibid.). As Wendt has argued (1992, p.407), actor’s 
practices help shape the system therefore, changes in those practices will change 
the inter-subjective knowledge that constitutes that system. This point supports 
Manners’ (2002) argument of a normative EU projecting its identity externally 
through its practices.  
Normative power is a very abstract concept which is exercised implicitly 
manner. Theoretically, it is underpinned by constructivism and by the notion 
that actions are taken within a socially constructed environment and through 
interpretative filters such as: ideas, beliefs, norms, identities and culture 
(Parsons, 2010, p.80). As a result, it emphasises  the importance of concepts such 
as meanings and interpretation in constructivist analysis and explanations. From 
this perspective, actions can be explained by taking into account a number of 
variables which are also defined as interpretative filters. Hence, constructivism 
aims to explain the world as a function of a landscape of ideas, norms, identities, 
practices and provides a powerful and demonstrable explanation about why 
people act the way they do (Parsons, 2010, pp.97-8). With regards to the case 
study of the ENP in Egypt, this position raises important questions related to the 
objectives of the policy and the means to attain them. Essentially, one should ask 
whether the ideas, beliefs, norms and values inherent in the AP with Egypt are 
transferable in Egypt and, if so, whether we can identify a successful process of 
89 
 
persuasion and socialisation by which to transfer them. If so, for which ideas and 
norms and in which sectors?   
Realism: classical, neo-real and neo-classical 
Realism has arguably been the most dominant paradigm in International 
Relation theory in the post-war period and consists of three dominant schools of 
thought: classical realism, structural or neo-realism and neo-classical realism. 
Although characterised by some differences, all realist schools share a number of 
assumptions. Firstly, they assume the nature of the international system as 
anarchic and conflictual; secondly, they emphasise the role of the state as 
central;19 finally, they emphasise the primacy of power and the role of security in 
all human actions and motivations (Carr, 1981, p.10; Gilpin, 1984, p.290). Gilpin 
notes (1984, p.290) that: “[U]nlike its opposite, idealism, realism is founded on a 
pessimism regarding moral progress and human possibilities”. Realism is 
understood as informing policy-makers to adopt a pragmatic, Realpolitik 
understanding of international affairs. In realist terms then, the state and the 
concept of power are central to the analysis. Power is seen as enabling actors to 
pursue their national interests as opposed to idealistic and altruistic visions of 
international affairs (Carr, 1981, p. 80). In his criticism of inter-war liberalism, 
Carr (1981, p.80) notes that the latter were mere “[S]logans of those who felt 
strong enough to impose them on others”. Thus, the promotion of a liberal 
ideology which essentially underlined the drive for power. Later, Morgenthau 
(1985, p.5) elaborated on the concept of power defined in terms of national 
interests. Theoretically, the result was an increased emphasis on state-centrism 
and an ontological understanding of human beings and states as inherently 
conflictual and power-seeking (Rynning and Ringsmose, 2008, p.22).  
In the seminal work Theory of International Politics, Waltz (1979) narrowed the 
scope of the realist paradigm by focusing only on systemic variables as an 
explanation for state behaviour (Gilpin, 1984, p.288; Jørgensen, 2006, p.51; 
Rynning and Ringsmose, 2008, p. 24; Waltz, 1997, p.916). Waltz (1988, p.617) 
                                                          
19 For neo-classical realist the state is also conceptualised as composed by individuals and thus, allowing for the analysis to 
consider the concept of ‘conflict groups’.  
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noted that: “Neo-realism contends that international politics can be understood 
only if the effects of structure are added to the unit-level explanations of 
traditional realism”. Analysing both levels allows the researcher to develop an 
international-political theory and make inferences regarding the expected 
behaviour of the unit (Waltz, 1988, p.618). Neorealists also argue that states 
struggle for power because they attempt to secure resources and their survival, 
i.e. they are primarily concerned with national security (Waltz, 1988, pp.616-7).  
In this struggle for survival, states are seen as continually adjusting their stance 
in response to other actors’ power. The balance of power system that emerges is 
defined by the number of poles (polarity) and forms the basis for the balance of 
power theory with the tendency for states to respond to systemic conditions. 
Theoretically then, the balance of power makes assumptions about states in 
terms of being unitary actors who, “[A]t minimum, seek their own preservation 
and, at maximum drive for world domination” (Waltz, 1979, p.118). One of the 
most important differences with classical Realism is that Waltz (1979) 
introduces an element of rational choice in state behaviour.  
Currently, two strands of neo-realism have emerged: offensive and defensive. 
Offensive realists share much with classical realism such as the inherent 
aggressive nature of states in an anarchic system. This means that states are seen 
as very skeptical of cooperation in situations of asymmetries (power and 
capability)  and therefore, primarily concerned with relative gains and power 
(Mearsheimer:1990). For offensive realists anarchy provides incentives for 
expansion in order to increase power and guarantee survival (Rynning and 
Ringsmose, 2008, pp.26-7; Norris, 2002, pp. 24-5). Defensive realists on the 
other hand, would argue that under certain circumstances and with the 
appropriate incentives, states will evaluate the cost-benefits of potential 
cooperation. Instead of focusing on material capabilities defensive realists are 
concerned with ideational factors such as intentions and perceptions of actors in 
order to explain state behaviour and thus, the potential for cooperation (Norris, 
2002, pp.26-7; Jervis:1969; Walt:1987; Huntington:1993). More recently and in a 
similar vein to defensive neo-realism, scholars have revived classical realist 
approaches by capitalising on the importance of norms, perceptions and other 
ideational factors. Costalli (2009, pp.328-31) argues that realism has always 
91 
 
been concerned with the relationship between international cooperation and 
culture, the formation of collective identities and non-material forms of power. 
According to Rynning and Ringsmose (2008, p.22), Morgenthau, Stanley Hoffman 
and Reinhold Neibuhr all shared assumptions about the socially constructed 
nature of the state and about the fundamentally power-seeking and self-
interested nature of human beings. The implicit link between the individual and 
state allows for an evaluation of world politics that accounts for variables such as 
international morality, subjective political power as well as objective material 
power (Rynning and Ringsmose, 2008, p. 22). Essentially, neo-classical realism 
brings the focus back to what Gilpin (1984, p. 290) defined as ‘conflict groups’ i.e. 
individuals that compose the state and takes into account both material and non-
material variables such as norms and perceptions.  
 
Focusing on EU policies in the Mediterranean, we could argue that they clearly 
manifest objectives designed to address material interests and security priorities 
aimed at enhancing the Union’s role in the region. The ENP objectives to create a 
ring of friends and an area of stability and prosperity reflect the rationale of the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) (2003), thus emphasising the primacy of 
security for the EU in its relations with Mediterranean partners (Biscop: 2004; 
Dannreuther: 2006).  As we have seen, the ENP rationale is to address a number 
of security-related concerns stemming from the EU external environment 
including: illegal migration and the linkages to organised crime, drugs trafficking, 
terrorism and its potential for regional instability, energy and conflict 
(Commission, 2004, pp.16-8; Commission, 2003, pp.10-11). With regards to the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East region, all of the above factors are directly or 
indirectly influenced by the political context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Maintaining a central EU role in the region and the ability of Brussels to be part 
of the framework and influence outcomes is, thus, a key objective of the ENP 
(Commission, 2003, pp. 7 & 13).  
 
Cavatorta et al. (2008) have argued that using an alternative theoretical 
framework for the analysis of EU behaviour in the Mediterranean would produce 
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very different outcomes vis-à-vis conventional constructivist explanations. Using 
evidence from the case of Morocco, the authors adopt a realist perspective of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and its objectives. The EMP rationale 
has generally been understood as one of promoting European security through 
stability and prosperity, thus linking security objectives to democratic and 
economic development in the Mediterranean (i.e. achieving a Kantian-style 
peace).  The logic has been one of affecting actors and their behaviour through 
osmosis (Cavatorta et al., 2008, pp.5-6) which reflects a constructivist agenda. 
However, from a realist perspective, the EMP appears as a successful initiative 
based on an instrumental and strategic use of norms  coupled with short-term 
objectives related to political and material interests (Cavatorta et al., 2008, p.8).  
 
Within the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations, adopting instruments that 
reinforce and maintain the role and power of the domestic regime irrespective of 
the degree of authoritarianism, seems to have taken priority over initiatives to 
engage with domestic political opposition and civil society in a credible manner. 
The promotion of democracy in fact, could be seen as a short-term 
destabilisation of the region and therefore, a threat (ibid.). This is clearly a realist 
conceptualisation of security “which maximises benefits in place of norms” 
(Cavatorta et al., 2008, p.9). The EMP as well as the ENP are formulated in a 
manner which reinforces the role of the partner states and promotes interaction 
with the government as the sole interlocutor, at the expense of promoting 
genuine dialogue with political opposition which, should be the minimum 
requirement for an agenda of democracy promotion (Cavatorta et al., 2008, p.14-
5). The authors (Cavatorta et al., 2008, p.12) note that achieving regional 
stability is essential for the EU for maintaining the regional status-quo: this is 
obtained firstly, by maintaining Arab regimes in place as ‘gate-keepers’ for the 
EU, in return for a privileged interlocutor’s position on matters of trade (which 
benefit the EU and are hijacked by local political elites) and aid assistance. Hence, 
the assumption that the EU is always interested in promoting democracy is to be 
challenged. Secondly, that analysing EU external relations from a rational/realist 
perspective might help us to identify how is the Union dealing with the 
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democracy-stability dilemma, (and if this dilemma still exists) (Cavatorta et al., 
2008, pp.19-20). 
EU policy in the Mediterranean could also provide a good testing ground for the 
neo-realist argument. Norris (2002, pp.40-1) has argued that neo-realism has 
been wrongly considered inadequate as a vehicle for explaining the end of the 
Cold War and process of European integration. Even though offensive realists 
such as Mearsheimer (1990) seem to have wrongly predicted a return to multi-
polarity within Europe, defensive realists claim to be able to explain such event. 
By focusing on the unit-level variable, for example, they can explain changes and 
rationales for cooperation amongst EU member states and, thus, can explain the 
development of integration and conceive of the EU as a unitary international 
actor. In fact, conceptualising member states’ actions from a defensive neo-
realist perspective, one could predict a degree of cooperation amongst them 
resulting in the emergence of a relatively coherent actor who could potentially 
balance U.S. hegemonic power (Norris, 2002, p. 40). More recently, a renewed 
dynamism of China in North Africa has been well documented and economic 
figures confirm that country’s growing role in regional industrial development 
and investment (Lafargue:2008; Xiaojie:2002). One must ask, then, if EU 
initiatives in the region such as the EMP and the ENP are also aimed at balancing 
the efforts of other actors? Is the EU aiming to forge for itself a degree of political 
weight and legitimacy in the Mediterranean in order to be more politically 
competitive?   
From an Egyptian perspective, Washington has generally been perceived as a 
political heavy-weight in the region as opposed to the EU, which tends to be 
regarded as primarily an economic actor (Bayoumi:2007). Recent events, 
particularly during the administration of George W. Bush, have arguably resulted 
in claims of an Egyptian shift towards Europe, the latter being perceived as more 
receptive, understanding and objective than the U.S.  (Gad, 2003, pp.188-9). This 
argument is, however, difficult to sustain since traditionally the U.S. stance 
towards the Egyptian government has been and remains one of support even if 
at times this position has undermined the process of democracy promotion. 
Under the Obama administration major cuts in democracy promotion have been 
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approved (McInerney:2010),20 signalling that Washington appears to be more 
concerned with stability than democracy in Egypt. But to what extent do these 
developments indicate an increasingly competitive environment for EU-US 
relations in the region?  
There is no doubt that the structural changes which happened in the post-Cold 
War period contributed to the perception of a more influential role for the EU in 
international affairs. The advent of globalisation and the emergence of a truly 
global economic system has meant a shift in the systemic distribution of power, 
arguably in favour of the EU. This is certainly true with regards to the EU 
neighbourhood where power asymmetries are evident and specifically, with 
regards to the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region where, unlike in the 
East of Europe, the absence of an actor such as Russia is determining.  The 
argument in favour of a more powerful EU in the Mediterranean region 
correlates well with Susan Strange’s notion of structural power defined as:  
“[T]he power to choose and to shape the structures of the global political economy 
within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprise, and 
(not least) their professional people have to operate” (Quoted in Keohane, 2000, 
p.x).  
Strange identified four domains of structural power, namely security, 
production, finance/credit and knowledge (Lawton, 2000, p.4).  Lawton et al. 
(2000, p.4) note that Strange addressed the narrow focus of International 
Relations and of Realism in particular, in favour of a broader conceptualisation of 
power, one that included structural and relational power, namely the power to 
influence the ideas of others, their access to credit, security and prosperity (see 
Strange: 1988 States and Markets). Whereas neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-
realism retain the centrality of the state, structural approaches as formulated by 
Strange are concerned with the impact of the system per se and, with changes 
                                                          
20 Under the Obama administration, bilateral assistance and funding for governance and democracy towards Egypt has been 
reduced from approximately $50 million to $20 million annually; the level of funding directly concerning civil society saw a 
staggering decrease from $32 million to only $7million with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) adopting a 
stricter policy of only funding officially registered and approved NGOS (McInerney, 2010, p.1).  
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within it. Nevertheless, Strange acknowledges the role of a superpower such as 
the U.S. (thus a state) in establishing and maintaining these structures. Structural 
power models would argue that the proliferation of trans-national cultural and 
economic interactions have led to the development of a global economic system, 
effectively changing the system (Lawton et al., 2000, p.8).  
Moschella (2004, p.60) has argued in those precise terms noting that EU region-
building in the Mediterranean can also be seen as a reflection of the changing 
distribution of power. In his view, EU region-building in the Mediterranean is an 
attempt to maximise power and influence relative to others over a determined 
time and space: “[R]egion-building is a multi-dimensional process, and economic 
regionalisation can be considered as a first step in order to achieve wider 
political and security objectives” (Moschella, 2004, p.60). From this perspective, 
Holden (2009, pp.14-6) has also focused on the nature of EU-U.S. relations and 
the impact of their respective agendas in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The 
author highlights the potential competitiveness emerging between the two 
actors as a result of the shifting distribution of power at the end of the Cold war. 
Holden (2009, pp.14-6) argued that if we borrow Strange’s concept of structural 
power, both actors can be seen as competing for more influence in these 
structures even if they arguably operate in different dimensions.  
Another valid argument is that far from employing normative instruments for 
collective milieu-shaping, the EU relies on very tangible sources of power, 
namely: its economic clout in the region, fear of exclusion from its market and 
the promise of membership (Hyde-Price, 2008, p. 31). This statement is 
consistent with the tenets of hegemonic stability theory as advocated by Gilpin 
(1987). Similarly to Strange, Gilpin (1987, pp.11-2) was interested in 
understanding the dynamics that characterised state-market relations and their 
impact on the evolution of the world economy and structural/systemic change. 
In his endeavour, the author has been credited with what has been labelled as 
‘Gilpin’s model of pluralistic enquiry’ comprising Liberal, Marxist and Realist 
perspectives (McNamara, 2009, p. 174; Cohen, 2007, p.203). He believed that 
even though the world was increasingly characterised by dynamics of complex 
interdependence, politics would ultimately retain its power to shape economic 
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relations (Cohen, 2007, p.203). Gilpin (1987, pp.72-4; 1981, pp. 127-155) argued 
that in order to see the emergence and expansion of an internationally open and 
liberal economic system, three prerequisites needed to be met: the existence of a 
hegemonic power, an economically liberal ideology and common interests 
amongst states. He was in fact, amongst the first scholars to support the idea that 
in order to have a healthy global economy, the weight of a dominant state power 
was essential (Cohen, 2007, p.204). According to hegemonic stability theory, a 
dominant state is seen as needed to be willing and capable to sustain such a 
liberal economic order. This increases the hegemon’s power and legitimacy as it 
helps to provide a number of public goods such as liberal trade, currency 
management regimes and security (Gilpin, 1987, pp.73-4). The market becomes 
a very powerful political instrument in this context as the hegemon is able to 
influence other actors both positively and negatively by allowing or denying 
access to its market (Gilpin, 1987, pp.75-6).  
The exercise of this type of power can be also applied to the EU in the 
Mediterranean. Conceptualising the EU in regional hegemonic terms can help us 
understand how and why regional initiatives such as the EMP and the ENP are so 
reliant on economic harmonisation and alignment. Moreover, the exercise of 
economic conditionality under these cooperation frameworks could be 
considered evidence of the exercise of economic power by the EU. Examining the 
Egyptian responses to the launch of the ENP, for example, Vignal (2009, p.4) 
notes that a degree of scepticism and mistrust reigned amongst officials at the 
Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to the extent and depth of politically-
oriented provisions in the proposed AP.  Negotiations had to go ahead dictated 
by a worrying economic situation and the need to introduce and implement 
effective economic reforms. Beyond official circles which emphasised the 
benefits of the AP, small and medium businesses in Egypt expressed concern 
regarding the potentially asymmetricality of the arrangements and the increased 
competition their domestic markets would face (Vignal, 2009, p.8).  The issues 
raised included concern over the capacity of the Egyptian administration to 
match EU standards as well as the high costs of achieving these standards, which 
were seen as prohibitive for this large section of the private sector (ibid.).  
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Hyde-Price (2008, p.30-2) has also argued that the external role the EU performs 
for its member states is an instrumental one driven by self-interest and 
asymmetrical power-capabilities in the region. The EU agenda in its 
neighbourhood could be seen as promoting and protecting member states’ 
economic interests, while at the same time shaping the regional milieu through 
various interventions (ibid.).  Beyond explanations of conventional security and 
economic interests mentioned above, access to energy is also seen as a main 
concern for EU members. We could argue that the post-1973 OPEC increase in 
energy prices exposed European dependence in this sector, a dependence that 
potentially could be addressed in part by the ENP in the Mediterranean. In this 
respect, the policy is seen as able to mitigate a number of EU shortcomings in the 
field of energy security namely: the dependence on limited suppliers, the EU 
difficulties in liberalising the energy market, the lack of EU competence in 
regulating energy imports (Hadfield:2009).  
Conversely, it is important to note the impact that member states have on the 
direction and nature of EU external relations (Hill, 2003, p.295). The power-
struggle that emerged between France and Germany over the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) (Balfour: 2009; Bechev and Dimitar: 2008; Aliboni et al.: 
2008; Schmid: 2007) is testament to the influence member states have on the 
various EU policies and regional initiatives. It is safe to say that northern 
European states have been traditionally skeptical and unwilling to share the 
burden of EU policies in the southern Mediterranean. The events of 9/11 and 
later the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London contributed to a change of 
perception in this regard (Schumacher, 2008, p.15 in Alboni et al., 2008). 
Although it appeared that Germany has been a strong supporter of the Barcelona 
Process since its inception, Schumacher (ibid.) argues that German foreign policy 
circles have also regarded the EMP as the playground of few southern European 
states and an inadequate forum in which to address political and security 
concerns, mainly hampered by the different positions on the Arab-Israeli issue.  
Over the last few years, Germany had tried to balance its position between 
having a say in Euro-Mediterranean affairs and guaranteeing that appropriate 
resources would be directed at EU engagement in the Eastern dimension. This 
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bargaining process has been relatively straight forward to date with an accepted 
division of labour between northern and southern EU members as defenders of 
their interests in their respective neighbourhoods (Schumacher, 2008, p.14). 
That said, Germany has increasingly become a strong supporter of a more 
assertive EU foreign policy in the Middle East as well as getting directly involved 
in a mediating role between Hamas and the Israeli government (ibid.). The UfM 
proposed by President Sarkozy as a project exclusively for Mediterranean states 
was seen in German circles as jeopardising the long-standing Franco-German 
alliance at the heart of the EU (Schumacher, 2008, p.15). Ultimately, although 
France was able to count on non-Mediterranean member states to support the 
initiative, its motivations for the idea were seen as purely self-interested. Some 
have argued that the reason for launching the UfM was to secure the Arab vote in 
the French elections (Schmid, 2007, p.7), while others have argued in favour of a 
logic based on a renewed dynamism in French foreign policy aimed at re-
establishing France’s role in Mediterranean politics (Albioni et al., 2008, p.5), an 
initiative aimed at promoting French grandeur in the region and vis-a-vis other 
EU partners (La Gloannec, 2008, p.18; The Economist, 2008). 
Realist perspectives on the study of the ENP have shown us that the EU could 
comfortably be seen as playing the role of a self-interested and power-
maximising actor in the Mediterranean, one primarily concerned with 
maintaining regional stability and the status quo, at the expense of democracy 
promotion and principled actions (Dannreuther:2006; Cavatorta:2008).  The 
security discourse could then re-conceptualise the ENP as a policy bridging the 
domain between realist and normative approaches. This would call into question 
the accepted view that various EU policy frameworks in the Mediterranean have 
been far from successful. If stability and security are the primary policy 
objectives, one could argue that the EMP and ENP have been somewhat 
successful in making use of norms in an instrumental and strategic manner 
(Cavatorta:2008). This argument also reinforces Carr’s view that powerful states 
can manipulate rhetorical slogans in order to accommodate their interests 
(1981, p.80). Classical realism, then, emphasises the role of material variables 
such as power and interests and the role of the state as the primary actor. Power 
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here is seen the ability to shape the international system in order to enable 
actors to pursue and maximise their interests. However, power can also imply 
the ability to implicitly instrumentalise specific norms to pursue a given self-
interested goal. The Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region can be seen as 
experiencing competitive dynamics between the EU-bloc and various 
international actors including the U.S. and an emerging China.   
According to neo-realist predictions, it could be argued that a degree of regional 
competition exists between both actors, resulting from the expected balancing of 
US hegemony. These competitive dynamics, which are more explicit on climate 
and trade issues, can nevertheless be identified by focusing on the respective 
approaches and commitments (both financial and political) to the region and to 
Egypt in particular. To an extent, this competition also affects the degree of 
legitimacy of the two actors vis-à-vis third countries and with regards to 
democracy promotion and aid assistance. Therefore, we could argue that using a 
Realist perspective would allow us to pose new questions and to arrive at a new 
hypothesis. Notwithstanding the intellectual challenge of applying Realism to the 
study of the EU external policy, this can prove fruitful and shed light on specific 
aspects of EU behaviour in the region and, in particular, in EU-Egyptian relations.  
Liberalism: Neo-liberal institutionalism 
The development and implementation of the ENP can also be conceptualised in 
neo-liberal institutional terms and as reflecting a neo-liberal EU agenda in the 
Mediterranean. The relevance of the neo-liberal institutionalist agenda in this 
context is that it focuses on: a) cooperation amongst actors in world politics and, 
b) the role of international institutions.  
Even though neo-liberal institutionalism shares some theoretical assumptions 
with neo-realism, key fundamental differences remain. Like neo-realism, neo-
liberal institutionalism aims at explaining state behaviour in an international 
system conceptualised as anarchic (or decentralised). Both approaches consider 
the nature of the international system and the centrality and power of the state 
as key variables in explaining and predicting patterns of behaviour (Keohane, 
1989, pp.7-8). However, neo-liberals see international institutions as an 
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important intervening variable for policy coordination and for the realisation of 
common interests. From this perspective, power is conceptualised as taking into 
account other dimensions, such as the economy, production and influence. The 
concept of power here takes also an abstract and more implicit and abstract form 
such as soft power. Finally, the definition of states’ interests goes beyond neo-
realist understandings. In their seminal work Power and Interdependence, 
Keohane and Nye (1977) challenged realist assumptions through the concept of 
complex interdependence on two grounds: the absolute centrality of the state 
and the primacy of military power in world affairs. Complex interdependence is 
seen as characterised by three features: multiple channels of contact amongst 
industrial countries, the absence of hierarchy amongst issues and, the minor role 
of military force. It relies on the concept of mutual dependence in world politics 
and refers to “[A] situation characterised by reciprocal effects amongst countries 
or amongst actors in different countries” (Keohane and Ney, 1977, pp. 9 & 29). 
While retaining the importance of the state in the analysis, complex 
interdependence allows for the evaluation of relations in the international 
system at the trans-governmental and trans-national level, where actors such as 
NGOs, international regimes and, sub-governmental agencies also operate 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.25). In this multi-level and multi-actor context, the 
concept of mutual interests becomes central for understanding the above 
approach.  
The geographical proximity of the EU to the Mediterranean has resulted in an 
acknowledgment of the concept of mutual dependence and therefore, of mutual 
interests. This refers to the economic and financial fields but clearly extends to 
include security. The EU approach in the Mediterranean is arguably a reflection 
of the above argument in its emphasis on achieving stability through 
development and prosperity, and signals a new comprehensive security agenda 
enshrined in the European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS states (Council of the 
European Union, 2003, p.2) that in the current global environment the increase 
in trade and investment flows, as well as new technological developments, have 
resulted in a bigger “scope for non-state groups to play a part in international 
affairs” and, as a result, have “increased European dependence – and so 
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vulnerability – on an interconnected structure in transport, energy, information 
and other fields” (ibid.). From a neo-liberal intuitionalist’s perspective, then, the 
ultimate goal of regional arrangements or regional projects such as the EMP and 
the ENP is the procurement of the public good from interdependence, be these 
economic or security ones. In this context, the pursuit of European security 
requires a degree of mutual management from a variety of actors. This process 
becomes more attainable when integrated into institutional and normative 
structures, thus making the concept of security regimes, in this case, more 
desirable and thus, applicable.  
Therefore, international institutions can be seen to have a significant impact on 
state behaviour: “[S]tate actions depend on a considerable degree on prevailing 
institutional arrangements” (Keohane, 1989, p.2). It is important to note that the 
new security agenda with its emphasis on non-military factors has reduced the 
degree of perceived anarchy in the system, thus minimising the security dilemma 
and rendering the possibility of cooperation amongst states more likely and 
attainable. In this new security context, institutions are seen to have an effect on: 
1) the flow of information and opportunities to negotiate, 2) the ability of 
governments to monitor others and make sure they implement their 
commitment and 3) prevailing expectations about the solidity of international 
agreements (ibid.).  
Keohane argues (1989, p.2) that formal and informal rules can play a much more 
important role for state behaviour. Two factors are important and affect the 
degree of reliability of that statement: 1) the degree of mutual interests of actors, 
i.e. how much will they gain from their cooperation and 2) the degree of 
instiutionalisation, i.e. institutional variation (Keohane, 1989, p.p.2-3). Therefore 
and within the context of cooperation, institutions are seen to have value 
separate and apart from states (Keohane and Martin, 1995, p.42). Essentially, 
they can be seen as providing benefits and goods to states. The authors note that 
institutions become even more relevant with regards to the relative/absolute 
gains debate as they render issues of distribution and bargain more salient 
(Keohane and Martin, 1995, p. 45).  
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We could argue then that cooperation amongst states in a decentralised 
international system will be more likely when institutional arrangements are 
present. In fact, these institutional arrangements will emerge in such a way as to 
reflect the shared interests of actors, and could have the potential to mitigate 
certain transaction costs associated with cooperation. Keohane (1989, p.11) 
emphasises the role of institutions in shaping expectations and determining the 
relevance of absolute and relative gains for states. State action and state interests 
must be interpreted and analysed within a context of embedded beliefs, 
expectations and  rules of cooperation within international organisations 
(Keohane, 1984, pp.54-6).  
Focusing on the ENP, it could be argued that the dense institutionalisation of the 
policy and the creation of joint-fora established at various levels could be seen as 
communication-channels or dialogue-spaces that the EU has created in order to 
engage and increase the prospects of cooperation in a variety of fields. For 
example, the Commission sees sector policy dialogue with partners under the 
ENP structure and within area-specific sub-committees very positively (Note to 
File-H1, 2008, p.11). There is no doubt that the trade and economic envelopes of 
the Euro-Mediterranean agenda are perceived as the most important aspect of 
the relation for both the EU and its partners. The Association Agreements (AA) in 
fact, focus predominantly on the economic and financial reforms and at 
transitions aimed at economic harmonisation and integration with EU structures. 
Mediterranean partners are clearly seeking to benefit from the above 
arrangements. Dondini and Fantini note (2006, p.510-2), that the ENP can have 
an impact on three important economic channels: structural reform, fiscal and 
monetary stability, and trade (Dondini and Fantini, 2006, p.512).  
We could argue, then, that the ENP can be conceptualised as an institutional 
arrangement, a cooperation arrangement,  that holds EU agency. However, we 
need to ask to what extent this arrangement matters and under which 
conditions? As argued by Keohane (1993, pp. 32-3 in Rittberg & Mayer Eds.), 
insitutions matter with regards to international behaviour in a number of ways. 
They can affect actors’ capabilities through the exploitation of power 
asymmetries, they can alter actors’ perceptions of their interests by reducing 
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transaction costs and by increasing policy-options. Regimes can also help 
introduce to states new practices, rules and ideas (ibid.).   
 
Keohane (1984, p.62-3) argues that a more sophisticated definition of states’ 
interests is needed to validate this point. In fact, and as seen before, self-interests 
should be defined beyond the realist understanding of power and rational action. 
The important point here is the variation in the perception of interests by actors. 
In essence, regimes should be conceptualised as “[A]rrangements motivated by 
self-interests: as components of a system in which sovereignty remains a 
constitutive principle” (Keohane, 1984, p.63). From this perspective, the EU 
agenda in the Mediterranean is seen as accommodating self- and partners’ 
interests and characterised by a number of agreements, norms and regulations 
that set the basis for this cooperation. With regard to EU-Egyptian relations, for 
example, regulative reforms and approximation with EU legislation are seen to 
address both actors’ interests.  Returning to the debate on Europeanisation and 
the mechanisms of conditionality and socialisation, it becomes all the more 
relevant to understand how these affect actors’ behaviour: how do these 
injunctions against certain types of behaviour translate? In a policy such as the 
ENP how are positive and negative inducements exercised?  Therefore, 
evaluating the implementation of the ENP from this perspective would enable us 
to identify and describe areas where patterns of cooperation and harmony are 
present, but also areas where discord and conflict still reign. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Assessing the literature on the ENP revealed that the policy is seen as an 
instrument of normative power. In the above chapter we have seen that the 
normative power paradigm (Manners:2002) rests on the assumption of a 
benevolent power which promotes its interests externally through the 
promotion of its ideas, principles and values (Manners and Lucarelli: 2006). 
Power is here a very abstract concept which is exercised implicitly and in a non-
traditional manner. Theoretically, this explanation is underpinned by 
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constructivism and the notion that actions are taken within a socially-
constructed environment and through interpretative filters such as ideas, beliefs, 
norms, identities and culture (Parsons, 2010, p.80).  
 
Moving away from the above conceptualisation and broadening the theoretical 
spectrum has allowed the study to consider alternative assumptions and 
explanations. This presents the researcher with a totally different 
conceptualisation of the ENP, one with clear power-centric objectives and 
rationale. Using a Realist framework to the analysis has allowed us to highlight 
the elements that make the ENP an instrument for the pursue of EU self-interest 
in the region. From this perspective, we could argue that the ENP allows the EU 
to extend its regional influence, to penetrate regional economies and, ultimately, 
to address regional security threats. Based on these assumptions, EU relations 
with Egypt should be based on practical security and economic interests and 
thus, should be seen as maintaining the regional status quo. That said, theoretical 
eclecticism has raised a number of important questions to be addressed in this 
regards. For instance, are norms instrumentally used to pursue power-centric 
objectives? What are the real EU and Egyptian interests in the context of the 
ENP? To what extent is the EU balancing US hegemony in the region and in 
Egypt? Can we identify convergence or divergence in their respective policies 
towards Egypt?  
 
Alternatively, using a liberal institutionalist framework has emphasised the 
development and organisation of EU institutional governance and its 
externalisation in Europe’s neighbourhood. Here, the ENP is conceptualised as 
characterised by institutions, norms, rules and regulations and with the aim of 
enhancing cooperation and institutional integration. The emphasis on 
cooperation and shared interests is crucial in this perspective and it allows us to 
evaluate the extent to which the Egyptian relations with EU have become 
institutionalised. From this perspective, the ENP can be seen as a tool for 
cooperation within which Egypt could also maximise its interests and where 
interests themselves, can be shaped through persuasion and socialisation. 
Relevant questions that emerge here include: to what extent is the EU-Egyptian 
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relationship institutionalised? What are the actors’ shared expectations of costs 
and benefits? To what extent does the ENP provide an institutional forum for 
dialogue and negotiation?  
 
It could be argued that a pluralist conceptualisation of norms allows us to bridge 
the various approaches with the parading of normative power Europe and to 
question the ontology of related concepts such as power, interests and 
cooperation. Thus, the rationale of the theoretical framework is to emphasise the 
value of all approaches outlined above and to recognise the shared agenda of 
complex-interdependence. However, the crux of the research will be concerned 
with the different explanations provided with regards to motives.  In this context, 
the various stages of the policy can provide us with different explanations. Here 
the concept of Europeanisation becomes important both as a conceptual and 
analytical tool. Europeanisation allows us to evaluate the influence of EU 
institutions in shaping partners’ priorities and motivations. Applying the concept 
of Europeanisation to the above problem can provide an analytical solution in 
terms of bridging the levels of analysis (Wong, 2006, p.6; White, 2004, p.20).  
 
Theoretically, the above framework will enable us to focus on the differentiated 
nature of the implementation of the ENP in terms of sectors and levels for 
analysis and, will provide us with a range of theories for the identification of 
motivation and responses at different policy stages. The added value of a 
theoretical eclecticism to the analysis is that it will be characterised by mutually 
inclusive and reinforcing perspectives thus, proving us with a multi-dimensional 
view of the subject matter. Not only will this project reject intellectual purity, but 
it will also benefit from its plurality by approaching and evaluating the various 
theoretical concepts from differing perspectives. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
EU-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS: THE RELEVANCE OF NORMS AND 
VALUES IN POLICY PROCESSES, STRUCTURES AND 
MECHANISMS  
 
This aim of this chapter is to outline the implementation process of EU-Egyptian 
cooperation under the ENP. In doing so, the chapter will outline the 
programming cycle, present and explain the various modalities for the delivery 
of assistance, and explain the levels of interaction between actors and their 
respective functions. Finally, the chapter will present the allocation of funds for 
Egypt over the period 2002 to 2013.  
In the context of the implementation process, the role of norms and values will 
remain central to our explanation. As seen in the previous chapter, norms can be 
conceptualised from various theoretical perspectives which can provide 
alternative explanations with regards to EU behaviour towards Egypt. For 
instance, from a constructivist perspective, the promotion of EU norms and 
values could be said to exemplify a benevolent ontology in the explanation of EU 
behaviour internationally. This chapter will argue that the choice of delivery 
methods and the prioritisation of sectors for interventions can be very telling in 
this regards. All delivery methods come with a set of mechanisms that can be 
seen as favourable for the transfer and adoption of norms. As already explored, it 
is not a coincidence that the ENP has borrowed a number of tools and 
instruments from the Enlargement process and that the policy is based on a 
similar benchmarking logic.  This chapter will also outline the function and 
division labour of the various Egyptian and European institutions operating in 
the context of the ENP in Egypt. The role of the EU Delegation in Cairo is central 
for the implementation and monitoring processes and can be considered the 
representative office of the EU in Egypt. It is not a consular office but rather, is 
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responsible for all matters related to trade, cooperation and diplomacy between 
the EU and Egypt. Between 2008 and 2012, the Delegation in Cairo comprised 
approximately 90 members of staff, 30  of which European officials and 
contractual agents.  
This chapter will explain how delivery methods can be conducive to the 
promotion of change in partner countries and how the mechanisms of 
socialisation and conditionality are inherent in that process. Moreover, it will be 
argued that through selected delivery methods the EU can be seen to attempt to 
induce change in partner states at various levels, be it procedural, institutional 
and/or individual. This chapter will also explain the channels for communication 
and the levels of interaction between the EU and its Egyptian counterparts under 
the framework of the ENP. This section will allow us to understand the reporting 
lines, roles, responsibilities and, importantly, the challenges that emerge in this 
context.  Finally, the chapter will outline the scope and distribution of EU funding 
under the ENP in Egypt with specific focus on the period 2007-2013. Of 
particular interest in this section will be the prioritisation of sectors and the 
gradual emphasis on the political dimension of cooperation.  
This chapter will firstly outline the rationale of the ENP and present the policy 
structure and instruments. This will entail unpacking the ENP programming 
cycle with its related processes and mechanism and will explain the implication 
of the ENPI for EU-Egyptian cooperation. Secondly, this chapter will shift the 
locus of the analysis on the sectors for cooperation under the EEAP and on the 
actors that characterise the implementation process and their respective 
functions and responsibilities. This section will allow us to better understand the 
levels and nature of interaction between EU and Egyptian practitioners. Thirdly, 
the chapter will outline project-cycle management for the implementation of the 
EEAP. In doing so, this final section will present the various delivery methods 
and explain how they are applied. Importantly, this section will highlight their 
relevance for the process of norms transfer. In its final section, this chapter will 
look at the formulation of cooperation with Egypt and at the allocation of funds 
per sector and over time.  
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THE ENP FROM FORMULATION TO PRACTICE 
This section will briefly outline the rationale, objectives and structure of the ENP 
with specific focus on the priorities of the EU-Egyptian Action Plan (EEAP). The 
section will argue that the emphasis on values and norms has become very 
explicit in the ENP and specifically in the EEAP. Moreover and unlike previous 
policy frameworks in the Mediterranean (see Annex 1), the ENP manifests a 
stronger emphasis on conditionality and a benchmarking logic. The ENP is a 
policy based on the recognition of shared values such as democracy, good 
governance and the respect of human rights but also, on the recognition and 
acceptance of principles related to liberal and market-oriented economic 
orthodoxy.  The policy builds on the existing EU institutional structure in the 
Mediterranean and emphasizes in particular the bilateral and unilateral 
dimensions of the Barcelona Processes (see Annex 1).   
Officially, the Commission firstly outlined the ENP as part of the ‘Wider Europe 
and Neighbourhood’ communication in 2003. The document aimed to address 
the changing nature of the EU and of its neighbors following the 2004 round of 
enlargement. In the Wider Europe communication the Commission noted that:  
“[T]he EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood 
– a ‘ring of friends’ - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative 
relations” (emphasis original) (European Commission, 2003, p.4).   
The method envisaged for the creation of such a region would rely on intensified 
economic and political relations between the EU and its neighbouring partners 
and importantly, on a long term approach of European support for domestic 
reforms, development and trade (European Commission, 2003, p.4).  In this 
context, the Wider Europe Communication states that:  
“In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective 
implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including in 
aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighborhood should benefit from the 
prospect of closer economic integration with the EU” (European Commission, 
2003, p.4).  
 
109 
 
We could argue that the approach advocated by the Commission is one based on 
the application of positive conditionality, whereby progress in the field of 
reforms would result in increased access to the EU markets and EU networks. 
This is an approach that seems to support the EU as a normative power, one able 
to transform its neighbourhood according to its own values and principles.  To 
this end, the Commission outlined the incentives offered as being access to the 
EU internal market, further integration and trade liberalizations aimed at 
promoting free movement of people, capital, services and goods (European 
Commission, 2003, p.4).  
In 2004, the subsequent year, the Commission formally unveiled the ENP in the 
Strategy Paper (2004). The Strategy Paper outlined the objectives of the ENP as 
follows: 1) commitment to shared values, 2) a more effective political dialogue, 
3) economic and social development policy, 4) trade and internal market, 5) 
cooperation in justice and home affairs, 6) connecting the neighbourhood, 7) 
people-to-people programmes (Whitman and Wolff, 2010, p.7; European 
Commission, 2004, pp.12-20). For its implementation, the ENP would rely on 
country-specific Action Plans (AP) drafted on the basis of individual Country 
Strategy Papers (CSP). The AP would serve to outline the priorities for action and 
to benchmark progress in key areas (European Commission, 2004, p. 3). The 
Strategy Paper also confirmed the intention outlined in the Wider Europe 
communication to merge all financial instruments and payment system (existing 
under the TACIS and MEDA frameworks) under one new European 
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) (Dammelhuber, 2007, p.8).21 Finally, 
the Strategy Paper (2004), along with the Council conclusions that followed, saw 
a downgrading of the incentives on offer as originally outlined in the Wider 
Europe communication. In fact, the ‘four freedoms’ were no longer mentioned 
and, instead, the incentives on offer focused primarily on aid and economic 
assistance, integration into EU programs and EU support with regards to 
accessions and financing by international financial institutions (IFIs) (Comelli, 
                                                          
21 Under the new ENPI made operational from January 2007, a total amount of € 11.181 billion was allocated globally for the 
period 2007-2013; of the total allocation, 95% was directed to country-specific forms  of cooperation while 70% specifically to 
Mediterranean countries. The ENP is also supported by the European Investment Bank (EIB) which in 2006 renewed its 
mandate for lending in the Mediterranean and Eastern neighbourhoods with a total allocation for the former of € 8.7 billion, 
around 60% of the total (Dammelhuber, 2007, pp.7-8). 
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2005, pp.4-5). The issues of movement of people between neighbouring 
countries and the EU remained a salient one which ENP partners have been keen 
to raise whenever possible.  
The ENP Programming Cycle 
The Action Plans (AP) are the main policy instruments introduced under the 
framework of the ENP. Although not legally binding, the AP provide a sort of 
road map of priorities for cooperation and reform with partners. Despite the fact 
that official EU documentation defines AP as based on specific local needs and 
realities differentiated, all AP have a similar structure of chapters and similar 
overall priority sectors. This structure aims to give the ENP a sense of policy 
coherence even though it has attracted criticism from some partners arguing 
against a one-size fits all approach. This was also the perception of some key 
Egyptian officials who expressed surprise as well as uneasiness with some of the 
terminology initially associated with the policy such as a ‘Wider Europe policy’ 
and ‘neighbourhood’ as opposed to the term ‘partnership’ used under the EMP. 
The latter, implying a geographical as opposed to a geo-political criteria in the 
choice of partners (Personal communication, Egyptian official, Cairo, 7th 
September 2009).  
Generally, AP comprise six actions or chapters reflecting the policy’s broad 
objectives. These cover respectively:  1) political dialogue and socio-economic 
development; 2) trade-related issues, market and regulatory reforms; 3) 
transport, energy and environment; 4) migration, social integration, justice and 
security; 5) science and technology, research and development and information 
society; 6) people-to-people contacts. Each chapter is then composed of 
additional priorities for actions. Overall, the AP are formulated on the basis of 
Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and the EU response strategy for each partner 
state.  
The Country Strategy Papers (CSP) are Commission documents drafted under 
the framework of the new instrument for financial assistance (the ENPI) that 
“[S]et out the EU’s policy and cooperation goals, together with its intended 
strategic response, and identif[y] appropriate priority objectives” (European 
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Commission, 2007a, p.3). Once the above priorities have been identified and 
responses formulated, individual AP are drafted by the Commission, presented 
to the Council for adoption and subsequently negotiated with the respective 
partner countries. The EU response to the CSP in terms of financial assistance 
takes the form of indicative financial and sector allocation through a multi-
annual indicative programme (MIP): nationally through the National Indicative 
Programme (NIP) and regionally though the Regional Indicative Programme 
(RIP).  
The National Indicative Programme (NIP) sets the “[S]pecific operations planned 
and the expected results […]” within a specific time-frame of three years from 
2007-2010 and 2011-2013 (European Commission, 2007a, p.3). In turn, these 
are phased over the period outlined and through Annual Action Programmes 
(AAP) which are country-specific annual programmes aimed at implementing 
the objectives outlined in the CSP. The AAP constitute the operational aspects of 
the implementation of the priorities outlined in the CSP and within the specific 
NIP. AAP are prepared by Commission personnel on the ground in the Delegation 
of the EU. Based on the priorities identified in the NIP and on the funding 
allocation earmarked for a given programme, the Delegation staff embarks on a 
process of consultations with partners. At this stage, partner states have the 
opportunity to reject any given programme. As a result of these consultations, 
once agreed upon,  individual programmes selected for support take the form of 
Action Fiches (AF) which are later submitted to an EU internal inter-services 
consultation and quality-control process. Finally, the Commission endorses the 
AAP with a decision which needs to be approved by partner countries. AF are 
then developed according to programme objectives, expected results and 
indicators to be utilised for monitoring, payment mechanisms and targeted 
beneficiaries.  
Dialogue and monitoring implementation: the ENP Sub-committees 
Once the AP are in force, technical sub-committees composed of EU officials and 
civil servants from the partner states oversee the implementation and 
monitoring of the different themes or chapters in the AP (European Commission, 
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2007a, p.3). The outcomes of discussions and the objectives obtained under the 
various subcommittees are presented at the annual Association Committee 
which meets at expert level and which in turn, presents its finding at the 
Association Council which meets annually at ministerial level. Thematic sub-
committees were introduced through the ENP as a forum for dialogue and 
interaction between respective practitioners. Importantly, sub-committees also 
signal an increased attempt to institutionalise relations with the EU across 
sectors. That said, it is difficult to evaluate who benefits most from this 
institutionalisation of cooperation, in particular with regards to political 
dialogue. On the one hand, political dialogue implies dialogue on domestic cross-
sector issues including democratisation while, on the other, political dialogue is 
understood in terms of traditional security issues and areas of cooperation 
related to foreign policy, defence and peacekeeping. There is no doubt that in 
less sensitive sectors, sub-committees can enhance communication, help forge 
shared expectation and target cooperation in areas of mutual interest.  
The monitoring process under the ENP framework relies both on the sub-
committees structure as well as on a system of yearly reports drawn up by the 
Commission. The reports are unilateral evaluations of the implementation of the 
AP and, in the specific case of Egypt, have proved to be a source of disagreement, 
particularly as the role of the latter in the consultative process is rather weak. 
These annual reports, highlight areas where progress has been satisfactory and 
where improvements could be made (Furness and Bodenstein, 2007, p.8).  
Annual reports should provide the Commission with the opportunity to review 
cooperation with partners and review the APs before eventually renegotiating 
them. In turn, partner countries deemed as successful and willing partners will 
be rewarded with a more comprehensive cooperation agreement (Furness and 
Bodenstein, 2007, p.9).  
The Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX), now the European 
External Action Service – EEAS- is responsible for the drafting of the reports 
based on the inputs of the various Delegations on the ground. Delegation staff 
drafts the reports according to their respective sectors of expertise (political, 
social, economic and trade) and then sends them to the desk-officers at HQ in 
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Brussels. Desk-officers are HQ focal-points for Delegation staff and provide 
advice and support at the administrative and procedural level. This includes 
formulating programmes and drafting agreements for example. The desk-officers 
verify and edit the reports before they are internally endorsed by HQ in Brussels.   
Once finalised and published, annual reports can be considered a key document 
in the cycle of the ENP since they provide an assessment of the implementation 
process and hence, can influence the nature and intensity of EU cooperation with 
partners. The Commission takes great care in weighing the tone and language in 
the reports as they often serve as diplomatic tools for communicating positions 
and intentions on various matters.  
As Whitman and Wolff (2010, p.9) note, we could argue that the ENP 
mechanisms rest on a cyclical or structured set of policy processes from the 
formulation of priorities based on CSP, to the implementation of the AP and their 
review through the various sub-committees and annual reports and the 
evaluation process.  
The European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI)  
With the introduction of the ENP, the framework for cooperation and assistance 
in the Mediterranean evolved from that outlined under the provisions of the 
MEDA system (see Annex 1), to the newly formulated European Neighbourhood 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (Regulation N. 1638/2006). The ENPI includes 
three innovations to the MEDA system: 1) a cross-border-cooperation (CBC) 
mechanism bringing partners that share a border closer together; 2) additional 
financial support through the new Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), the 
Good Governance Facility (GGF) and finally, 3) merging previous cooperation 
frameworks such as TACIS and MEDA under the ENPI. Importantly, the ENPI 
could be seen as further enhancing the opportunity for partners to benefit from 
instruments such as TAIXE and  Twinning (European Commission, 2010a). These 
are instruments which could be seen as traditionally employed for the accession 
process and primarily aimed at institutional approximation between public 
administrations in partner countries and the equivalent institution in an EU 
Member State (ibid.). In the context of the implementation of the EEAP, 
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Twinning, and TAIEX are particularly pertinent to the process of legislative 
harmonisation with the acquis. Additionally, they are seen as providing financial 
and technical assistance and Commission know-how.  
According to Delegation staff (Personal communication, N.14, 2009), the 
introduction of the ENPI reflects an evolution rather than a shift in the delivery 
methods for assistance. The ENPI is in fact, a more efficient tool for coordination 
and cooperation between partners and European developmental financial 
agencies such as the EIB, the AFD and the KfW. The introduction of the NIF under 
the ENPI has resulted in the ability of the Commission to disburse larger sums of 
money and to focus efforts on sector-reforms and dialogue. This evolution should 
also be understood in terms of a potential increase in EU influence on sector 
reforms and administrative and procedural reforms. Ultimately, the ENPI was 
designed to support change and reform in partner states:  
 
“The ENPI has three strategic objectives, namely: supporting democratic transition 
and promoting human rights; the transition towards the market economy and the 
promotion of sustainable development; and policies of common interests 
(antiterrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conflict 
resolution, the rule of international law, etc.). Within the framework of these 
strategic objectives, the Commission and partner countries established four 
principal axes of co-operation based on: 1) The implementation of a strengthened 
dialogue on priority multisector reforms 2) The approximation of legislation 3) 
Institutional support 4) The Objectives of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals”  
(European Commission, 2010a). 
 
The introduction of the ENPI resulted in additional financial resources being 
allocated to the neighbourhood (an overall increase of 32%). Under the 
framework of the ENPI, the MIP for Egypt was allocated €558 million for the 
period 2007-2010 and, €449.29 million for the period 2011-2013 (European 
Commission, 2011, p. 7). Moreover, a more explicit emphasis was placed by the 
Commission on the promotion of regulatory, institutional and legislative reforms 
and policy dialogue, through the application of sector budget support (SBS) as a 
delivery method. As an EU official noted, the introduction of the ENPI in Egypt 
115 
 
has mainly meant a change in terms of method and quantity, i.e. more use of SBS 
meant larger amounts disbursed (Personal communication, N.9, 2009). Some EU 
practitioners at the Delegation have noted that the added value of the ENP and 
ENPI is in its sector prioritization process and response to national needs. 
Importantly, this process is seen as based on a demand-driven logic that informs 
cooperation assistance (Personal communication, N.8, 2009).  
 
It could be argued that although the focus of EU support in Egypt remains 
oriented towards regulatory and market reforms, the introduction of the ENPI 
broadens the target-areas for cooperation and promotes multi-level EU 
interaction with Egyptian actors though the introduction of additional delivery 
methods. This chapter will thus argue that the recent evolution of the 
Commissions’ delivery methods and the utilization of SBS and Twinning in 
particular, can facilitate the process of normative transfer. As it will be explained 
in section three of this chapter, the application of technical conditionality and 
socialisation are also identifiable through the implementation of delivery 
methods.  
EU-EGYPT ACTION PLAN: PRIORITIES AND ACTORS 
The aim of this section is to identify the nature of EU-Egyptian cooperation and 
identify what could be described as priority sectors for action under the ENP. 
Importantly, this section will assess the type of norms promoted under EU-
Egyptian cooperation. Initially, the focus will be on EU-Egyptian Action Plan 
(EEAP) before outlining the relevant policy sectors and actors involved in the 
implementation process. This section will also outline the delivery methods 
(instruments) under the ENP before finally looking at the operational dimension 
of the relationship by focusing on project cycle management (PCM).   
 
The Joint EU-Egyptian Action Plan (EEAP) 
The agenda for EU-Egyptian relations under the ENP is outlined in the provisions 
of the Action Plan. The Joint EU-Egypt Action Plan (EEAP) is, like most such 
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documents, composed by six broad chapters.22 Within the six chapters nineteen 
priorities for action can be identified, covering a number of issues ranging from 
security to political dialogue, political reform, socio economic reforms, trade, 
economic modernisation and people-to-people contact. The EEAP states that:   
“[I]mplemetation will help fulfil the provisions and aims of the Association 
Agreement (AA) and will encourage and support Egypt’s national development, 
modernisation and reform objectives” (European Commission, 2007b, p.3).  
The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA) with Egypt was signed 
in Luxemburg on the 25 July 2001 and entered into force on the 1 June 2004. The 
agreement primarily emphasises the establishment of an FTA in the region and 
aims at bringing Egypt closer to the EU in terms of trade and financial 
liberalisation. That said, the agreement also emphasises the principles outlined 
in the United Nations Charter, particularly the observance of human rights, 
democratic principles and economic freedom.  
Egyptian reactions to the introduction of the ENP and the AP were initially 
negative. The immediate reactions by Egyptian practitioners to the new policy 
was one of surprise as much as annoyance for the lack of consultations over the 
initiative. From an Egyptian perspective, Cairo had just ratified the EMAA and 
implementation was not even under way when the proposal for the ENP was put 
forward by European negotiators (Personal Communication, N. 27, 2009). 
Moreover, Egyptian negotiators perceived the status of their relationship with 
the EU as down-graded from ‘partner’ to ‘neighbour’ (ibid.). Some Egyptian 
officials even suspected that their EU counterparts were already aware of the 
upcoming negotiations over the AP during the negotiations for the EMAA 
(Personal communication, N. 7, 2009).  From their perspective, if they had 
known about the AP at the time of the EMAA negotiations, what was being 
negotiated and how would certainly have been different (ibid.). During the 
negotiations on the EEAP, the Egyptian administration insisted on a number of 
positions it deemed important before signing the document. Firstly, they wanted 
                                                          
22 These included: 1) political dialogue and socio-economic development; 2) trade related issues, market and regulatory 
reforms; 3) transport, energy and environment;  4) migration, social integration, justice and security; 5) science and technology, 
research and development and information society and finally, 6) people-to-people contacts. 
117 
 
to ensure that the document would reflect Egyptian priorities, not European 
ones. Thus, for Cairo, it was important to reflect an element of specificity in the 
AP. This meant emphasising that  Egyptian priorities were mainly concerned 
with the socio-economic chapter and not with the political one. Secondly, the 
EEAP was to be formulated and understood as a supporting instrument for the 
national process of reform, not as an EU agenda for Egypt. Thirdly, Egypt 
requested guarantees that the ENP would not replace but rather complement the 
EMP framework. Finally, Cairo was uneasy about some of the terminology in the 
AP such as ‘rewards’, and a formal request was made for such terminology to be 
replaced (Personal communication, N.27, 2009).  
The Action Plan’s pillars and target-sectors 
As we have seen, the EEAP compromises six chapters.23 For the purpose of this 
study these chapters will be defined as three distinct pillars aggregating a 
number of actions: a trade pillar, a socio-economic pillar and a political pillar.  
This aggregation and differentiation aims to draw some analytical order and to 
set clear and distinct parameters for the analysis.  
 
The trade pillar focuses on trade-related issues, market and regulatory reforms 
including movement of goods, right of establishment, company law and services 
as well as other key areas including taxation, competition policy and state aid, 
intellectual property rights and enterprise policy amongst others.  
The socio-economic pillar focuses on macro and micro economic issues including 
economic development and reforms, science and technology, research and 
development, information society and audio-visual cooperation as well as 
infrastructure issues such as transport, energy and environment. The social 
component of the pillar focuses on social development and social integration as 
well as people-to-people contacts.  
                                                          
23 Actions in the EEAP are listed as: (2.1) Enhanced political dialogue, economic and social development and reforms, (2.2) 
Trade related issues, market and regulatory reforms; (2.3) Transport, energy and environment; (2.4) Migration, social 
integration, justice and security, (2.5) Science and technology, research and development, information society and audio-visual 
cooperation; (2.6) People-to-people contacts (EEAP, 2007).  
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The political pillar includes actions related to democracy and the rule of law, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, cooperation in foreign and security 
policy, combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs); migration and border management, judicial cooperation in 
criminal and civil matters, promotion of transparency, the fight against organised 
crime including drugs, money laundering and human trafficking (European 
Commission: 2007b). Although the distinction between political and non-
political pillars in the EEAP could be considered conceptually weak, it is 
nevertheless useful for the analysis in order to distinguish between what is 
predominantly the domain of development cooperation and trade and, what 
actions tend to be considered more political in nature and thus, point to areas of 
cooperation that are more sensitive and problematic. The analysis will initially 
consider these pillars separately before providing an overall cross-pillar 
evaluation.  
 
We could argue that the priorities in the socio-economic and trade pillars of the 
EEAP point to a long-term strategy of sustainable socio-economic development 
aimed at increased economic integration with the EU market and increased 
economic development. Priorities for interventions include a number of sub-
sectors such as infrastructure, improving macro-economic governance, 
industrial development and enterprise, strengthening cooperation and support 
in the social, environmental and energy  sectors and deepening sector dialogue 
(policy dialogue) in all of the above (Commission, 2007b, pp.8-10). 
Implementation of these sector-objectives is foreseen to take place in a context 
of deeper political, economic and social relations and on the basis of the strategic 
partnership (Commission, 2007b, p.1).  The political pillar is a more sensitive 
pillar where the objectives of cooperation can be seen as two-fold: on the one 
hand, it aims to induce domestic reforms and dialogue in the field of democracy, 
human rights and good governance, and, on the other, it focuses on issues related 
to the regional dimension of security including illegal migration, trafficking and 
terrorism.  
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Actors: roles and responsibilities (levels of interaction)  
 
The EU Delegation in Cairo is the principle interlocutor between Brussels and 
Cairo on cooperation matters. The Delegation is responsible for programming, 
managing and monitoring implementation of the EEAP portfolios, in close 
coordination with the various Directorate General (DG) at HQ and with the 
relevant Egyptian counterparts. The Delegation comprises four main 
departments or sections: the finance and contract  section, the political section, 
the trade section and an operation section, the latter being responsible for all 
aspects of assistance and cooperation programmes provided to Egypt under the 
current and previous frameworks for cooperation (respectively the ENPI and 
MEDA). The finance sections mainly supports operations with procedural and 
legal aspects related to the cooperation framework. The role of the operation 
section is central to all levels of the ENP policy-process with Egypt, from 
identifying and formulating priorities (programming), to decisions related to the 
implementation of programmes and delivery methods, payments, monitoring 
and evaluation.  
 
Internally, the Operation section coordinates and manages all assistance with the 
various sub-sections (Economic cooperation and Social affairs). Its role is to 
coordinate and implement activities and support for Egypt. The Delegation also 
acts as a liaison with the respective institutional departments (DGs) in Brussels 
and Egyptian counterparts. All operations managed by the Delegation in Cairo 
are the responsibility of DG DEVCO which could be considered as the main 
implementing arm of the Commission under the ENP framework in Egypt. 
Importantly, the Operation section has the delicate task of identifying and 
agreeing cooperation and assistance programmes with the Egyptian government. 
Internally, the programming exercise is led by the Operation section at the 
Delegation in joint consultations with the EEAS and the DEVCO Egypt desk. The 
role of the Political section at the EU Delegation is to monitor and report to HQ 
the implementation (or not) of the EEAP political chapter and the nature of 
political developments in Egypt. The Trade section also holds more of a political 
and legal role and is particularly relevant in monitoring the implementation of 
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the EMAA and promoting further trade liberalisation through negotiations with 
the Egyptian counterparts, mainly with the Ministry of Trade. The Trade section 
also monitors domestic trade practices that fall short of international trade 
provisions as outlined by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the EMAA. 
These assessments should also be taken into consideration for the programming 
process. In terms of the actual management of programmes, the Political and 
Trade sections are not directly involved but rather, they provide advice and 
direction for potential programmes. In the context of the functions of the 
Delegation as a whole, the Political and Trade sections support the Operation 
section in formulating priorities and assessing implementation. The Operation 
section on the other hand, is responsible for managing the entire ENP 
programme portfolio for Egypt.   
 
The Operation section is divided in two-departments, the Economic section and 
the Social section. The Economic section is responsible for two different aspects 
of cooperation programmes in Egypt: the first focusing on strict economic issues 
related to trade, public finance management, macro-economic and financial 
policy and, a second dimension related to economic development understood in 
terms of structural and infrastructure modernisation and investment (Personal 
communications, N.5, N.14, 2009). The Social section is primarily concerned with 
projects related to social development such as rural development, education and 
health, all of which are primarily aimed at reducing poverty and improving socio-
economic conditions and quality of life in Egypt (Personal communication, N.4, 
2009). As an EU official put it, the operation section has a dual role: 1) the 
management of all projects with Egypt in all of their aspects and administration 
and, 2) a political role, since “[C]ooperation is the arms of the political relations 
of the EU” (Personal communication, N.26, 2009).  
 
Externally, the Delegation interacts with the Egyptian government mainly at 
ministerial and sub-ministerial levels and maintains close relations with various 
sections of civil society. With regards to the implementation of the EEAP, the 
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main interlocutors are the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation24, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. In the context of the 
implementing process, the Delegation also interacts with various public bodies 
and institutions as well as with other relevant line ministries. At the 
administrative level, the Ministry of International Cooperation is the main focal 
point or entry point for all EU assistance and cooperation. Importantly, it is the 
body which grants Egyptian approval for all EU programmes and assistance in 
the country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a central role at the political and 
diplomatic level, but also in terms of coordination and political dialogue at the 
policy level. In the context of the ENP sub-committee for example, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs holds a leading and coordinating role for all sub-committees.  
 
For our purposes, the main body of interests at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
the Steering Bureau for the Implementation of the EMAA and EEAP. Here, the 
Ministry’s role has been to coordinate the positions of various line ministries in 
their articulation of national sector needs and priorities for cooperation and 
assistance with the EU. The Steering Bureau also works to provide the EU with a 
coherent national position on a number of issues. This has been particularly 
useful for the EU Delegation during the processes of programming and 
identification in which the Bureau acts as main coordinator for the Egyptian side.  
The function of the Bureau is primarily to follow-up the state of implementation 
of the EEAP and evaluate and negotiate with the EU. Moreover, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has also the role of conveying official communications and 
demarches to the EU and vice versa.  
 
Finally, the role of the Ministry of Finance has recently become more important 
in terms of the EU criteria and conditions attached to the delivery modalities and, 
in particular, with regards to eligibility for sector budget support (SBS). In fact, 
SBS delivery implies a central role for the Ministry of Finance, since the funds are 
delivered to the national treasury and assume an increased efficiency in public 
finance management.  
                                                          
24 Before January the 25th 2011, it was the Ministry of International Cooperation.  
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We could argue that EU-Egyptian interaction in the context of implementation 
the ENP and the EEAP pillars primarily involves the Commission in the form of 
the Delegation on the ground and the three Egyptian ministerial focal points as 
outlined above. That said, everyday EU interaction with Egyptian counterparts 
increasingly takes place in the context of relevant line ministries and sub-
ministerial bodies. Arguably, it is at this level (sub-ministerial) that EU access is 
more qualitative and its influence more effective.  
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN: OPERATIONS AND 
DELIVERY METHODS  
The following section will attempt to outline the operational dimensions of EU-
Egyptian cooperation by focusing on the various project-cycle processes and 
related decision-making phases. The aim will be to understand how priorities are 
identified and implemented, and through which instruments. This section will 
outline the priorities for EU-Egyptian cooperation identified under the NIP 2007-
2010. The aim is to identify the prioritising of sectors and fund allocation from 
both partners during the period in question.  
 
The Project Cycle Management (PCM)  
 
From a narrow perspective, project cycle management (PCM) implies all the 
management activities and decision-making procedures associated with the life-
cycle of a programme or project (European Commission, 2005, p. 17). For our 
purpose, the PCM can also be understood as a conceptual framework for the 
management of the overall cooperation programme between the EU and Egypt 
under the ENP.  Importantly, the PCM allows us to understand how EU policy 
towards Egypt is prioritised, where the resources are allocated and how are they 
disbursed. Hence, the PCM should be considered as a tool for analysis as it allows 
us to identify and trace the implementation and, thus, the prioritisation of 
actions under the EEAP.  According to the Commission’s Guidelines for Aid 
delivery:  
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“Project cycle management is a complex and creative process involving the 
negotiation of decisions acceptable to key stakeholder groups…. [I]t provides an 
overall analytical and decision making framework, which must nevertheless be 
complemented by the application of other specific ‘technical’ and ‘process’ tools” 
(European Commission, 2004, p.2). 
 
The PCM is a process compromising six phases: 1) programming, 2) 
identification, 3) formulation, 4) implementation, 5) evaluation and 6) audit. The 
process of programming is coordinated by the Commission and programmes are 
selected according to the beneficiaries’ priorities, their evolving needs, 
absorption capacity and progress on reforms and, are based on the objectives 
outlined in the relevant Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and indicative 
programmes (Council Regulation N.1488/96, points 14-18) (For procedures see 
points 19-22).  
 
The main phases and related EU documentation and tools supporting the PCM in 
the context of the implementation of the EEAP are the following: 1) 
Programming phase: Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and National Indicative 
Programme (NIP); 2) Identification phase:  Identification or Action  Fiche 
(sometimes called an End of Identification Document); 3) Formulation phase: 
The Financing Proposal, either for individual projects or for a Programme of 
Projects (sometimes called an ‘Action Programme/Financing Decision’); 4) 
Implementation phase: The Financing Agreement and associated Technical and 
Administrative Provisions and Terms of Reference (ToR); 5) Monitoring 
(operational) phase: Information contained in the CRIS (Common Relex 
Information System), including the Implementation Report window; and 6) 
Evaluation phase: evaluation and Audit reports (European Commission, 2004, p. 
18).  
Each of these documents is relevant in the PCM at different stages of the 
operational cycle although not all are publicly accessible (e.g. Financing 
Agreements and ToR). For our purposes, this section will focus on the first four 
phases and related documentation. The selection of these documents is essential 
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for understanding and unpacking the nature of interaction and cooperation 
between the EU and Egypt under the framework of the ENP.  
 
Each phase of the PCM implies different levels of interaction, decision-making 
and responsibilities between EU and Egyptian officials. For example, the 
programming and identification phases (1) undertaken by the Commission are 
articulated in the CSP and NIP. The process involves consultations and joint 
identification of priorities with partners and stakeholders at various levels 
(ministerial, sub-ministerial, experts, civil society). The formulation phase (2) is 
mainly related to internal EU decisions on programmes such as prioritisation 
and approval with the involvement of Audit Committees, member states and the 
European Parliament (EP). This phase is articulated in the Annual Action 
Programme (AAP) and Action Fiches (AF), also known as the Financing Decision 
in which partner states have to undertake a pre-feasibility study. The 
implementation phase (3) entails the signing of the Financial Agreement and 
associated Terms of References (TORs) for each programme and project. Here 
the main Egyptian interlocutors are the key three ministries: the Ministry of 
International Cooperation, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  Depending on the mode of delivery, additional relevant line ministries or 
other public and non-public bodies are also involved at the technical level. The 
implementation phase consists of the implementation of operational plans as 
well as a monitoring process (annual and quarterly reports) which are often 
conducted by partners states (principle of ownership) with Commission support 
(European Commission, 2004, p. 19).  
Delivery Methods 
 
This section aims to outline the delivery methods under the framework of the 
ENP and to highlight the central role played by the Commission and in 
particularly, by DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) in the 
implementation of the EEAP. The aim here is to understand how the Commission 
delivers cooperation in partner states and through which mechanisms. The term 
‘delivery’ here is conceptualised as the actual implementation of projects 
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following a specific cycle of stages and procedures comprising the identification 
of priorities, financial and implementing modalities and monitoring. This section 
will argue that utilising instruments from Enlargement and Development policy, 
the Commission is able to apply mechanisms for normative transfer 
(conditionality and socialisation) in a variety of sectors and across different 
levels (policy and institutional) in its cooperation with Egypt. To sustain this 
argument this section will outline the various processes of how objectives are 
identified, how resources are transferred and under what conditions.  
 
In order to understand delivery methods under the ENP we firstly need to 
contextualise their rationale as part of the EU aid and development strategy. The 
principles and objectives of the EU’s external aid and development strategy are 
set under Art.177-181 EU Treaty and aim at the fostering of sustainable 
economic and social development, the smooth and gradual integration of the 
developing countries into the world economy and the fight against poverty. DG 
DEVCO is the main institutional interlocutor with both beneficiaries and the 
EEAS (ex-RELEX) and all sector DGs (DEVCO, 2011). With regards to the 
Mediterranean region, strategic objectives are defined as:  
 
“[T]he establishment of a zone of peace, stability and prosperity, and supporting 
economic and political reform and transition” (European Commission, 2004, p.4).  
 
The main instruments envisaged for pursuing this strategy are: political 
dialogue, development cooperation and trade. In this context, ownership of 
partners/beneficiaries, together with an increasingly participatory role for civil 
society and the harmonisation of donors’ efforts, are all principles agreed by the 
international donor community (see the OECD’s Rome Declaration on 
Harmonisation, 1998 and 2003) and reinforced by the principles outlined in the 
Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda (2005). From an EU perspective, a re-
adjustment of intervention modalities was needed for: a) the streamlining of aid 
delivery instruments, b) promoting the use of sector and budgetary aid as 
delivery methods; c) increasing decentralisation of responsibilities (devolution) 
to the EU Delegations on the ground and, d) promoting the harmonisation of 
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donor’s efforts (Commission, 2004, p.5). Moreover, it could be argued that the 
new strategic approach also emphasised the interconnectedness and links 
between socio-economic development and good governance and, generally, the 
promotion of increased democratisation. In this context, the Commission’s Aid 
Delivery Guidelines (2004) state that:  
 
“Irrespective of the sector focus, delivery modality (e.g. budgetary aid or projects) 
or geographic location of EC development assistance, there are a number of critical 
cross-cutting development issues which must be appropriately addressed 
throughout the project management cycle” (ibid.).  
 
These cross-cutting issues include: good governance, gender equality and 
environmental sustainability (ibid.).25 Although these cross-cutting issues can be 
conceptualised as development objectives in their own right, they also reflect an 
increasing concern with long-term objectives related to institutional and 
administrative reforms and the promotion of basic (and political) rights.  This 
new approach seems particularly evident in the working logic of the ENP Action 
Plans and in the strategic rationale of the ENPI were political dialogue, 
development cooperation and trade are all part of one seemingly coherent 
cooperation framework. Importantly, we could argue that re-adjustment of 
intervention modalities specifically envisaged the promotion of SBS and the 
improvement of local ownership thorough institutional and procedural 
decentralisation. In this context, political dialogue could be also understood as 
sector policy dialogue compromising increased dialogue in the process of 
identification and implementation of priorities.  
 
As already noted, Commission operations in terms of support and assistance rest 
on a varied number of delivery methods and instruments. The choice of delivery 
methods is usually established during the programming phase and rests on the 
assessment of the socio-economic and political development of the partner state 
                                                          
25
 See pp.5-6 of Aid Delivery Guidelines (2004) for a Commission’s definition of the three above cross-
cutting issues and their relevance to development assistance.  
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and its national priorities. The choice of delivery methods by the Commission is 
based on four important considerations:  
 
“(i) the degree of control donors wish to maintain over their resources; (ii) who 
takes primary responsibility for targeting resources; (iii) the level at which donors 
and their partners wish to engage in dialogue – policy or project; and (iv) then level 
of transaction costs associated with managing donor funds” (European 
Commission, 2004, p. 12).  
 
The section below will present the rationale and characteristics of the main 
delivery methods as outlined in the Commission’s Aid Delivery Guidelines 
(2004).  The role of Delegation in this context consists of evaluating the criteria 
for delivery, assessing the capacity of recipients and conducting constant 
monitoring and evaluation of the implementation process. The main delivery 
methods comprise the following: the project approach, budgetary aid and sector 
budget support, as well as TAIEX and Twinning.  
Project-approach (PA): 
Traditionally, the main delivery method for aid assistance by the Commission 
has been through the project-approach. Projects are defined as: “[A] series of 
activities aimed at bringing about clearly specified objectives within a defined 
time-period and with a defined budget” (European Commission, 2004, p.8). 
Projects can vary in their size from small ones forming part of a wider 
programme, to larger ones which are programmes in their own right. Therefore, 
projects could be conceptualised as a set of activities which aim to contribute to 
the implementation of broader EU and partners’ national objectives in a given 
area or sector (e.g. health and education) (ibid., p.9). The formulation of a 
project’s objectives should be the result of inputs from the EU, partner 
governments and when relevant, non-governmental actors in partner states.  
Although the EU, like other international donors, has consistently relied on a 
project-approach for the delivery of aid assistance, this trend seems to have 
changed during the period under study. Challenges associated with the vast 
numbers of donors and projects implemented across sectors, together with the 
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new direction undertaken by the development community (see above), have 
resulted in a shift away from the project-approach in favour of sector budget 
support (SBS) and budgetary aid in the Commission’s development strategy. 
Nevertheless, the project approach remains an important component of EU 
assistance in Egypt.  
Sector budget support (SBS) 
As mentioned, the utilisation of SBS in Egypt been increasingly applied during 
the period under study. The rationale on this shift can be seen as justified based 
on the concepts of fungibility and total effect in the Commission’s Aid Delivery 
Guidelines (European Commission, 2004, pp. 9-10).26 Sector support and 
budgetary aid are mechanisms directed towards the public sector and thus, do 
not apply to supporting civil society and/or the private sector. Both approaches 
are based on the principles of ownership (i.e. they should be led by partner 
governments) and the principle of fungibility and are aimed at improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of EU resource allocation. Overall, SBS have three 
common objectives: 1) to broaden the ownership of partner government’s 
decision-making in regards to sector policy, sector strategy and sector spending; 
2) to minimise transaction costs by either adoption and/or harmonisation of 
government/donors’ procedures; 3) to increase coherence between sector 
policies, spending and results through greater transparency and a wider dialogue 
(European Commission, 2004, pp.10-1). The logic of sector budget support rests 
on the partner governments introducing a programme and spending plan for a 
specific sector-reform programme which will be eligible for Commission’s 
support. The sector programme formulated should be composed of three key 
components: 1) an approved sector policy and related strategic framework (e.g. 
a Poverty-reduction Strategy Paper), 2) a sector medium-term expenditure 
                                                          
26 The concept of fungibility of aid resources highlights the fact that donor funded projects can simply allow partner 
governments to re-direct their own financial resources to other purposes (assuming that government would have spent their 
own money on the project(s) even if the donor funding was not available).  The total effect of donor support therefore depends 
on how government uses these freed resources and not on the specific project or programme against which the development 
assistance is specifically earmarked. Reaching agreement between the partner government and donors on overall public 
expenditure priorities (i.e having a donor/partner government policy dialogue on overall objectives and expenditure planning) 
is thus a way of helping to ensure that fungibility does not compromise the development objectives that donors specifically 
want to promote/ support (European Commission, 2004, pp.9-10). 
129 
 
framework and annual budget and 3) a co-ordination process in the specific 
sector between donors led by the partner state (European Commission, 2004, 
p.11).  
 
The criteria for determining eligibility to SBS are: 1) the extent to which macro-
economic management is stable and provides a supportive environment for the 
private sector; 2) the extent to which national policy reflects a credible 
commitment to poverty reduction and growth, and in the case of the 
Mediterranean region, a commitment to convergence with the European 
economy; 3) the quality of the public finance management and/or the existence 
of a credible programme of reforms to public finance systems and, 4) the 
existence of agreed performance indicators by which to measure and review 
progress towards national policy objectives (European Commission, 2004, p. 12).  
These criteria can be said to contribute to the application of positive 
conditionality through the prerequisites needed for eligibility: i.e.  an existing 
national policy or strategy, related budget and financing framework and, through 
agreed performance indicators. Moreover, the Commission’s emphasis and 
influence on developing sector dialogue is also critical element to analyse in the 
context of normative transfer, particularly with regards to socialisation 
mechanisms.  
 
The Commission’s main instrument for providing sector support to partner 
states is the Sector Policy Support Programme (SPSP) which has three operating 
modalities: 1) Sector Budget Support (SBS) which is the main modality of choice 
in the case of Egypt, 2) financial contribution to Common Pooled Funds, also 
knows as a common basket fund which finances all or part of the sector 
programme and 3) Commission specific procedure with funds directly sourced 
from the EU budget and EDF (European Commission, 2004, p.11). In the context 
of cooperation in Egypt, only the first instrument is applicable. On the other 
hand, Budgetary Aid (BA) is a resource transfer to partner governments, 
managed entirely by the latter using its budget and financial management 
system. There are two types of BA: Macroeconomic Budgetary Aid which 
supports the overall national development policy and the macroeconomic and 
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budgetary framework and, Sector Budgetary Aid (within the sector policy 
support programme-SPSP) which provides additional funding to a specific sector 
policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
The Delegation of the EU in Cairo has prioritised SBS and sector reforms by 
targeting and approving one SBS programme (in the AAP) per year. Each 
programme consists of an amount of money roughly equal to 60-70% of the 
yearly EU allocation for Egypt. Over recent 6 years, SBS priorities were as 
follows: Water in 2005, Health in 2006, Education in 2007, Transport in 2008, 
Health in 2009 and Water in 2010 (Personal communication, N.19, 2009). 
Agreement on SBS in Egypt follows a process of consultations with national 
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beneficiaries and culminates with the signing of a Financial Agreement between 
the EU and the government of Egypt compromising: the Ministry of international 
Cooperation, the Ministry of Finance and relevant line ministries (e.g. Education 
and Health). The Financing Agreement is a legal document outlining 
responsibilities, conditions and financing modalities (Personal communication, 
N.9, 2009). The conditions or bench-marks in the Financing Agreement, also 
known as ‘matrix’, are formulated by the Delegation (operation section) together 
with external experts and following consultations with Egyptian counterparts 
thus, following a trilateral exercise (Personal communication, N. 9, N.26, 2009).  
As already mentioned, sound public finance management (PFM) is a crucial 
element of eligibility for SBS. In this context, the evaluation of PFM is done by the 
Delegation through a Performance Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
(PEFA)27 analysis in partner states. As noted by a Delegation official, PEFA is 
more of a diagnostic tool for assessing the process of PFM rather than a project. 
In Egypt, it started in 2008 following a request by the Ministry of Finance 
(Personal communication, N.9, 2009). The aims of PEFA are to increase local 
ownership and donor coordination but also to assess a country’s PFM 
performance leading to a better impact of reforms (World Bank, 2010). 
Essentially, undertaking a PEFA exercise allows the Economic section at the 
Delegation to support the Ministry of Finance in its reforms related to PFM. 
Moreover, it allows Egypt to standardise and align practices and policies with 
international economic and financial standards and creates more transparent 
processes and practices aimed at good governance and accountability. PFM 
reforms also seek to achieve efficiency in terms of domestic policy output, e.g. 
see the lack of money for the various social sectors and the subsidy system.  
Thus, a sound PFM is needed in order for Egypt to remain eligible for SBS.  
Payments under SBS are based on two elements: 1) a sound PFM, i.e. fiscal 
discipline in the disbursement of money by the Ministry of Finance and, 2) the 
                                                          
27 The goals of the PEFA Program are to strengthen recipient and donor ability to assess the condition of country public 
expenditure, procurement and financial accountability systems, and (ii) develop a practical sequence of reform and capacity-
building actions (World Bank, 2010).  
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implementation of conditionalities or matrix, formulated in the Financing 
Agreement. Payments are then disbursed in yearly tranches directly payable to 
the Ministry of Finance (i.e. into the treasury) and not to the line ministries. 
These conditionalities are specifically relevant to the policy sector identified for 
reform and entail activities to be undertaken in each tranche by the Ministry of 
Finance as well as the relevant line ministries, the division of labour being 
respectively about 25% and 75% (Personal communication, N.9, 2009). Non-
implementation or non-attainment of these bench-marks results in non-payment 
by the Commission. The idea of SBS is to decentralise the management of the 
budget and decision-making procedures from the treasury to the relevant line 
ministries and from the ministerial level to the local or regional level (Personal 
communication, N.19, 2009).  In the case of Education in Egypt, for example, this 
means that the Ministry of Education had to have an overall reform strategy in 
place and was able to demonstrate the ability to formulate a mid-term forecast of 
expenditure. This forms the basis upon which benchmarks are drafted (matrix) 
and progress monitored. For example, benchmarks could consist of relevant new 
legislation to be adopted, or training for certain organisations/institutions to be 
undertaken (Personal communication, N.19, 2009). According to EU officials at 
the Delegation, the Ministry of Finance is working well towards reform of the 
PFM and the implementation of related bench-marks. However, although these 
bench-marks (matrix) are formulated trilaterally, expert economists are seen, at 
times, as setting ambitious targets and are regarded by Delegation staff as 
detached from the Egyptian reality:  
 
“PFM benchmarks are a high priority as they are relevant to the Financial 
Agreement and matrix and cannot be changed. Now we are re-negotiating some 
PFM-related benchmarks because some activities that would take a developed 
country 10-20 years to implement, are listed as achievable in 3 years by Egypt […] 
the system is not ready for certain steps. In re-negotiating the bench-marks we 
comply a compliance report where we note how Egypt has complied and we ask the 
Egyptian government to provide documentation evidence for this compliance […], 
we discuss what type of documents we need, what laws have been passed, what is 
the government doing in terms of PFM reforms […] We believe reforms are there 
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but won’t take 2 years […] so we don’t think we should punish a country for that” 
(Personal communication, N.9, 2009).  
Therefore, PFM bench-marks can at times be too ambitious and criteria can be 
applied too strictly. In this context, the Delegation has undertaken what it terms 
as ‘a dynamic interpretation’ of the criteria focusing on constant progress in PFM 
(Personal communication, N.14, 2009).  This is seen as an important distinction 
for Egypt’s eligibility to SBS and its capacity to reform but also, for the EU to 
access an area which is considered politically sensitive. In fact, the reform of PFM 
and, in particular, the PEFA exercise, allow the Commission to have access to 
information regarding the functioning (process, mechanisms, allocations) of the 
treasury and to have a dialogue on its policy orientation and reform, thus 
influencing it. The preliminary results of PEFA in 2009, showed that Egypt is not 
a top reformer. However, these finding are not featured in the policy 
recommendation but rather serve as a diagnostic tool to monitor progress every 
3 years (Personal communication, N.9, 2009). The dynamic interpretation of the 
SBS criteria in the field of PFM could be seen as having helped the Commission to 
better assess the capacity of the Egyptian administration to reform and to 
establish a better quality policy dialogue:   
“[W]e ask what progress has been achieved and what benchmarks are still there 
[…] both of us can set high and too ambitious reforms. After the first round of 
disbursement we realised the limits of Egypt’s capacity to achieve these 
benchmarks. SBS is new to Egypt […] they enter into financial agreement without 
really knowing what SBS means….until last year the Ministry of Finance had little 
coordination with line ministries which didn’t see any money. Now, the ministry is 
more cooperative with us and with line ministries, which was not happening 
before” (Personal communication, N.9, 2009).  
From a Commission perspective, we could argue that more emphasis on SBS 
forms part of the new development strategy outlined above. Importantly, these 
reforms are seen as falling in priority-areas/sectors for the Egyptian government 
and thus, sustainable through the presence of political will domestically. In terms 
of the work carried out by the Delegation (Economic section) in this context, SBS 
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serves a dual function: 1) as an instrument to monitor public finance 
management (PFM) in terms of decentralisation and transparency and 2) assess 
the degree of reform in Egypt. Moreover, the role of the Delegation is thus crucial 
in ensuring that Egypt remains eligible to SBS (Personal communication, N.9, 
2009).  
 
Looking at the criteria and components for eligibility to SBS, we could argue that 
the Commission is able to influence policy formulation as well as institutional 
reforms through the mechanisms aimed at increased decentralisation, good 
governance and transparency. Thus and from a broader policy perspective, SBS 
is in line with the objective of the ENP aimed at creating a ring of stable and 
friendly states.  The application of SBS in fact, implies the gradual transformation 
of partner states, the liberalisation and decentralisation of their state systems 
through administrative and institutional reforms. Although these objectives are 
primarily aimed at further integration with EU market, they also imply the 
promotion of some political rights based on a long-term objective of 
democratisation. As noted by an EU official at the Delegation:  
 
“[I]mprovements take time but see for example the developments and expectations 
in a sector such as education were some [SBS] conditionalities relate to the gender 
and the number of girls in classrooms. This is where human rights should start, 
from basic rights…if girls don’t go to school how are they expected to vote…human 
rights should include a component of basic rights” (Personal communication, 
N.26).  
We could argue that the methodology and criteria associated with SBS are seen 
by practitioners as a valid delivery instrument in terms of applying positive 
conditionality through the principle of local ownership (i.e. emphasising a 
demand-driven approach) and, in terms of achieving broader ENP objectives of 
partners’ transformation and reforms. In fact, that SBS consist in the allocation of 
large sums of money, made available on demand and based on the requirements 
of a national sector strategy, sector policy and budget, and expenditure forecast 
available. This process clearly reflects the ENP logic advocated in the policy 
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documentation and implies a degree of positive conditionality being applied.  
Importantly, the expertise and know-how of the Commission are seen as crucial 
in the context of strategy and policy formulation. As noted by an EC official in 
Cairo: 
 
“Sector reform is a good idea in Egypt because of the bureaucratic and socialist 
nature of the regime […] political will from the government is very strong for 
reforms and modernisation […] in the modern approach, people that know better 
do the work [...] we support this because is part of what we have done in Europe 
and what we want and, is necessary in the neighbourhood […] the ENP is about 
good, healthy and stable neighbours and this is also in our interests” (Personal 
communication, N.19, 2009).  
Technical assistance: Technical Assistance and Information Exchange 
(TAIEX) and Twinning  
The introduction of the ENP in the framework of EU cooperation in the 
Mediterranean has also allowed regional partners to increasingly benefit from 
policy instruments previous unavailable, specifically TAIEX and Twinning. These 
programmes originally intended for accession countries, were extended to 
partners in the Mediterranean in 2003 (Twinning), and 2006 (TAIXE).  
TAIEX was set up in 1996 in the context of enlargement and in order to foster the 
implementation of the acquis communitaire in candidate countries on the basis of 
compulsory transposition (European Commission, 2009a). TAIEX, like Twinning, 
is a demand-driven instrument aimed at institutional reforms and harmonisation 
over a range of subject areas. Its main tasks are:   
“To provide short-term assistance and advice on the approximation of EU 
legislation with the national legislation of Beneficiary Countries and on the 
subsequent administration, implementation and enforcement of such legislation; 
To provide  “peer-to-peer” assistance by public experts from EU Member States 
(MS) to partners and stakeholders of the Beneficiary Countries; To be an 
information broker by gathering and making available information; To provide 
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database tools for facilitating and monitoring the approximation progress as well 
as to identify further assistance needs, notably through Twinning projects” (ibid.).  
TAIEX comprises three types of assistance: 1) Expert Missions in Beneficiary 
Countries intended to provide technical expertise and support in the context of 
the adoption and implementation of the EU acquis as well as provide examples of 
good practice; 2) Workshops or Seminars in Beneficiary Countries presenting 
and explaining EU acqui-related issues/areas chosen by the beneficiary country; 
3) Study Visits in Member States intended to familiarise practitioners of the 
beneficiary state with the EU acquis. The expected results associated with TAIEX 
are to provide to partners information on changing EU legislation and policies, to 
improve understanding of the EU acquis in beneficiary countries, to intensify 
cooperation with a view to improve regulatory convergence and legislative 
approximation towards higher standards and, to disseminate relevant 
information through TAIEX database and website (ibid.). Importantly, TAIEX is 
also seen as providing the basis for further technical assistance under Twinning 
projects. 
 
The rationale of Twinning is defined by the Commission as:  
 
“ [T]o bring together public sector expertise from EU Member States and 
beneficiary countries with the aim of enhancing co-operative activities [and] yield 
concrete operational results for the beneficiary country under the terms of the 
Association Agreement between that country and the EU” (European Commission, 
2009a).  
 
These activities usually include a legislative approximation component with the 
acquis, a capacity -building component whereby members of the beneficiary 
institutions are supported with training and workshops and, finally, an 
organisational component whereby the beneficiary institutions are supported to 
re-organise and streamline their departments to achieve more efficiency.  
Twinning covers various institutions and sectors including finance and internal 
market, environment, justice and home affairs, energy, transport, trade and 
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industry, agriculture, employment, social affairs, health & consumer protection 
amongst others (ibid.).  
 
The role of EU Delegation in Cairo is an important one when it comes to the 
above delivery methods. As we have seen, technical instruments are aimed at 
legislative harmonisation, institutional restructuring and learning, enhanced 
technical cooperation and consultations (know-how). In the context of technical 
assistance, the Operation section at the Delegation acts as focal point with the 
Partner’s Administration Office (PAO) affiliated to the Ministry of International 
Cooperation. Together, the Delegation and the PAO are involved in the planning, 
design, choice of assistance and evaluation of implementation (Personal 
communication, N.10, 2009). The selection of the beneficiaries however, remains 
channelled through the PAO with little access by the Delegation.  
 
The Operation section is thus responsible for designing technical assistance 
objectives and benchmarks relevant at two levels: a) at policy level and b) at 
programme level. At policy level, the EEAP and the EMAA are seen as the 
references for assistance, i.e. they provide the broad objectives for areas of 
national reform identified for technical assistance and, also based on national 
abortion capacity. At programme level, the various Support for the Association 
Agreement programme (SAAP) and Support for the Implementation of the Action 
Plan (SIAP) programmes are designed specifically for the implementation of 
technical and legislative aspects of the acquis under the EEAP and EMAA (ibid.). 
Thus, TAIEX and Twinning are considered mechanisms for maximising EU know-
how in the implementation of programmes such as SAAP and SIAP. Although the 
implementation of TAIEX in Egypt has to take into consideration long time-
frames related to the capacity and political will of certain ministries to lobby for 
legislative change, the instrument is regarded as having achieved 65% of 
expected results through SAAP/SIAP and individual programmes (Personal 
communication, N.10, 2009). In this context, TAIEX always precedes Twinning in 
that it identifies possible areas of further technical assistance and aims at 
forming the building blocs for that assistance to be implemented (Personal 
communication, N.10, 2009).  
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The outcome and results achieved under TAIEX and Twinning are also used to 
inform the formulation of the SBS matrix and, vice versa (Personal 
communication, N.10, 2009). This link between technical assistance and SBS 
objectives is even more evident in the selection strategy for Twinning in Egypt. 
The strategy can be either concentrated or diversified. In Egypt we can identify a 
concentrated strategy in the Water and Transport sectors were both technical 
assistance and SBS programmes complement each other. Other programmes that 
fall under a diversified approach are: animal disease, food safety and quarantine 
amongst others. Some sectors which could benefit from technical assistance in 
Egypt have proven more difficult than others to engage for the EU. For example, 
in some sensitive areas such as justice and security technical assistance is not 
requested due to the selection process of beneficiaries. The PAO retains the right 
to approach the ministries and indirectly to select the agencies than can benefit 
from TAIEX and Twinning. According to Delegation staff:  
 
“So the intermediary [PAO] can at times act as a filter on certain issues and needs 
[…] or maybe they are under instructions by the government” (Personal 
communication, N.10, 2009).   
 
Justice, home affairs, security and the prison service are all areas which fall 
under the above category. The Commission has reportedly approached various 
Egyptian administrations on an informative level regarding the benefits of 
technical assistance in the above sectors but with no success (ibid.). Overall 
however, cooperation with the PAO has been essential and prolific. In the context 
of TAIEX from 2006 to 2009, Egypt has benefited from 61 programmes, the 
majority under the internal market, agriculture and infrastructure sectors 
(Dataset – TA, 2009).    
 
In the context of the NIP 2007-2010 for Egypt therefore, TAIEX is considered a 
complementary if not a key implementation tool in the context of various 
approximation programmes and objectives outlined in the EEAP. With regards to 
Twinning and the implementation of the EEAP, the instrument can be viewed as 
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an additional mechanism for the transfers of certain norms, rules and practices 
and resting on a long-term process of institutional learning and importantly, 
socialisation. The process of intensified interaction together with the exchange of 
experiences and know-how from the EU to partner states is in fact a key 
component supporting the implementation of the EEAP. Although the prospect of 
accession is absent from the Southern dimension of the ENP, it could be argued 
that the mechanisms for change and normative transfer applied under 
enlargement policy (technical assistance on legislative and institutional change 
and reform) are also present in the above instruments and importantly, are seen 
as such by the Commission. In the context of the implementation of the ENP, the 
Ex-Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldern stated that:  
 
“[The ENP] is supported with significant EU assistance through the new European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), inter alia in the areas of 
governance, trade, energy, environment, education, health and research. In this 
process, Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA are key tools which ensure the transfer of 
European know-how in a practical, hands-on manner. They aim to upgrade and 
modernize the institutions of the neighbouring countries and are thus central in 
applying the EU’s transformative power” (Ferrero-Waldern, 2008). 
 
The cycle of operations in Egypt:  
This section will trace and analyse the distribution of EU aid assistance to Egypt 
by focusing on the analysis of the various phases of the PCM and specifically, by 
focusing on the NIP 2007-2010. This will allow us to further contextualise EU 
cooperation objective with Egypt over time and focus specifically on the multi-
annual financial allocations. Thus, this section, will focus on identifying and 
discriminating between bilateral sector strategy, objectives and mechanisms of 
implementation, through the evaluation of three main stages of the PCM and 
related documentation for the period 2002-2010: the programming and the 
various Country Strategy Papers (CSP), the identification through the various  
Multi-Annual National Indicative Programmes (NIP), and formulation through 
the various Annual Action Programmes (APP) and the respective Action Fiches 
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(AF) focusing on the NIP 2007-2010. These documents and decisions outline the 
priority sectors, objectives of the projects, programmes and other forms of 
support and assistance negotiated and subsequently approved with regards to 
assistance to Egypt under the framework of the ENPI. It is important to at this 
stage to flag the fact that the initial process of interaction with beneficiaries, the 
identification of sectors and programming process, funding mechanisms and up 
to the signing of a Financing Contract takes place within roughly one to two 
years of time-delay.  
Programming and identification phases 2002-2007 (CSP and NIP):   
The context of the formulation of the CSP 2002-2006 was characterised by the 
signing of the Association Agreement with Egypt in 2001. To that effect, the CSP 
identified three objectives for cooperation with Egypt: 1) promoting the effective 
implementation of the EMAA, 2) support for the process of economic transition 
and 3) supporting a stable and a balanced socio-economic development 
(Commission, 2001, p.21). In order to achieve these objectives two national 
indicative programmes (NIP) were formulated for the period of time concerned: 
NIP 2002-2004 and NIP 2004-2005.  
 
The NIP 2002-2004 was allocated € 351 million and proposed seven (7) 
programmes28 addressing the three main priorities outlined in the CSP. The 
method of fund allocation and delivery was based on the rationale of MEDA, i.e. 
covering large sector projects both within a regional and national portfolio. 
Distribution of funding focused primarily on trade related issues with 54% of 
funds earmarked for Trade Enhancement Programme (TEP), financial and 
investment sector cooperation and the restructuring of the spinning and weaving 
sectors. Social and economic development saw 24% of funds allocated for the 
development of the South Sinai region, civil society and increase social 
development in general. Education saw 12.5% of funds allocated through the 
                                                          
28 The programmes and respective funding allocation were outlined as follows: Technical and Vocational Training Reform 
(€31m), Trade Enhancement programme (€60m), Integrated local development programme-S. Sinai (€64m), support for social 
development and civil society (€20m), Financial and investment sector cooperation (€52m), Spinning and weaving restructuring 
(€80m), Higher education tempus participation (€11m).  
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Technical Education and Vocational Training (TEVT) programme and the reform 
of the higher education programme Tempus (Commission, 2001, p. 27).  
The NIP 2005-2006 was allocated € 243 millions and its formulation reflected 
the introduction of the ENP in the context of EU-Egyptian relations. The 
priorities identified were: 1) support the preparation for the new 
Neighbourhood Policy and promotion of the EMAA, 2) support the process of 
economic transition and 3) support sustainable socio-economic development 
(Commission, 2005, p. 9).  Support was allocated for 8 programmes29 in total 
with distribution of funds as follows: 1) support for the ENP and the EMAA was 
allocated 17% of total budget at €40 million, 2) economic development was 
allocated 42% of budget at €103 million and 3) socio-economic development 
was allocated 41% of total budget at €100 million (Commission, 2005, p.24). It is 
important to note that with the introduction of the ENP and EEAP more 
emphasis was placed on the strengthening of democracy and human rights, 
which translated for the first time into an allocation of 2% of total budget (€5m); 
a small amount indeed, but one which holds particular political importance.  
We can observe that the formulation of the CSP 2002-2006 emphasised the 
importance of the objectives of the EMAA, while the NIP 2005-2006 manifested a 
degree of adjustment as a result of the ENP and its overall objectives and 
rationale. Interestingly, the identification document explicitly tackles for the first 
time the issue of political reforms in Egypt, including the promotion and support 
of human rights and democracy. In this context, the NIP 2005-2006 makes 
particular reference to the findings of the of the UNDP Human Development 
Report for the Arab World 2002 related to democratisation, the role of women in 
society and the governance situation in the Arab world (Commission, 2005, pp.4-
6). Arguably, cooperation between the EU and Egypt manifested for the first time 
an explicit emphasis on political reforms in its technical documentation. This 
apparent shift or adjustment in the NIP 2005-2006 could also be seen as the 
                                                          
29 The programmes and respective funding allocations were outlined as follows: support to the Association Agreement (€25m); 
support to the Sector reform facility (€15m); support to the Water sector reform (€80m); support for Research and Innovation 
(€11m); extension of Tempus (€12m); support to the social sector (€15m); support to the health sector (€80m); strengthening 
democracy and human rights/governance (€5m) (Commission, 2005, p.24).  
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result of internal (institutional and technical) changes related to the policy and 
its mechanisms which emerged and were adopted for the implementation of the 
ENP.  
Programming and identification phases 2007-2013 (CSP, NIP) 
From 2007 onwards, cooperation between the EU and Egypt fell under the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). 
The new CSP 2007-2013 fully integrated the objectives outlined in the ENP and 
EEAP and stated that the EU:  
“[W]as seeking to promote its values and interests as a global economic and 
political player by using various instruments, such as the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), development assistance and trade” (Commission, 2007a, 
p.5).  
With regards to the strategy for Egypt the document states that the EU objective 
were:  
“[T]o develop a privileged partnership through deeper political cooperation and 
economic integration, supported by the appropriate package of financial assistance 
and other ENP instruments. The key strategic importance of Egypt lies in its plans 
for political, social and economic reform, in its potential for deeper economic 
relations with the EU and in its willingness to cooperate with the EU on promoting 
peace and security in the region” (2007a, p.19).  
The three areas for cooperation identified under the CSP 2007-2013 were:  1) 
political reform and good governance, 2) competitiveness and productivity of the 
economy and supporting the implementation of the Action Plan, 3) socio-
economic sustainability of the development process (Euroepan Commission, 
2007a, p.19).  
The signing of the EEAP in March 2007 allowed Egypt to benefit from €558 
million under the NIP 2007-2010 (Commission, 2007a, p.3).  The NIP 2007-2010 
identified in total seven (7) programmes under the three mains objectives of the 
CSP 2007-2013, namely: 1) political reform and good governance, 2) the 
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competitiveness and productivity of the economy and support for the 
implementation of the Action Plan (SAAP) and finally, 3) the socio-economic 
sustainability of the development process.30  The distribution of funding with 
regards to percentage of total allocation was as follows. Under the first priority 
(political reforms and good governance) €40 million were earmarked equivalent 
to 7% to total allocated funds. Priority two (economic development and SAAP) 
saw €220 million allocated for 40% of total funds. Finally, priority three (socio-
economic sustainability and development) had €298 million equivalent to 53% 
of total allocated funds (Commission, 2007a, p.37). The percentage of 
distribution clearly points to the introduction of a political reform element when 
compared to previous aid assistance packages, but one that remains dwarfed in 
comparison to the emphasis on socio-economic development and reform. The 
€40 million (7% of total) allocated under political reform and good governance 
covered nevertheless a number of important sectors for the first time. The 
programme itself had three dimensions: the first dealing with the electoral 
process31, the second with decentralisation32 and the third dealing with good 
governance33 (European Commission, 2007a, p.27).  
The overall objectives of the NIP 2011-2013 are to intensify EU-Egyptian 
cooperation in political, economic, and social relations with the aims of 
“eventually seeking to achieve a significant degree of economic integration, 
modernization of the Egyptian society, and deepening of political dialogue and 
shared values” (European Commission, 2011, p. 5).   In order to achieve these 
objectives the NIP 2011-2013 identifies the following areas for cooperation: 1) 
Supporting Egypt’s reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights, good 
                                                          
30
 Programmes included: Political reforms, decentralization and good governance (€13m); Protection of human rights and 
strengthening of civil society (€17m); Modernisation of justice (€10m); SAAP (€220m); Education (€120m); Health (€120m); 
Transport, energy and environment (€58m).  
31 Reflecting the recommendations of the Egyptian NCHR, the objective is to increase electoral participation, revisit the 
electoral lists and administrative frameworks (2007a, p.28).  
32 In preparation for the new ‘decentralisaton Law’, the programme will support government efforts to modernise local 
administration systems and develop local authorities in terms of ‘decision-making powers’ and ability to plan and implement 
efficiently local development (2007a, p.28).  
33 “The third component of the programme will support the Government with further modernisation and development of 
public services rendered to citizens, promoting accountability, transparency and contestability, including improvement of good 
governance and measures to combat corruption” (2007a, p.28). 
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governance and justice, 2) Developing the competitiveness and productivity of 
the Egyptian economy, 3) Ensuring the sustainability of the development process 
with effective social, economic and environmental policies and better 
management of natural resources (ibid.). In the document, the Commission 
explicitly emphasises the inter-connectivity of sector-priorities identified and the 
importance of democratisation on the process of socio-economic development:  
 
“The three priorities are closely interlinked, and parallel progress across all of them 
is  important to maximise synergies […] Political reform is clearly important for the 
process of domestic democratisation and  upholding of human rights, but it can 
also  have a significant impact on the region where Egypt is considered a key player 
and can lead others by example. Democratisation can contribute to stronger 
growth  by helping to limit state  interventionism in the market, facilitating  a more 
transparent regulatory framework  and encouraging private sector actors to 
participate in the economy” (European Commission, 2011, pp.5-6).   
 
The bilateral allocation for the NIP 2011-2013 amounts to €449.29 millions with 
an average increase with the previous programming period of 5.4% in line with 
Egypt’s objectives and as the result of the demonstrated capacity to absorb ENPI 
funding (European Commission, 2011, p.7). This statement is in contradiction 
with the opinions collected from most EU practitioners on the ground who 
explicitly point to the limits of the Egyptian administration and its absorption 
capacity. In fact, the burdensome bureaucracy of the Egyptian public sector 
together with the lack of skilled personnel in the various line ministries are often 
referred to by EU practitioners as a weak link of bilateral EU-Egyptian 
cooperation. The distribution of funding sees 11.1% of the total budget allocated 
to priority one (political reforms), 42.2% allocated to priority two 
(competitiveness of the Egyptian economy) and, 46.7% allocated to priority 
three (sustainability and development in socio-economic sector) (ibid.) and 
comprises the formulation of a total of eleven projects.34 Interestingly, priority 
                                                          
34 1) Support for political development, decentralisation and promotion of good governance (€12m); 2) Promotion and 
protection of human rights (€17m); 3) Support for modernisation of administration of justice (€10m); 4) Upgrading of 
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one is envisaged to pursue the exact same objectives of the NIP 2007-2010 in the 
area of political reforms with an additional component of €50 million for the 
process of legislative and procedural legislation between the EU and Egypt 
“whenever necessary and relevant” and for providing technical assistance on a 
demand-driven basis and in the context of facilitating the implementation of the 
EEAP (European Commission, 2011, p. 8).  At this stage it important to note that 
the formulation process of the above NIP was partially finalised and 
implemented due to the events of January 2011 in Egypt.  
CONCLUSION 
The aims of this chapter have been to explain and unpack the implementation of 
the ENP in practice. The chapter has maintained the focus on the role of norms 
and values in the in the processes and mechanisms that characterise the ENP and 
its implementation modalities with Egypt.  
In the design of the ENP, much emphasis was placed on the process of economic 
integration and reform along the lines outlined under the EMP. Attracting foreign 
direct investment was made even more relevant through the introduction of the 
NIF instrument. Action Plans went further than before in emphasising the role 
and relevance of political reforms and political values, adding more weight to 
arguments supporting the normative power thesis. In terms of the 
comprehensive approach to security, the ENP is seen as explicitly addressing the 
challenges outlined in the ESS (2003) and as an instrument able to attain the 
strategy’s objectives. However, the ENP introduced important changes and new 
mechanisms that have a specific relevance for the process of norms transfer. As 
we have seen, the ENP design and logic rested on the policy of Enlargement and 
it can be argued that a number of instruments have been borrowed if not 
adopted, from the latter. Importantly, under the ENP much more emphasis has 
been put on the application of SBS as a delivery instrument and, in theory at 
                                                                                                                                                                      
regulatory, institutional and legislative environment (€20m); 5) Transport sector reform (€85m); 6) Energy sector reforms 
(€84m); 7) Trade enhancement measures (€20m); 8) reform of education and training (€105m); 9) Water sector reform (€50m); 
10) Support for solid waste management (€20m); 11) Local community development (€35m) (European Commission:2011).  
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least, on the ability of the EU to influence the conditions and standards of 
reforms in partner states.  
In this chapter we have seen that the interlinked nature of sectors and related 
assistance tools imply a varied degree of interaction between the EU and 
Egyptian institutional structures and actors. Importantly, we have seen how the 
quality of interaction is sector-sensitive. Nevertheless, we can argue that EU 
interaction with the Egyptian administration takes place at four levels: 
Ministerial, sub-ministerial, regional and local (public and civil society). 
Interaction at ministerial level has been identified at policy and coordination 
levels with regards to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
International Cooperation. With regards to the Ministry of Finance however, the 
role of the Commission can be seen as much more influential in terms of 
procedural reforms and institutional de-centralisation. The discussion above 
suggests that the Commission could be particularly influential at the sub-
ministerial and regional/local level (see institutional reforms, regulatory reforms 
and sector dialogue and assistance). In this context, the Delegation has also faced 
some limitations to the application of ENP instruments in the form of the PAO 
which can act as a filter in the selection of beneficiaries. The role of the 
Delegation is crucial in terms of influencing the selection process and 
consultations with Egypt, in reaching agreement on sectors and implementation 
modalities and, importantly, in establishing a more enhanced dialogue on sector 
policy and strategy.  
 
Focusing on the context of the EU-Egyptian cooperation has allowed us to trace 
the evolution of delivery instruments. Under the ENP in particular, increased 
emphasis was placed by the Commission on adopting a comprehensive and 
complementary approach to assistance and a logic of positive conditionality 
through the application of demand-driven instruments such as SBS and technical 
assistance (TAIEX and Twinning).  We could also argue that these delivery 
instruments are aimed at achieving institutional and procedural change. They 
can also be seen as characterised by mechanisms conducive for the process of 
socialisation to take place though increased dialogue and interaction. This point 
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was evident in the sections focusing on the EU cooperation strategy and 
implementation methods. Focusing on the process of project cycle management 
allows to unpack mechanisms and instruments relevant the process of norms 
transfer and change. In this context, the chapter has outlined how technical 
assistance instruments and/or SBS contribute to the achievement of policy goals 
such as legislative reform or institutional harmonisation, but also how they could 
contribute to the socialisation of agents through increased consultations and 
interaction, peer-to-peer advice and know-how transfer, institutional learning 
and dialogue. Importantly, understanding the mechanisms and processes of the 
project cycle management allows us to identify the various actors involved and 
their respective responsibilities, the links between objectives and procedures 
across sectors and, the relevance of the legal framework.  
 
The section on delivery methods has supported the hypothesis that that the 
processes and mechanisms for normative transfer under the ENP can be 
identified in Egypt. In an analytical context however, the most important 
argument is that instead of focusing on the analysis of policy objectives alone, 
this section has focused on the processes and mechanisms that underpin the 
process of implementation and, on the nature of interaction amongst actors. It is 
these processes and mechanisms that hold the answer to the extent and quality 
of EU-induced transformation and change in Egypt. This section has also 
indicated that delivery methods should also be considered as political tools and 
that their application, at times, does not aim to achieve the expected objectives. 
This argument could be applied to the dynamic application of SBS criteria in 
Egypt raising questions about EU benchmarks and standards. As we have seen, 
SBS also drastically increases the yearly Commission disbursement in Egypt 
making this a relatively easy and fast way to implement cooperation.   
 
Finally, the chapter has outlined the sector-targeted by the EU in its cooperation 
with Egypt. Overall, we could argue that social development and economic 
transition are sectors that have been systematically targeted over time. Similarly, 
the implementation of the respective EMAA and EEAP has been consistently 
supported in the various strategy papers. The NIP 2000-2006 is important in this 
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context insofar as it signals the first explicit attempt at cooperation in the sector 
of political reforms. Moreover, the introduction of the ENPI has emphasised 
more explicitly the linkages between democratisation and socio-economic 
development in the EU assistance approach and, the preference for the 
application of sector support. The final section of this chapter has also been able 
to evaluate how the rhetoric of the policy discourse is translated with 
actions/priorities on the ground.  The picture that emerged is one where fund 
allocations remain focused on economic priorities at the expense of socio-
political ones. This evidence weakens the normative power theory in favour of 
more realist and self-interested explanations of EU behaviour. That said, we can 
argue for a degree of disparity between what the EU promotes rhetorically and 
what it prioritises on the ground. The role and influence of Egyptian policy-
makers and their perceptions of Egyptian interest must also be taken into 
consideration in this context.  
 
In terms of the process of normative transfer, this chapter has demonstrated that 
the structure of the ENP in Egypt could be considered as conducive to influence 
change both in terms of conditionality and socialisation. Apart from the obvious 
mechanisms for norms transfer that could be said to take place through bench-
marking and positive conditionality mechanisms, we can also argue that there is 
ample evidence to support the argument that a degree of socialisation takes 
place, or could take place, under the framework of the ENP.  From the evaluation 
in this chapter, the degree of interaction and communication between EU and 
Egyptian policy-makers could be described as dense and multi-level, both 
informally through every day interaction and formally through institutional 
structures such as the various sub-committees and councils. This implies that the 
mechanisms of socialisation (and related assumptions and explanations) have to 
be taken into serious consideration in the analysis, considering that the prospect 
of influence and argumentative persuasion could be considered very high. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
THE ANALYSIS OF THE THREE PILLARS OF THE ENP: 
TRADE, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
 
 
Following the discussion in previous chapters and based on the methodology 
outlined, this chapter will proceed with the analysis of the implementation of 
the ENP in Egypt, with a particular focus on the period 2007-2010. The analysis 
will start from a number of assumptions: Firstly, that when attempting to 
evaluate changes understood as the result of normative transfer, we can only 
rely on evidence of conforming and/or non-conforming behaviour of a 
particular actor (be it an individual, an institution or a state); secondly, that the 
analysis of the ENP needs to differentiate between: a) different policy cycles, b) 
different sectors and c) different levels of interaction, be it at the policy, 
institutional, procedural or individual (actor level); finally, let us not forget that 
the main issues under investigation in this study are related to EU behaviour in 
international relations. Concepts such as values, norms, interests, power, 
cooperation and change will remain central to the analysis and to the 
application of the empirical evidence to the theory and vice versa.  
 
The analysis will tackle the three main areas for cooperation under the EEAP, 
here defined as pillars: trade, socio-economic development and political. The 
analysis will focus on cooperation in priority sectors, i.e. where a concentration 
of funding allocations can be identified. Activities envisaged for the 
implementation of all three pillars are conceptualised by the EU as linked with 
one another. Cooperation in social affairs is in fact directly linked to economic 
reforms aimed at achieving sustainable socio-economic development “[W]ith a 
view of raising living standards and generating more jobs for Egypt’s rapidly 
growing labour force” (Council of the European Union, 2009, points, 69-70). 
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Democratisation, human rights, transparency and good governance are 
referred to in the Action Plan as shared values that underpin this bilateral 
relationship (European Commission, 2007a). Even though the analysis in this 
section will focus on three separate areas and sub-sectors, the aim of the 
analysis is to provide a broad overall perspective.   
This chapter will argue that an induced process of normative transfer can be 
identified through policy tools and mechanisms that support legislative, 
institutional and individual change. Here the mechanisms of conditionality and 
socialisation are key for the explanation of that process and for eventual 
inferences. The analysis will evaluate the areas of interest and cooperation 
under the policy before focusing on the key factors influencing norms transfer.  
Evidence in this regard will consider both Egyptian reactions and European 
limitations.    
 
The analysis will be characterised by and adopt an ethnographic approach 
resting on data collected from observations undertaken by the researcher while 
in employment at the EU Delegation in Cairo, Egypt. These observations were 
recorded for a period of a year out of three years of employment. The aim is to 
complement and enrich the analysis with an ethnographic perspective on the 
implementation of the ENP by focusing on ideational factors that shape actors’ 
perceptions of each other and, hence, can influence cooperation dynamics. The 
relevant themes here are culture, knowledge, practices, expectations, meanings 
and opinions.  The policy areas of interest here will be the monitoring process 
of the ENP, interactions and communication, practices, organisational culture, 
perceptions and meanings as well as knowledge.  
 
It is important to note at this stage that my working experience at the EU 
Delegation has provided a unique insight into the organisational culture and 
the understanding of EU-Egyptian relations by Delegation staff. The Delegation 
at the time of my work there was composed of approximately 70% local staff 
and 30% expatriate staff. The focus of this section will mainly be on the latter. 
The expatriate staff at the Delegation is made up of contractual agents and civil 
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servants, with the selection done on a rotational basis. In the case of contractual 
agents, indefinite contracts allow staff to spend extended periods of times in a 
position, while for civil servants the rotation rules require that every four years 
they have to change Delegation.  
With regards to civil servants, the rotation system can be seen as problematic 
on two accounts. Firstly, the staff that arrive in a Delegation are usually new to 
the country and region and often even to the sector they are working in. As a 
result, it will normally take these individuals as long as a year to understand the 
situation, only gradually developing expertise in the political and operational 
contexts in which they are working. Secondly, by the time they have adjusted 
and understood all the structures and actors within their field of work, a couple 
of years have passed and is already time to prepare for the new destination. 
Rotation and appointment mechanisms within the EU system are based on 
seniority (i.e. how many years spent with the Commission), so essentially an 
individual could have access to a high level managerial position without having 
the background needed in order to work effectively. Moreover, the lack of any 
prior knowledge of the local context (Egypt in our case), makes such a position 
all the more ineffective when considering the relatively short period of stay 
before rotation.  
On a more operational and less individual level, the working culture of the EU 
Delegation reflects, to an extent, its departmental organization. For instance, 
Operations (including Social and Economic sections), Political and Trade 
sections work very much in their respective domains with little horizontal 
coordination and consultations. The Political section, which should be advising 
and coordinating with Operations  on all of the programming in terms of 
sectors and beneficiaries, was seldom involved in that process. On the other 
hand, Operations hardly ever received from the Political section any relevant 
information on political developments on the ground or on EU positions vis-à-
vis Egypt on political and diplomatic issues.  
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In the section that follows, the analysis will take the form of narrative, 
systematically addressing the following questions for each of the three pillars:  
 
 
1) In which area is the EU pushing for reforms/norms transfer?  
2) What is the response of the government of Egypt?  (What is the extent of 
political will manifested? What evidence is available?) 
3) What are the limitations of EU efforts/strategies in this pillar? (Why? What is 
the role for Egypt?) 
 
THE ANALYSIS OF THE TRADE PILLAR  
Trade is one of the main instruments of EU external relations and should be 
considered as the main pillar upon which EU-Egyptian relations are built. The 
EU and Egypt have actual shared material interests to pursue in this sector. As 
such, we could argue that under the trade pillar, both actors share specific 
preferences, goals and values related to the promotion and application of a 
liberal orthodoxy in policy making.  
 
The priority sectors outlined in the following section could be seen as the areas 
in which the EU is pursuing a degree of change and reform and whereby actions 
(as outlined in the Action Plan) can be conceptualised as benchmarks. This is an 
important point since the evaluation of progress achieved by Egypt is 
undertaken against those benchmarks in the EEAP (Personal Communication, 
N.1, 2008).  
In which area is the EU pushing for reforms/norms transfer?  
The trade pillar under EU-Egyptian cooperation rests mainly on the provisions 
of the EMAA, signed in 2001 and adopted in 2004. The EMAA provides the legal 
basis for EU-Egyptian cooperation and covers an extensive road map for 
reform. The objectives of the EMAA mainly comprise the liberalisation of trade 
and the establishment of a free trade area. Within these broader objectives, a 
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number of sub-sectors are targeted for cooperation, the most relevant being: 
quality infrastructure, sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues, customs reforms and 
business environment.  
 
The substance of the EMAA is to be found in Title II which sets the provisions 
for the Free Movement of Goods with the aims of gradually establishing a free 
trade area over a period of twelve years (EMAA, Art.6). Title II of the EMAA 
focuses mainly on tariff dismantling and regulatory reforms for industrial and 
agricultural goods and, to a lesser extent, on the liberalisation of services. The 
latter, however, has never been the main target of the original EEAA 
negotiations and was seen at the time of the signing of the agreement, as a new 
area for potential negotiations (Personal communication, N.25, 2009). For EU 
practitioners, Title II represents the core of the EMAA (Personal 
Communication N. 3, 2009). The EMAA promotes the adoption of provisions for 
free trade, an export oriented and open-market policy, which rest on a varied 
but structured set of reforms to be undertaken. The fact that the EEAA is also 
known by EU practitioners as a free trade agreement (Personal communication, 
N.25, 2009) is very telling in this regard.  As the EU officials have put it, the aim 
of the EEAA is to create an even playing field for trade relations amongst the EU 
and Mediterranean partners (ibid.).  
Cooperation in the industrial sector under the EEAP envisages a number of 
reforms in the following priority sectors:  approximation on technical 
legislation, standards and conformity, negotiations on the Protocol on 
Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA), 
implementation of 2007-2008 work programme on industrial cooperation 
(European Commission, 2007b, p. 16 and p.21). Standards and conformity (EU 
harmonised areas) actions are primarily aimed at harmonisation of standards 
for industrial products, with the aim to facilitate the free movement of 
industrial goods. This process also entails cooperation in the legislative sector 
with regards to product safety and market surveillance (regulatory reforms). 
Under the chapter of Enterprise policy (European Commission, 2007b, p.21), 
EEAP actions are aimed at improving industrial cooperation and support for 
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the national Egyptian strategy for industrial modernisation and 
competitiveness.  
 
Agricultural products and fisheries are an important component of EU-Egyptian 
trade relations accounting for 8.2% of total EU imports from Egypt and 6.6% of 
Egyptian imports from the EU for the period 2004-2006 (The Council of the 
European Union, 2006, point, 63). Agriculture remains a key sector for the 
Egyptian economy, accounting for approximately 13.7% of GDP, about 30% of 
total labour force and contributing to food needs as well as raw material 
supplies to Egypt’s textile sector (Data set SCM 2008-1). Agreed priorities for 
sector reforms also aim at the modernisation and restructuring of agriculture 
and fisheries sector in line with Art.50 EMAA. Priority was also given to 
facilitating Egyptian access to export market through structural, institutional, 
legal and administrative support delivered through increased technical and 
scientific cooperation (Commission, 2007b, pp.24-5).  
The establishment of a free trade area (FTA) of southern Mediterranean states 
including Egypt and the EU is a main objective of the ENP (European 
Commission, 2007b, pp. 18-19).  The aims of the FTA are clearly articulated in 
ENP:  
  
“Develop south-south trade including support the implementation of the Agadir 
Agreement, and promote trade and investment amongst regional partners” 
(European Commission, 2007b, p. 36).  
 
South-south trade envisages participation in regional projects such as 
infrastructure, trade facilitation, energy and transport (European Commission, 
2007b, p.8). The reform of the Egyptian customs system is seen as an essential 
element for the facilitation of a FTA and is also prioritised in bilateral 
cooperation under the Action Plan (European Commission, 2007b, p. 16). The 
priorities outlined in this sector focus on the modernisation of the customs 
administration and the simplification of customs legislation and procedures, 
the increase in transparency in custom rules and tariffs, the strengthening of 
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administrative cooperation and the exchange of experiences and know-how 
(European Commission, 2007b, p.32-33). Implementation of all trade priorities 
in Egypt is closely followed by the Trade section at the EU Delegation which 
liaises with a number of partner states’ entities. Internally, the Trade section 
directly interacts with a number of Commission DGs such as TAXUD (Taxation 
and Customs Union), DG Trade and EEAS (ex-RELEX).  
 
The above section has shown that the liberalisation of trade and the 
establishment of an FTA is a key part of EU-Egyptian cooperation. On paper at 
least, this sector manifests a number of areas of common interest for both 
actors. We should note that the aims and objectives of the respective EMAA and 
EEAP form part of the formulation process of the policy cycle. We can argue 
that there is a clear effort to harmonise and modernise various sectors of the 
Egyptian economic systems in order to first integrate the latter into the EU 
market and eventually into the global market. Theoretically, this picture fits 
well with neo-liberal institutionalist explanations whereby cooperation and 
shared interests are pursued through various institutional structures and 
networks.  From a constructivist perspective of cooperation in trade, the EU 
could also be seen as promoting and projecting externally its values, believes, 
practices and institutions.  
What is the response of the government of Egypt and what is the 
extent of political will manifested? What evidence is available?  
In the context of trade liberalisation and tariff dismantling, Egypt seemed to 
have responded positively and embarked on a reform of import tariffs in 2007, 
resulting in a drop of 25% to a rate of 6.5% for tariffs on industrial products 
(Data set SCM 2007-1). According to EU officials at the Delegation in Cairo, 
industrial tariff dismantling was reportedly proceeding according to the 
schedule outlined in the EMAA and was entering its final phase in 2009 
(Personal Communication N.3, 2009; Data set SCM 2008-1.2). 
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With regards to standards and conformity, in 2007 Egypt agreed to negotiate 
with the EU the contents and priority sectors for the ACAA aimed towards the 
gradual standardisation and harmonisation of the Egyptian system with that of 
the EU (Data set SCM 2008-1.2).  The work on standardisation has been mainly 
carried out by the Egyptian Organisation for Standardisation (EOS). The aim of 
this cooperation is to identify legislative shortcomings and, eventually, 
establish a national body for the standardisation and control of quality amongst 
Egyptian manufactures (European Commission, 2008, p. 8 Annual Report). In 
2008, Egypt started a Twinning project for the support and development of the 
EOS in its regulatory and legislative functions (Data set SCM 2008-1.2).  A year 
later, in 2009, the Egyptian Accreditation Council was recognised as an 
associate member of European Cooperation for Accreditation and a member of 
both the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation and the 
International Accreditation Forum. This type of participation in EU cooperation 
structures and networks facilitates dialogue and contributes to the socialisation 
of actors. From an institutionalist perspective, these structures can contribute 
to mitigate conflict and enhance cooperation, thus influencing actors’ 
perceptions and interests. By 2010, EU standards were adopted as Egyptian 
standards for toys, electrical appliances, vehicles and vehicle parts, low-voltage 
equipment, as well as milk and milk products (European Commission, Annual 
report, p.11, 2010). Overall, Egypt has been seen as very active in this sector, 
receiving praise by the EU for its role in the Working Group of Trade Senior 
Officials (The Council of the European Union, 2009, point, 75).  
 
Negotiations on the liberalisation of agriculture, agricultural products and 
fisheries were successfully concluded with Egypt in 2009, after a difficult 
processes lasting two years. At the time, Egypt was the first Mediterranean 
country to reach such an agreement with the EU (Personal Communication N.3, 
2009). Under the agreement: 
 
“Egypt will be now granted with duty-free access for all agricultural (except a list 
of eight sensitive products) and processed agricultural products (except a list of 
11 sensitive products with a high content of sugar).  Furthermore, Egypt will 
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grant duty-free market access to all fish and fishery products originating in the 
EU (Combined Nomenclature chapter 3 and products of 1604, 1605), and fish and 
fishery products originating in Egypt will enter the EU market also duty-free 
(except prepared/preserved sardines and prepared/preserved tuna of 1604 13 
and 1604 14) (Data set SCM 2008-1).   
 
Despite the fact that EU officials at the Delegation described the agreement as 
one which will benefits Egypt immensely (Personal communication, N.25, 
2009), cooperation in agriculture is affected by the area of standards in sanitary 
and phyto-sanitary (SPS). SPS could be conceptualised as manifesting a degree 
of (negative) conditionality being applied, i.e. if safety standards are not met, 
then import restrictions are applied by the EU. In this context, the Egyptian 
administration disputed more than once the safety standards applied by the EU. 
Over the period under study, a number of Egyptian products such as potatoes 
and peanuts suffered respectively from contaminants such as aflatoxine and 
brown rot, which resulted in an EU import ban in 2008 and 2009 (European 
Commission, Annual report, p.9, 2008; Council of the European Union, 2006, 
point, 64). Although in 2010 trade did resume following Egyptian guarantees, 
restrictions concerning the import of Egyptian potatoes remained in place due 
to concerns expressed by member states (Data set ACT 2009-1.1). The Egyptian 
government argued against the restriction and noted that the potato trade 
should, as a rule, be free with an embargo on exceptions following the 
occurrence of 4-5 interceptions (Data set SCM 2008-1).  Still in the context of 
SPS, the outbreak of Avian Influenza (AI) in 2008 has prompted Egypt to 
impose a ban on certain poultry products, including poultry meat cut in pieces 
and heat-treated. On the grounds of AI, Egypt stood firm not to fully open its 
market to these products. The Commission at the time expressed concern in 
this regard and recalled that the OIE (World Organization for Animal Health) 
recommendations clearly stated that heat-treated meat and meat products 
(following a process which ensures destruction of AI virus) could be safely 
traded regardless of the AI status of the exporting country.  
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One could argue that the area of SPS indicates a degree of conflict and lack of 
cooperation. Measures taken by the EU have often been seen as unjust and 
aimed at protecting the domestic market.  To an extent, we could infer that the 
Egyptian administration applied the same SPS rules to protect its poultry 
industry, in particular considering the fact that Egypt has struggled 
domestically to cope with AI. Nevertheless, Egypt has been cooperating in 
improving its safety standards and has been willing to harmonise the phito-
sanitary legislation with that of the EU. In particular, the Egyptian 
administration requested technical assistance from the EU in dealing with fruit 
flies in citrus and aflatoxines in peanuts and benefited from a number of 
Twinning and TAIEX projects to that effect (Data set SCM 2008-1).  
 
In the context of free movement of services and capital, Egypt has continued to 
implement its national reforms plan for the modernisation and liberalisation of 
the financial sector launched in 2004, although at a slower pace and with much 
more difficulty.  
 
Another area seemingly prioritised under the ENP was the enhancement of the 
business environment. With regards to enterprise policy, the EU has 
systematically encouraged Egypt to implement the Euro-Mediterranean 
Charter for Enterprise and to consolidate reforms aimed at improving and 
boosting private sector development with regards to small and medium-size 
companies (SMEs) (Data set ACT 2008-1.4). In 2010, the EU praised for Egypt 
for the implementation of recommendations made with regards to three key 
areas of the SME Charter: innovation, skills development and access to market 
and with regards to the progress achieved to date with regarding the alignment 
of technical regulations, standards and quality infrastructure (Council of the 
European Union, 2010, point, 70).  
 
In 2009, the Commission reported that progress in the establishment of a free 
trade area (FTA) had been modest due to the application of ad hoc measures 
and arrangements, specifically with regards to the import of manufactured and 
agricultural products (European Commission, 2009, pp.12-3). In fact, as a result 
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of the Agadir Agreement, Egyptian customs should apply preferential tariffs to 
cumulative trade within the Agadir partners and the EU. As we will explore 
below, the issue of the FTA did not generate very positive reactions in Egypt, on 
the contrary. Related to the latter, the customs regime in Egypt was expected to 
have a complete overhaul starting from the reform of the 1963 custom law and 
in line with the implementation of Protocol 4 of the EMAA on rules of origins 
(Data set ACT 2008-1.3). By 2008, the new customs regime under the Egyptian 
Custom Authority (ECA) at the Ministry of Finance had undergone institutional 
reforms in the form of administrative decentralisation (three distinct and 
independent regions/administrations operating under the supervision of a 
Custom Commissioner) with the aim to reduce and simplify customs 
procedures. The reform also envisages a new organisational structure, 
separating executive and operational activities from legislative ones (Data set 
MR 2008-1). The aim of these reforms was to achieve a degree of 
administrative decentralisation in decision-making and management.  From an 
Egyptian perspective, the rationale for the new customs law was to facilitate 
trade, promote transparency and be more business friendly. Moreover, since 
the signing of the EEAP in 2007, Egypt did apply the Harmonised System (HS) 
with EU support in the following areas: risk-based custom control, definition of 
standards for certifying operators, training and computerisation (European 
Commission, Annual report, p.9, 2008).  
 
We could argue that in most of the sectors mentioned above, Egyptian efforts 
have been seen as positive and, at times, even commendable by Commission 
staff in Cairo. In terms of the liberalisation of trade, a genuine effort was made 
at the onset of the ENP in 2007 by Egypt to undertake regulatory reforms, in 
particular in the area of safety and standards and to harmonise with EU 
systems. In a number of areas such as SPS issues, standards and harmonisation 
of accreditation structures as well as in the promotion of the business 
environment, Egypt requested and obtained EU technical and financial 
assistance to modernise and upgrade these sectors.  In the context of the 
promotion of neo-liberal norms and reforms therefore, we can say that EU 
efforts found little resistance since the Egyptian administration’s goals and 
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national plans were similar. To the credit of the Egyptian side, these reforms 
not only were aimed at legislative harmonisation but, as we have seen, a great 
deal of emphasis was placed on the decentralisation and simplification of 
administrative procedures and structures. Interestingly, with the advent of the 
ENP in 2007, we can also observe a new momentum on the Egyptian side in 
terms of initiatives, draft legislation, participation in multilateral structures and 
forums.  Importantly, in 2007 Egypt and the EU entered in negotiations on a 
number of issues including the liberalisation of agriculture, services and ACAA. 
We could argue then that Egyptian political will to engage with the EU in 
reforms under this pillar was present. We could also add that Egypt took 
measures to try and meet the expectations for reforms outlined in the EEAP. 
However, despite the seemingly positive developments under this pillar, a 
number of issues remain problematic and have resulted in a negative reactions 
form the Egyptian administration. The following section will elaborate further 
on this point.  
 
What are the limitations of EU efforts and strategy in Egypt? 
The analysis of the trade pillar has pointed to a number of issues which could 
be described as problematic and challenging to cooperation, from both 
practical and structural perspectives. Despite an overall positive perception by 
Delegation staff of the implementation of the provisions of the EMAA, Egypt has 
often taken unilateral decisions in non-conformity with the agreement, 
measures that can be described as amounting to trade distortion measures.  For 
example, the EU has publicly expressed concern over unilateral decisions taken 
by Egypt on export restrictions which have ignored provisions for notification 
and consultations with the EU outlined in Art. 17 and Art. 25 EMAA (Council of 
the European Union, 2010, point, 64, Data set SCM 2008-1.2). According to the 
ENP Annual Report 2008, Egypt banned exports of rice for a year between 
March 2008 and April 2009 as well as cement exports for six months in order to 
address shortages of these commodities in the national food and construction 
sectors (European Commission, 2009, p.12). According to Commission 
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documentation, these measures were justified by the Egyptian administration 
through reference to the severe instability in the country and shortage of 
certain commodities (and rising prices of commodities such as wheat) and, 
thus, by a need to secure local markets and guarantee social and political 
stability (Data set SCM 2008-1.2). Moreover, in January 2009 the Egyptian 
government imposed a duty of EGP 500 (approximately $80) per tonne on 
imports of white sugar in order to protect the local industry (European 
Commission, 2010, pp.10-11). Finally, in April of that same year Egypt re-
established an export ban on cement and clinker, then extending the ban in July 
2009 (ibid.).  
These unilateral decisions and deviations from the provisions of the EMAA are 
telling in so far as they pose important questions with regards to the focus of 
this study. We could argue that these measures manifest non-conforming 
behaviour from the Egyptian administration, but do they also mean that the 
political will to reform is no longer there? As seen above, there is no doubt that 
the relevant administrations in Cairo have been very keen to implement the 
EMAA road-map and have done so with some degree of success according to 
the EU Delegation. However, it is clear that in time of need, Egyptian decision-
makers have been more than willing to bend the rules in order to protect their 
national interests and domestic markets. In this context, the question to ask has 
to do with the way the Commission enforces the provisions outlined in the 
EMAA. According to a Commission official, such infringements are difficult to 
address bilaterally since there is no dispute-settlement mechanism for the EU 
to utilise and, as a result, no consequences that can be imposed (Personal 
communication N.25, 2009). The Commission in this context has limited 
powers to enforce the agreement beyond inviting and trying to persuade 
Egyptian counterparts to be more cooperative and more consultative. 
 
Despite evidence of Egyptian political will to engage with the EU and initiate 
reforms, a major bottleneck has been the Egyptian legislative system and the 
lengthy procedures require for the adoption of new legislation. As a result, 
achievements in terms of legislative reforms have been perceived by EU 
officials at the Delegation as modest (Personal communication N.25, 2009). 
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This is a factor that affects cooperation horizontally. The important variable 
here is the degree of Egyptian political will. If Egyptian political will for reform 
in any particular sector is present at the highest level–ministerial or even 
higher—this will usually result in a quicker process of legislative approval, 
although often not a very transparent one.  However, at times even the 
strongest political will cannot prevent the clogs of the Egyptian bureaucracy 
and the lengthy procedures from dramatically slowing the process. As a result, 
legislative reforms and hence approximation with the EU, is often a very slow 
and lengthy process.  
 
In the sector of agriculture, cooperation between the EU and Egypt has also 
been characterised by a number of problems. Despite the signature of the 
agreement on liberalisation of trade in 2009 and related rhetoric, the 
agricultural sector has benefited from relatively limited financial support from 
the EU. The bulk of the financial allocation, in fact, has mainly focused on 
technical assistance in the form of Twinning and the promotion of access to 
finance for the sector through the NIF instrument.  
From an Egyptian perspective, we could argue that a number of issue-areas 
have emerged related to the failed application of the principle of comparative 
advantage. In fact, the food safety requirements limit Egypt’s agricultural 
sector’s in Egypt  potential for exports. Although it is true that Egyptian food 
and safety standards have been below European expectations, the application 
of the SPS system can also be seen as measure aimed at market protection and 
trade distortion.  
 
Despite Egyptian willingness to enter into further negotiations on the free 
movement of services and capital, by April 2009 bilateral negotiations had 
manifested no progress whatsoever. The main obstacles that emerged were 
related to two issues:  a) the inability to reach agreement on the establishment 
of viable dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM) and, b) on the component in 
the right of establishment related to the movement of people thus, extending 
the scope of the agreement to natural persons in the supply of services (MODE 
4) (Data set ACT 2008-1.2). From Commission documentation it appears that 
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the main issues of contention were related to the free movement of people 
(MODE 4) (ibid.). Here, no progress was achieved because the Commission felt 
it had limited decision-making powers since the issue concerned member 
states’ interests and raised important questions related to security, migration 
and employment. Moreover, from a Commission perspective, this component is 
considered as falling outside the parameters of the EMAA (Personal 
communication, N.25, 2009). Again, it is interesting to observe that national 
interests—those of EU member states in this case—are once again prioritised 
over the provisions of cooperation that the EU itself has drafted and proposed.  
 
In the context of the Agadir Agreement and the establishment of an FTA, real 
concerns were expressed by Delegation staff with regards to the political 
commitment of southern partners. For instance, in 2008 Egypt disputed and 
refused recognition of a Renault car model assembled in Morocco using 
components built in France. The Egyptian administration argued that the 
French company was attempting to avoid high tariffs by importing the product 
to Egypt through Morocco under the Agadir rules of origins and, thus, entering 
the market at zero tariff. The Egyptian refusal resulted in a similar action being 
taken by the Moroccan administration with regard to buses imported from 
Egypt in what can only be described as tit-for-tat diplomacy. Since the car 
industry is a sensitive sector in Egypt, the Renault arrangement with Morocco 
could have been perceived as threatening to Egyptian competition in the 
assembly sector. As a Commission official put it:  
 
“[Egypt and Morocco] are playing a game rather than following the rules […] 
creating obstacles or slowing the process is common activity” (Personal 
Communication N. 3, 2009).  
 
Hence, the lack of political will by Southern partners to implement the 
agreement and the resulting dispute over the application of rules of origins, as 
well as the accumulation of rules of origins, seems to have created some 
conflicting interpretations and positions between partners (such as what per 
cent of a product has to be manufactured in designated locations in order to fall 
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under preferential tariff). Although the Commission provides financial support 
for the Agadir secretariat and its Technical Unit in Amman, Jordan (Personal 
Communication N.3, 2009), its role is often overlooked, if not by-passed, by the 
members. The Delegation in Cairo seems to have inadequate access to 
information and little knowledge about the pillars of the agreement or how the 
agreement should work. At the practical level therefore, Agadir remains a 
sensitive issue to tackle for the Commission (Personal Communication N. 3, 
2009). The lack of active involvement and knowledge of the technical and 
practical issues at stake only add to the problems of enforcement faced by the 
Commission in this field. In a sense, we could argue that the Commission lacks 
the political weight in this regards and, therefore, the ability to influence 
partners’ behaviour. Essentially, its role seems to be limited to that of a 
facilitator.  
Conclusion  
Under the Trade pillar the EU strongly promotes the establishment of a 
regulatory and legislative environment that facilitates free trade with Egypt. 
Thus, the EU is promoting a specific ideology of economic organisation and 
practice, underpinned by neo-liberal principles.  Cooperation and assistance in 
this sector often comes with benchmarks and objectives such as the 
dismantling of tariffs and the liberalisation of industrial and agricultural goods 
as well as approximation with EU standards, rules and norms.  Trade can be 
considered as an area of offensive interest35 for Egypt and, generally, efforts 
towards liberalisation by Egypt have been seen in positive terms.  
 
The analysis in this section has identified EU efforts at promoting legislation 
and practices aimed at the liberalisation of trade in general and more 
                                                          
35 The term ‘Offensive Interests’ refers to interests an actor may directly have as result of agreements or negotiations. For 
instance, gaining access to a market and/or trade facilitation can be seen as offensive interests. ‘Defensive interests’ on the 
other hand, refers to the interests to prevent costly and/or non-confirming behavior. For instance, the unfair competition an 
actor may face from within  specific markets and/or trade agreements. 
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specifically, at improving the quality infrastructure. Moreover, the 
simplifications and decentralisation of decision-making and administrative 
structures have also been at the heart of these reforms. We can observe from 
the evidence above that Egyptian policy-makers have been very pro-active 
regarding this pillar, in particular at the onset of the ENP in 2007. Within the 
structural limits of its centralised system, it could be argued that Egypt had 
made concrete efforts to both reforms as well as to engage with the EU at a 
broader level and actively participate in the institutional structure and EU 
networks in the sector. At the same time, however, Egyptian policy makers 
often took decisions which clearly did not conform with various bilateral and 
international trade agreement. Despite these incidents, however, the Trade 
pillar can be said to manifest a high degree of shared understandings and has 
resulted in substantial cooperation across sub-sectors.  
 
As we have seen, the capacity of the Commission to influence developments in 
this sector has been hampered by a number of issues. Firstly, the lack of an 
enforcing mechanism has relegated any efforts by the Commission in this 
regard to merely making statements of concern. The ability of the Commission 
to enforce some of the agreed legislation and regulation has been negligible. 
This is particularly true in the context of the FTA and with regards to trade-
distorting measures applied by Egypt. Here, the Commission seems to be 
lacking both an enforcing mechanism and also the political will to take such 
action. In this context, an EU official at the Delegation described the EU as 
having “[A] hollow soft power due to the lack of a credible stick to utilise in the 
trade sector but also with Egypt overall” (Personal communication N.3, 2009).  
With regards to Egypt, the EU approach towards the implementation of the 
EMAA and the EEAP was described as soft, mainly due to the special status that 
the country holds for the EU and, more practically, due to the shortcomings 
caused by the nature of the Egyptian bureaucracy and administrative system 
(Personal communication N.25, 2009). Secondly, the centralised nature of the 
Egyptian state-structure has also resulted in the lack of efficiency in the 
implementation of many EU initiatives. This argument is particularly pertinent 
with regards to the slow and complex process of legislative formulation and 
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adoption, key aspects for harmonisation and approximation with the EU 
structures.    
 
Looking at the pace and nature of reforms in this sector, we could argue that 
although much progress seems to have been achieved in terms of trade 
barriers, implementation of these rules remains weak (see unilateral decisions 
taken by EU and Egypt). The role of the Delegation here seems to have been 
limited to monitoring implementation of the EMAA and serving as a liaison with 
the relevant ministries. This evidence both supports a degree of genuine 
norms-adoption by the Egyptian administration with regards to certain sectors, 
but at the same time emphasises the resistance to and, thus, non-conformity in 
others. Additionally, it raises questions about whether norms adoption in areas 
where high costs of adaptation are present can actually be achieved without 
any enforcing mechanisms.  
 
In terms of EU support in this sector, this has been limited to technical 
assistance (legislative harmonisation and institutional approximation). 
Interestingly, in agriculture, which is one of the offensive interests for Egypt, 
the level of financial support has been negligible. Theoretically, this point raises 
the question of self-interest and behaviour in international relations. The 
question is actually about the willingness of the Commission to apply the 
principles that it explicitly promotes.  As we have noted above, concerns have 
been raised by the Egyptian side with regards to the non-application of the 
principle of comparative advantage in the agricultural sectors. Similarly, 
negotiations on the liberalisation of trade have been mainly hampered by the 
inability of the Commission to grant (or even negotiate) free movement of 
service providers (MODE 4) due to member states’ concerns. Here, the position 
of the Commission could be said to be one of protecting member states’ 
interests at the expense of the principles it actually promotes and thus, 
reflecting Realist explanation of international behaviour.  
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THE ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PILLAR  
The socio-economic pillar of the EEAP will be conceptualised in this study as 
including both an economic and a social dimension of development 
cooperation. This section will firstly focus on economic development before 
focusing on social development and related micro-economic linkages.  The aim 
of this pillar is defined as the ability to achieve a degree of sustainable socio-
economic development: 
 
“[W]ith a view to maintaining high economic growth capable of rising living 
standards and generating more jobs for Egypt’s rapidly growing labour force” 
(Council of the European Union, 2009, points, 69-70). 
Economic development 
The priority actions under the EEAP that will be focused upon in this section 
are: Economic development and Transport, Energy and Environment, Water.36 
EU support under this pillar explicitly targets national reform plans and could 
be seen as being implemented most effectively in areas where clear mutual 
interests between stakeholders are identified. This section will attempt to 
identify such sectors and will argue that the choice of delivery instruments is 
crucial for attaining a degree of change and reform. This is true in terms of 
attaining broad ENP policy objectives but also with regards to changes in 
practices and procedures within the Egyptian administration. Of particular 
importance in this context is the section on infrastructure as it could be 
considered both as an area of cooperation manifesting mutual interests for the 
EU and Egypt but also as an area in which the EU assistance mechanisms have 
influenced domestic policy, polity and processes (see conceptualisation of 
Europeanisation by Börzel, theory chapter). For example, the signing of a 
                                                          
36 Actions in the EEAP include: a) improving macro-economic stability and growth and, promoting employment; b) reducing the 
inflation rate and gradually achieving price stability; c) complete preparation on a new monetary policy strategy and d) improve 
public finance management and progress transparency and accountability of government finances; e) improve efficiency of 
public services and accelerate and reduce public and judicial procedures; f) accelerate the reform of the financial sector; g) 
develop a commercial dispute settlement mechanisms (European Commission, 2007b, pp.21-3). 
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Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the EU and Egypt on Energy 
cooperation as well as the EU commitment to various supports for sector 
reforms in water, transport, education and health all point to an apparent 
political will to further cooperation in key sectors and the continuation of a 
specific delivery method. Moreover, energy efficiency and renewable energy 
sources are a new area of focus for EU support in Egypt, very relevant for the 
EU strategic approach with regards to the inclusion of cross-cutting issue 
(Dataset ACT 2008-1.5).  
 
In which area is the EU pushing for reforms/norms transfer?  
Economic development and reform in the EEAP will be conceptualised in its 
narrow definition. The agreed-upon priorities indicate interests and 
preferences of both actors but are also telling in terms what they show about 
the perceptions of the reforms needed to improve the performance of the 
Egyptian economy. In fact, following years of slow economic  growth, efforts 
undertaken by the  Ahmed Nazif government since 2005 translated into 
impressive economic growth, averaging 7.1 % of GDP in 2007 (European 
Commission, 2008, p.7).  EU concern for the Egyptian economy was heightened 
by long-term factors such as food dependence (particularly with regards to 
wheat), a fast growing youth population and an increasingly indebted 
government, as well as the heavy subsidy system in place (European 
Commission, 2009, p.9).  The integration and the growth of the Egyptian 
economy is a central aspect of the reform process under the EEAP, aimed 
primarily at changing and improving policy formulation, decision-making and 
administrative procedures. In this context, the improvement and reform of the 
public finance management (PFM) was seen as a priority by the EU: 
 
“These reforms are necessary to improve debt sustainability and reduce the 
vulnerability to shocks. Improving the structure of public spending, by reducing 
the share of the government wage bill, interest and subsidies in total expenditures 
remains a priority. This will require gradually phasing out the energy and food 
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subsidies and replacing them by better targeted income support” (European 
Commission, 2008, p. 7). 
 
The following section will focus on the sectors prioritised under this pillar of 
the EEAP. These are sectors that have benefited from substantial financial 
allocation under the ENPI, transport, energy and water. Importantly, this 
section will also focus on the application of delivery methods by explaining how 
they work in practise. 
 
With regards to cooperation in the Transport sector, the EU has supported 
Egypt since 2008 through a sector policy-support programme (SBS) of €80 
million (see AAP 2008). Under the programme, the Ministry of Transport is the 
direct beneficiary which co-monitors, with the Delegation, the achievement of 
conditions and benchmarks (outlined in the Financing Agreement and matrix) 
(ibid.). The programme has four components. Component one, institutional 
reforms and governance, focuses on relations between the Ministry of 
Transport and other ministries and the restructuring of the Ministry itself. 
Component two is aimed at the financial stability of the sector and focuses on 
the management of revenues generated in this sector. The aim is to transfer 
responsibilities from the Ministry of Finance (where they currently are lodged), 
to the Ministry of Transport in order to achieve more institutional transparency 
and decentralisation and, importantly, empower the latter in terms of budget, 
policy planning and evaluation (Personal communications, N.5 and N.9, 2009). 
As outlined in chapter three, the promotion of sound public finance 
management is crucial under the SBS, which is aimed at a degree of 
institutional decentralisation and procedural reform in favour of line 
ministries. Component three aims to improve safety, security and 
environmental aspects through EU technical assistance and support. Finally, 
component four is about maritime multi-modality, essentially focusing on 
reforms in and the modernisation of the infrastructure and absorption capacity 
of the Egyptian port-system (Personal communication, N.5, 2009). The idea is 
for the Commission to support the development of a domestic multi-modal port 
system in order to enhance regional maritime links and, thus, Egypt’s ability to 
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re-export goods and work towards its ambition to become a regional hub 
(ibid.). 
 
Through the explanation of the Transport programme we can clearly identify 
how the EU prioritises sectors and concentrates support in terms of compatible 
instruments and financial allocation. According to Delegation staff:  
 
“[W]e are putting these as conditions for approval of the project by the Ministries 
of Finance and Economic Development. In the safety area Egypt already benefited 
from three Twinning programmes, maritime, railway and road safety […] the SBS 
project is in support of the continuation of what was done at the level of these 
three Twinning” (Personal communication, N.5, 2009). 
 
The process of monitoring implementation of the Transport programme falls 
under the remit of the Delegation, but only insofar as the conditions drafted in 
the Financing Agreement and matrix are met. Formulation and endorsement of 
the matrix implies the agreement of a baseline monitoring system with the 
Ministry of Transport:  
 
“[A] base-line monitoring system’ is a document that basically sets the base-
line…where is the ministry now regarding the conditions, what they have done 
and so on…based on this monitoring system you then set what has to be achieved 
to reach the goals outlined […]” (Personal communication, N.5, 2009).  
 
Therefore, the base-line monitoring system allows for pre-conditions to be set 
and enhanced gradually. For example, one of the objectives is to establish an 
independent regulatory executive body for each transport mode. The first 
condition is thus a legal one, related to the legal and institutional framework for 
the establishment of a regulatory council. The second condition builds on the 
former and, accordingly, is concerned with interim structures, rules, tasks and 
responsibilities to be approved by the established council (Personal 
communication, N.5, 2009). Essentially, we could argue that the process of 
reform under the Transport SBS manifests an incremental logic, characterised 
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by an element of continuity and fluidity of objectives, making the various 
process and mechanisms related to SBS essential for an explanation in this 
regard. As we have seen elsewhere, non-fulfilment of these conditions results in 
the non-payment of the relevant tranche. The role of the Delegation here 
becomes a crucial one in terms of consultation with Egyptian counterparts and 
for setting realistic conditions and monitoring their attainment. Importantly, 
the role of the Commission in the above processes is also central for promoting 
policy-dialogue. As noted by Delegation staff in Cairo,  
 
“[T]he strength of SBS is about raising awareness and enhancing the policy 
dialogue…the national dialogue around a specific question which is seen as 
important for the partner” (Personal Communication, N.5, 2009).  
 
Finally, Egypt developed of a comprehensive national transport Master Plan 
expected to start by the end of 2008 for the duration of 18 months. The 
Ministry of Trade was also engaged in the final stage of a detailed study entitled 
‘The Study on Multimodal Transport and Logistics System of The Eastern 
Mediterranean Region and Master Plan in The Arab Republic of Egypt’ which 
covers all intercity transport modes as well as the multimodal transportation 
(Data set SCM 2008-3). As seen previously, the development of an overall 
sector strategy is an essential element for eligibility to SBS for the EU.  
 
 
We could say that the EU adopted a concentrated approach in the transport 
sector whereby SBS has added complementary technical assistance 
instruments. The above analysis of the modalities and mechanisms of SBS point 
to a potential for EU-induced change to take place in the context of the 
conditionalities to be fulfilled, as well as through the quality of interaction in 
the context of sector dialogue. The mechanisms of positive conditionality and 
socialisation can also be said to be evident in the example above. Fulfilment of 
the matrix, in fact, is crucial for the attainment of payment (tranche), whereby 
failure to comply will result in no-payment. Likewise, we could argue that the 
concept of sector dialogue is a very important element for both actors to build 
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trust, exchange technical know-how and expertise which importantly, facilitate 
persuasion.  
 
The Energy sector could be said to be one of the priorities of EEAP. Egypt is 
considered an asset for the EU in terms of energy security and access to natural 
gas resources. National reforms for the energy sector were articulated in 
Egypt’s energy strategy 203037 (Data set SCM 2007-3). Overall, areas for 
cooperation in this sector include:  
 
“[E]nergy strategy development; regulatory issues in the electricity and oil/gas 
sectors (through twinning); energy data bases/statistics; technology transfer and 
industry cooperation, renewable energy (twinning under consideration) and 
energy efficiency (e.g. exchanges on the EU's proposal for an international energy 
framework agreement on energy efficiency; share experiences on regulatory 
policy and enforcement)” (Data set SCM 2007-3).  
 
In this context, the key political document is the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on Strategic Partnership on Energy signed on December 
2, 2008 (Council of the European Union, 2010, point, 75) (Data set SCM 2007-
3).  The MoU was formulated in the context of the priorities identified under the 
EEMA and the EEAP and identifies five specific areas for cooperation: 1) 
develop a comprehensive Egyptian energy strategy, 2) establish a work 
programme for the convergence of Egypt’s energy regulatory market with that 
of the EU, 3) develop a wide-range of joint policy-measure in the field of energy 
demand management, energy efficiency and renewable energy, 4) develop 
energy networks for the improvement of energy security both in Egypt and the 
EU and from the Mashreq region to the EU, 5) enhance technological, scientific 
and industrial cooperation (MoU, 2008, p.4). The attainment of these objectives 
                                                          
37 The 2030 Energy strategy aims to address the current and future plans for supply/demand for local and international markets 
and recommend future options; review current infrastructures for oil and gas production, transmission, treatment and 
distribution and recommend future infrastructure upgrade or new projects; analyse energy costs and pricing policy and draw 
recommendations on addressing the issue of subsidies; review private sector participation and recommend reforms to 
maximise its participation in sector developments; as well as review current energy export policies, assess related 
infrastructure needs and recommend future action to help enhance cooperation with EU (Data set SCM 2007-3). 
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envisions an intensified degree of interaction between the EU and the Egyptian 
administration at various levels, as well as various regulatory and legislative 
reforms. For example, the development of an Egyptian energy strategy 
comprises consultations and discussions with European and other relevant 
stakeholders over the formulation of the overall strategy and action plan,  
follow-up mechanisms and monitoring tools (ibid.). With regard to convergence 
with EU regulations in the energy market, these include regulatory reforms 
supported by Commission in the form of TAIEX for regulators and Twinnings 
for ministries (MoU, 2008, p.5). Development of policies related to energy 
efficiency and diversification imply the presence of the necessary institutional 
and legislative frameworks and, thus, reforms, in line with international 
standards and conventions. Whereas, with regards to energy security the 
emphasis of the MoU is on the reliability of transit structures (markets and 
pipelines), scientific and technological cooperation is envisaged through the 
transfer of European technology into the Egyptian energy sector and the 
exchange of expertise and practices (ibid., p.7). Therefore, the overall pillars of 
cooperation in the energy sector are: the interconnectedness of the sector 
between the North and South of the Mediterranean, the legislative and 
regulatory harmonisation of the sector with the EU system, the upgrade of the 
electricity network and, more emphasis on renewable energy (Personal 
communication, N.8, 2009).   
 
We could argue that cooperation in this sector is seen as addressing EU 
interests as much as Egyptian ones and, therefore, prioritising ‘priorities’ 
within the EEAP. Egypt is thus seen as an asset both as a producing and as a 
transit country (Data set SCM 2008-3).  From an Egyptian perspective, the 
administration in Cairo would like to see Egypt become a bridge connecting the 
Mashreq, Iraq, the Middle East, Africa and the EU (European Commission, 
Annuals report, p.18, 2009). In this context, Egypt has been an active partner in 
the Mashreq regional gas project and in the development process of the Trans-
Mashreq.  It could be argued that the  reform energy sector is at the top of the 
Government’s agenda even though the implementation process faces a number 
of major challenges including sharply increasing international oil prices and  
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energy demand,  the need to address energy subsidies while taking account of 
social aspects, the gradual opening up of markets including the enhancement of 
the regulation, energy efficiency, the development of renewable energy sources, 
as well as infrastructure development.  
 
The Energy sector, therefore, is a priority for both the EU and Egypt. The 
approach for cooperation has also been a concentrated one, involving 
complementarity of assistance tools and enhanced sector dialogue. Shared 
interests in this sector are articulated very clearly through the objectives of the 
programme and there is clear evidence of political will in Cairo to harmonise 
legislation and collaborate with EU institutions without much resistance. In the 
context of this sector, the application of TAIEX and Twinning technical 
assistance is very appropriate as there is the space for the legislative and 
regulatory harmonisation within the regional and international institutional 
framework on energy. Once again, the efficiency of both instruments for the 
adoption of specific norms and rules cannot be underestimated, given that they 
are applied within the appropriate context for their function. Additionally, we 
could argue that the EU is very present at the level of sector dialogue and, to a 
degree, supportive of Egypt with the formulation of both strategy and policy.  
 
In the context of Water, the sector has benefitted from EU support since 2005 
and is regarded by EU practitioners at the Delegation in Cairo as success story. 
The Water sector has been targeted for assistance under the NIP 2007-2010 
under two programmes: 1) Improved Water and Water Services Programme 
through a decentralised management method (project approach) for the 
amount of €29 million under co-financing procedures including the KfW, EIB, 
AFD and the Commission through the NIF (for a total of €129 million) (AAP 
2008); 2) the Water Sector Reform Programme-Phase II (WSRP) with an 
allocation of €120 million phased in over two years (€80 million in 2010 and 
€40 million in 2011) and delivered through centralised management/SBS (AAP 
2010).  
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Cooperation in the water sector in Egypt can be considered a clear priority for 
both actors and the amount allocated over time to the sector is testament to 
that. However, the important aspect under the Water programme is the 
selection of delivery methods. Phase II of the programme is delivered through 
standard SBS as outlined above and is the continuation of the SBS initiated in 
2005. The Improved Water and Water Services Programme, on the other hand, 
is a combination of project approach with additional funds under co-financing 
procedures which fall under the NFI instrument. Co-financing is mainly 
undertaken by European financial institutions, in this case the EIB, KfW and 
AFD. The Commission also contributes with a portion of the funds in order to 
leverage the bulk of the funding which comes in the form of soft loans, unlike 
the rest of EU assistance under the ENP which is considered as a grant to the 
government of Egypt.  The NIF is only applicable for large infrastructure 
programmes and has often been perceived by the Egyptian side in negative 
terms.   
 
We could say, therefore, that in Egypt, the EU is promoting extensive technical 
reforms (legislative, regulatory, institutional) in three key sectors: transport, 
energy and water. The process of these reforms is aided and supported by ENP 
policy instruments such as SBS, TAIEX and Twinning, which hold the 
mechanisms for approximation and harmonisation, as well as providing the 
forum and technical levels of interaction and dialogue amongst technical and 
political counterparts.  
What is the response of the government of Egypt and what is the extent of 
political will manifested? What evidence is available?  
With regards to Economic development and reform, in 2008 Egypt worked to 
improve its fiscal stance by gradually reducing government debt (European 
Commission, Annual report, p.7, 2008). Soaring energy and food prices kept 
consumer price inflation high at 24% year-on-year in September 2008 which 
diminished the purchasing power of the population and affected low-income 
households the most.  Despite soaring global commodity prices, the 
government deficit widened only slightly to 7.8% of GDP in the 2008 fiscal year 
176 
 
and the purchasing-power decline continued.  In the fiscal years 2008 and 2009 
the government maintained its commitment to a budgetary deficit of between 
6.8% and 7% of GDP (European Commission, Annual report, p.8, 2010) 
According to the Commission, in 2010 the Egyptian economy remained 
vulnerable and in particular fiscal sustainability was considered the most at 
stake (ibid.).  
 
In the context of internal public finance management, the second report by the 
Transparency and Integrity Committee on Corruption in July 2008 highlighted 
the need for the identification of indicators in the process of financial control, 
considered as one of the principle aims of State budgetary policy (European 
Commission, 2009, p.15). In June 2009 the Ministry of Finance received an IMF 
mission to advise on fiscal decentralisation and recommend public finance 
management measures needed for the implementation of the process 
(European Commission, 2010, p.13). However, despite IMF, EU and WB advice 
on setting up an internal audit of public finance management and budgetary 
expenditure, at the time of writing this was yet to be put in place. The pace of 
reforms in this sector was reported as slow by the Commission (European 
Commission, 2010, p.13). In this context, we have seen the relevance of PFM for 
eligibility of SBS. It was noted above how the Commission has supported Egypt 
in this context, at times seemingly bending the rules by adopting a ‘dynamic’ 
interpretation of these criteria (see Chapter three).  
 
In the transport sector, Egyptian priorities initially were aimed at separating 
the railway regulators from the operations: the overarching medium-term goal 
was the improvement of the safety record of the Egyptian National Railways 
(ENR) (Data set SCM 2007-3). As a result, a number of structural reforms about 
safety, customer service and freight transport were planned over three phases 
(restructuring, commercialisation and expansion) (Data set SCM 2008-3). The 
Egyptian reform of the railways also envisaged an upgrading of the railway 
network and the renewal of the rolling stock of the national rail—50% of the 
current stock needs to be modernised. The Egyptian Ministry of Transport, 
together with the Egyptian National Railways (ENR), is looking to the 
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privatisation of the sector in order to attract private investment for the 
modernisation process through Private Public Partnerships (PPP). From the 
time-frame above we could argue that the national strategy for the transport 
sector in Egypt also manifested a degree of dynamism and momentum, thanks 
to potential support pledged by the EU in the form of SBS, a national strategy 
being a key criteria for eligibility.  
 
Egypt’s primary Energy mix is 49% oil-based, 47% gas (but the share is 
increasing), 2% hydro, 1% coal, 1% others. 86% of electricity generation is 
fossil-based while the remaining 14% is mostly from hydro-origin (Data set 
SCM 2007-3). Oil and gas production in Egypt reached 74.5 million tons in 
2006, of which 19.5 million tons were exported while oil exports represented 
$10.6 billion in 2006. From an Egyptian perspective, the rationale was to attract 
more FDI and therefore continue to upgrade upstream concession agreements.  
Egypt aimed to stabilise crude oil production despite declining trends due to 
aging wells and was also working on  the modernisation of the refinery 
industry and the development of new industries (e.g. petrochemicals, 
fertilisers) (Data set SCM 2007-3).  
Egypt also continues to develop its increasingly important gas sector, including 
for exports. Between 2000 and 2007 proven gas reserves increased by 50% 
over the previous 7 years, reaching 69.5 trillion cubic feet in March 2007.  In 
terms of domestic developments in energy, these included a new draft gas law 
and legislation for the establishment of a gas and oil regulatory body. Also in 
2008, the new draft Gas Act was being reviewed by the Higher Energy Council 
together with a Framework Act for the establishment of an Oil and Gas 
Regulator. In implementing any sectoral decision, Egypt would have to take full 
account of the social impact related to price increases since energy is heavily 
subsidised. In this context, one of the priority aims has been to lift subsidies for 
heavy energy consuming industries (Data set SCM 2008-3). Regionally, the 
completion of the Arab Gas Pipeline in 2008 was seen as  a major development 
for Egyptian ambitions to act as an ‘energy hub’ in the region and, with regards 
to increased EU access to regional energy supplies since the pipeline will 
connect the region to the EU via Turkey (European Commission, 2010, p.16). 
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Agreement at the EU-Mashreq Ministerial Conference in April 2008, which 
marked the completion of the Arab Gas Pipeline, consisted of the following key 
developments:  
 
“[T]he Ministers of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria agreed to take steps to 
connect the pipeline to the European network. Gas exports to Jordan started 
through this pipe. Egypt pursued a strengthened role in the EC supported Euro-
Mashraq gas master plan project, which contributes to developing a Euro 
Mediterranean natural gas market. It constructed domestic gas pipelines and 
studied interconnection possibilities with Gaza, Libya and Sudan. A pipeline to 
Israel was completed and Egypt started gas exports. Egypt has plans to expand 
Liquefied Natural Gas and refinery capacity” (European Commission, 2009, p. 
18). 
 
In the sector of Renewable energy in Egypt, energy efficiency and more use of 
renewable energy resources (wind, solar, biomass) are key priorities within a 
broad strategy to diversify the energy mix, reduce gas use for power 
production, improve electrification of isolated areas and, ensure the protection 
of  the environment (Data set SCM 2007-3). With EU assistance, Egypt 
embarked on the promotion and use of renewable energy (Council of the 
European Union, 2008, point, 63). Importantly, Egypt pledged to create a 
sustainable institutional, legal and regulatory framework to create enabling 
conditions for large-scale investment in the renewable field (Data set SCM 
2007-3). In this context, in April, 2007, the Supreme Council for Energy 
presented a long-term plan to meet 20 % of electricity demand by renewable 
energy by 2020 (European Commission, Annual report, p. 14, 2008), the 
composition planned being 12% from wind energy and 8% from hydro. To this 
effect wind farms should be built by 2020. Enhancement of local manufacture 
and technology transfer in this field is also amongst the objectives of the 
national plan (Data set SCM 2007-3). In 2008 Egypt benefited from a 
substantial allocation of the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) for the 
wind farm at Gulf of El-Zeit (European Commission, Annual report, p. 18, 2009). 
The project fell under the NIP 2007-2010 (AAP 2010) with an allocation of €20 
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million from the EC plus €10 million from NIF, co-financed by the KfW (€191.5  
million), the EIB (€50 million) and the Egyptian government (around €68.5 
million), and delivered through a project approach/decentralised management 
(AF 2010, p. 15). Let us not forget that support in the way of the NIF implies 
large loans being provided at a competitive interest rate by European financial 
institutions and, thus, could be seen as an instrument able to promote 
European capital investment in the public sector. 
What are the limitations of EU efforts and strategy  in Egypt? 
Overall, it could be argued that the limitations of the EU in the above sectors are 
mainly related to the applicability of SBS and its implications on EU-Egyptian 
relations. SBS remains a policy instrument that does not allow the EU to 
monitor the allocation of funds due to the principle of fungibility. Additionally, 
many doubts still remain over its effectiveness and over the strict application of 
SBS criteria in Egypt. In this regards the European Court of Auditors expressed 
strong criticism on the lack of transparency in public finance management and 
in relations to the Egyptian budget in general (ECA, 2013). This is quite a 
different position from most of the EU practitioner’s interview where SBS and 
the process of PFM was defined in optimistic terms and as gaining momentum. 
According to the ECA report on Egypt:  
 
“According to Commission policy, the satisfactory overall implementation of PFM 
reform is a general condition for budget support. However, the Commission did 
not establish clear criteria in terms of annual reform milestones and benchmarks 
for monitoring and assessing what constituted an adequate pace of reform and 
continued to disburse  budget support despite slow implementation of reforms” 
(2013, p.22).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In Egypt, SBS has gradually (and seemingly) become the favoured method of 
delivery for both actors. Here, processes and mechanisms associated with SBS 
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can be seen as increasing the opportunity for the EU to influence the Egyptian 
administration (at institutional, legislative, procedural levels) and introduce 
norms related to better governance, transparency and a more intensified and 
participatory policy dialogue. In this context, EU support for infrastructure and 
modernisation has focused on institutional, regulatory and legislative reforms 
that are supported through technical assistance and consultations aimed at 
enhancing the quality of policy-dialogue, externally with the EU as well as 
internally between the various national stakeholders. In the transport sector, 
for instance, the data collected from personal interviews with relevant staff 
show that the Commission seemed satisfied with the progress achieved up to 
2010. In the area of road transport steps have been taken in order to establish a 
transparent regulatory framework for granting access and licences to road 
transport freight operators, in line with EU standards. There is little doubt that 
EU practitioners on the ground appreciate the influencing power of 
instruments such as SBS. One could argue that through the matrix the EU is able 
to apply technical conditionality on agreed-upon bench-marks and to feel itself 
part of consultations and sector dialogue for sector-strategy and sector-policy 
formulation.  
 
With regards to the energy sector, one could argue that mutual interest means 
that the reform process is strongly supported at the political levels both in 
Cairo and in Brussels. In fact, Egypt requested an SBS in energy which was later 
formulated under the NIP 2007-2013 at €84 million under priority two 
(developing the competitiveness and productivity of the economy) (Personal 
communication, N.8, 2009). Finally, and with regards to the water sector, this 
has been represented by EU officials as a success story in Egypt. In fact, SBS in 
water was seen by EU practitioners as key in achieving the drafting of a sector 
strategy upon which to build further cooperation and reforms: 
 
“[S]BS was related to the drafting of an Egyptian Master Plan for Water Supplies 
which is to define the current and future capital investment needs…. [T]his was a 
key document achieved through the conditionalities of the SBS in the water sector 
which has been going on for 3 years now,  with a cost of €9 million and involving 
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27 different firms, plus a €3 million related programme focusing on Rural areas 
in the Delta and co-financed in part by the EC, KfW, the EIB and, in part by the 
Egyptian government. This Master Plan is seen as the basis for further sectoral 
cooperation …so basically a conditionality…. [S]o we say [to Egypt], now you have 
it you have to use it and keep updating it […]” (Personal communication, N.8, 
2009).  
 
Importantly, EU practitioners see themselves as able to influence reform 
through the mechanisms of SBS:  
 
“[C]onditionalities in the water sector have worked…. [W]ithout our push it could 
have taken years…. [T]hey can be effective but it depends on the relevant Minister 
and political will…. [T]here are always difficulties with imposing conditionalities 
[…]” (Personal communication, N. 26, 2009).  
 
In conclusion, we can say that economic cooperation in terms of infrastructure 
seems to have been positive during the period under study. Moreover, in 
several occasions the application of conditionalities through the mechanisms of 
SBS have resulted in sector change and transformation. The main reflection 
here would have to revert to the criteria for eligibility and for their dynamic 
interpretation which, it could be argued, relegate SBS to a political tool for 
cooperation rather than a technical one. Finally, it must also be noted that SBS 
for infrastructure projects (transport, energy and water) usually come with 
lending conditions from European institutions. Negotiations over the 
conditions of these soft loans have often been long and difficult, manifesting a 
dependency from the Egyptian side to proceed with public works.  
 
Social development and social affairs 
The main principles of cooperation under the pillar of social development and 
social affairs are to ensure sustainable economic development and, 
consequently, a better quality of life and more opportunities for all Egyptians.  
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As already mentioned, cooperation in social affairs is seen as directly linked to 
economic reforms aimed at achieving  “sustainable socio-economic 
development […] with a view to maintaining high economic growth capable of 
rising living standards and generating more jobs for Egypt’s rapidly growing 
labour force” (Association Council, 2009, points, 69-70).   
In which area is the EU pushing for reforms/norms transfer?  
The objectives for EU cooperation in this section of the EEAP target education, 
the social situation, employment and poverty reduction and public health. From 
the distribution of the financial allocation under the EEAP, we can note that 
Education and Health are two sectors that absorb most of the resources and 
that very little has in fact been allocated for other actions. Hence, the focus of 
the analysis will mainly rest on the former two sectors.  
 
With regards to Education the objectives articulated in the EEAP aims to 
support the reform and upgrading of the education and training systems and 
work towards the convergence with EU and international standards and 
practices (Commission, 2007b, p.28). Under the NIP 2007-2010 EU assistance 
to Egypt in this sector has taken the form of an Education Sector Policy Support 
Programme (ESPSP) with a package of €120 million delivered through SBS 
(centralised management) (AAP 2007) and building on the previous Education 
SBS of 2005.  
 
Actions focusing on the Health sector, on the other hand, aim at achieving 
universal access to health services for citizens. The method envisaged was to 
promote decentralisation (and liberalisation) of the health system. The 
Egyptian health strategy benefitted from EU support in the form of the Health 
Sector Reform Programme (HSRP), implemented by the Ministry of Health and 
Population and supported with a SBS € 88 million operation in 2006. The 
programme allowed the introduction of the “Family Health Model” (FHM) in 5 
governorates and representing 10% of the total public primary health-care 
facilities. Moreover, efforts also targeted the upgrading of over 1000 family 
health Clinics by June 2006 and providing a basic Benefit Package to both 
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uninsured and insured segments of the population. Under the 2007-2010 NIP 
EU support in this sector has taken the form of the Health Sector Policy Support 
(HSPS) II with an allocation of €110 million delivered through centralised 
management/SBS (AAP 2009). The aim of this phase was to accompany the 
reform of the health sector in its short/medium and long term objectives (Data 
set SCM 2007-4). For example, in the case of one of the pilot projects the aims 
are as follows:  
 
“In order to experiment and fine tune the new Universal Health Insurance Model, 
a pilot project is being implemented in Suez governorate. This new model: (1) 
merges all the public health purchaser entities into a sole public payer, (2) adopts 
a defined health package (3) uses an actuarial instrument to measure the fiscal 
sustainability of the system and (4) introduces a state subsidy mechanism to cover 
the expenses of the poor. Once fine tuned, this new model of health insurance 
model will be progressively rolled-out nationwide” (ibid.).  
 
Sector cooperation with the EU included possibilities offered by the TAIEX and 
Twinning instruments. From an Egyptian perspective, interest was expressed 
for EC support in the areas of nursery and special care to the elderly as well as 
in the area of human resources and capacity building of medical doctors and 
nurses in addition to enhancing the possibility of developing trilateral 
cooperation between Egypt, EU and African countries in health field (Data set 
SCM 2007-4).  
 
With regards to the social situation, suffice it to say that the main strategy 
adopted by the EU was to promote dialogue about poverty reduction through 
social dialogue and employment policies. As mentioned already, no funds were 
allocated to this sector in the period under study. Despite the needs in this area, 
the EU cooperation under this action remains almost absent and without any 
funding or strategic direction. Like other areas such as gender and 
environment, and poverty reduction remains a cross-cutting issue which, 
rhetorically at least, are always included in EU cooperation programmes. The 
only EU assistance for social development under the NIP 2007-2010 (ENPI) 
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was aimed at supporting  rural development with an allocation of €10 million 
which was delivered through a project approach/decentralised management. 
The aims of the project were to improve overall living conditions in target areas 
by empowering local community-based associations and bodies (Personal 
communication, N.4, 2009).  
 
With regards to the priority sectors mentioned above it is clear that the two 
large disbursements for Education and Health are clearly intended to promote 
change at the policy and legislative levels. As we have already seen, SBS implies 
the fulfilment of a matrix of conditionalities for the release of payments and, 
thus, the application of technical conditionality by the EU. Finally, and when 
looking at the project approach in the rural development project, we can clearly 
see how the aim is to empower the beneficiaries to take responsibility for the 
project and its outcomes. The decentralised modality of implementation does 
exactly that at the administrative level albeit with some EU support when 
needed. Finally, the project also promotes participatory approaches to decision-
making and governance by attempting to involve the community and local 
authorities in domains that traditionally have been dominated by the 
centralised Egyptian bureaucracy. 
What is the response of the government of Egypt and what is the extent of 
political will manifested? What evidence is available?  
In the sector of Education and training, in 2007 Egypt was encouraged by the 
EU to implement the ongoing education reforms in line with the principles of 
the Bologna Declaration acknowledged as relevant for all Mediterranean 
partners at the Euro-Med Conference on higher Education and Scientific 
Research held Cairo in 2007 (Association Council, 2008, point, 68). The reforms 
aim at enhancing the capacity of institutions and organisations involved in 
quality assurance and training (Association Council, 2007, point, 62). The 
Tempus programme has also been instrumental in providing a platform for 
cooperation between Egyptian and EU universities through the participation in 
Erasmus Mundus. Moreover, through the programme Tempus IV the EU has 
committed itself to the supporting the development and modernisation of the 
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higher education system in Egypt (Association Council, 2008, points, 68-9). 
However, an OECD review of Egyptian higher education policy in 2010 
concluded that this sector remains underdeveloped and unchanged (OECD, 
2010). It adds that:  
 
“Without a fundamental reform of the sector the country will face difficulties in 
improving its competitiveness in an increasingly knowledge-based world, in 
providing for a larger and more diverse student population, and in reducing 
social inequalities” (OECD, 2011). 
 
This statement seems to undermine the achievements of the long-term 
assistance provided by the EU in this sector. In fact, education is seen by the EU 
staff at the Delegation as a key sector for the development of Egypt; a view that 
was not shared by HQ in Brussels in drafting of the latest NIP 2011-2013 
(Personal communication, N.26, 2009). As it was noted by a Delegation official, 
the drafting of the NIP provides no guarantees with regards to continuity in the 
selection of a priority sector. Seen as having long-term objectives, the 
Delegation ‘had to defend’ continuity in the education sector while RELEX at the 
time (EEAS now) argued for shifting the allocation on the basis that it did not 
include elements of the acquis and that it represented only a small percentage 
on the national sector-budget, approximately 3-4% of the national education 
budget, thus meaning little leverage for the EU (Personal communication, N.26, 
2009).  
 
In the sector of Health, Egypt started a comprehensive sector reform in 1996 
aimed at improving the managerial and administrative capacity of the Health 
Insurance Organisation (HIO) (Data set SCM 2009-4).   
 
What are the limitations of EU efforts and strategy in Egypt? 
The above section has attempted to provide yet another perspective in terms of 
EU support for socio-economic development. The main sector-objectives here 
are related to education, health and rural development. The section has also 
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touched on the structural challenges Egypt faces in terms of poverty reduction 
and, although this sector seems to be perceived by the EU as a priority for 
assistance receiving €298 million under the 2007-2010 NIP alone, that the 
actual allocation of funds paints a different picture. The two main interventions 
under SBS for Education and Health alone take €240 million. This could be seen 
as part of the EU strategic reasoning and rationale, aimed at a rapid and easy 
disbursement of the funds and at the same time based on a preference for 
working through SBS modalities in order to achieve tangible and substantial 
results in terms of sector legislation, policy and strategy (Personal 
communication, N.10, 2009). However, if we look at actual benefits to final 
citizen beneficiaries and at actual improvements of sectors on the ground, a 
number of questions naturally arise.  
 
Clearly SBS raises important questions about the application of positive 
conditionality and about the issue of normative transfer. In terms of EU 
assistance, the analysis of the application of SBS and the project approach in 
this sector point to the degree of reform taking place at institutional, regulatory 
and legislative levels in terms of intuitional decentralisation and 
empowerment, participatory formulation and regulatory frameworks. The 
analysis also intended to focus on the processes underpinning the 
implementation of the policy. Thus, the study of this pillar aims to provide 
evidence for the argument that cooperation under the ENP is conducive to the 
process of EU-induced normative transfer and change. In this context, the 
mechanisms for normative transfer—involving socialisation and 
conditionality—are understood to operate under the application of delivery 
instruments such as technical assistance, SBS, Twinning and TAIEX and, to a 
lesser extent, in the project approach (PA). With regards to sector reforms, it 
seems that, overall, legislative and institutional reforms in Egypt are 
proceeding, albeit at their own pace and are almost always hampered by the 
bureaucracy and dense administrative structures. EU practitioners seem well 
aware of the limits of the Egyptian administration, to the point that their 
expectations fall quite below what ideally should be achieved and by when (e.g. 
see PFM criteria and dynamic interpretation, setting and agreeing benchmarks 
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and conditionalities). It seems that more emphasis is placed by practitioners on 
the process of cooperation itself than on the actual objectives achieved. This 
explains the attempt to bend the PFM criteria and make sure that Egypt 
remains eligible to SBS as well as the emphasis articulated in the interviews on 
the efficient application of the matrix, from formulation to implementation. 
Therefore, we could argue that although policy objectives seem to provide the 
reference for cooperation, the essence of this cooperation is to be found in the 
processes of interaction and related expectations. 
 
One of the main challenges facing the EU in the above pillar has to be the sheer 
size of the needs, as compared with the funding available for allocation to 
Egypt. There is doubt that €200 million in support of education over a period of 
three years is a substantial indicator of the commitment of both the EU and 
Egypt on the sector. That said, the full amount equates to less than 3% of the 
annual budget for Education in Egypt (Personal communication, N.26, 2009). 
This disparity between needs and resources not only undermines what might 
be thought of as substantial financial commitments by the EU, but it also 
undermines and weakens the little leverage that a delivery tool such as SBS can 
have in Egypt (Personal communication, N.26, 2009). Combining these facts  
with a very slow process of legislative reforms, a difficult environment for the 
implementation of these reforms, and the highly centralised nature of the 
Egyptian administration raises the question of whether both Education and 
Health are two black holes, sectors where no matter the amount of funding 
allocated to them, the results of that investment could never be fruitful. 
However, this statement seems to undermine the achievements of the long-
term assistance provided by the EU in this sector.  
Conclusion 
This section also identified two themes running through the analysis: a) a 
comprehensive approach to assistance adopted by the EU and comprising 
trade, development and economic development, and b) the utilisation of SBS as 
a preferred delivery method during the period under study.  The 
comprehensive approach to assistance rests on the inter-connectedness of 
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sectors and sector-objectives and envisages assistance and reforms in trade, 
agriculture, social and economic development, infrastructure, as well as across 
institutions, legislation, procedures and practices. An important theme that 
emerges is the horizontal link between the various norms promoted by the EU 
including: economic development, trade and social development, as well as 
good governance, transparency, all thus, being aimed at procedural and 
institutional transformation and integration (see below).  
The locus of this process has been identified in the delivery instruments and 
associated mechanisms. Of particular interest is the emphasis placed by the 
Commission on public finance management and rapid reformation of the 
subsidy system. In this context, the eligibility and application of SBS is directly 
linked and complementary to achieving reforms in this sector. Importantly, 
infrastructure has been recently characterised by an increased application of 
SBS (one per year). This seems to follow a strategic reasoning by the EU aimed 
at prioritising strategic sectors such as energy. As we have seen, through 
various delivery methods the EU is able to interact and influence change at 
various institutional levels and through various delivery mechanisms. SBS, 
technical assistance and sector dialogue can all be seen as essential 
components of the process of normative transfer, promoting both technical 
conditionality (matrix and bench-marks) and socialisation (administrative 
procedure and institutional learning, sector-dialogue). Importantly, we could 
also argue that through the application of local ownership, the EU is able to 
apply positive conditionality in its relations with Egypt. This is telling insofar as 
it provides evidence for the export of EU governance, practices and, some might 
argue, of EU power.  
 
Although the above analysis has mainly focused on the mechanism for norms-
transfer and technical reforms under the framework of the EEAP, this must not 
divert our attention for the broader discussion of the nature of the EU and its 
behaviour towards Egypt. The intent of this analysis was also to paint an overall 
picture of the nature of EU-Egyptian relations in this pillar and across sectors. 
We could argue that the EU promotes a high degree of liberalisation and 
decentralisation of the Egyptian state system, also aimed at the integration with 
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EU governance structures. As we have already seen, from a strategic 
perspective this is in line with EU interests and rationale as outlined in the ENP. 
In this context, we could argue that the EU strategy towards Egypt has recently 
shifted its focus of assistance to newly identified sectors such as environment, 
energy and political reforms (Personal communication, N.26, 2009).  
From a theoretical perspective, motivations for such behaviour would be 
explained through the neo-realist paradigm of self-interested actions. 
Structural asymmetries and dependence identified in trade and economic 
relations give weight to this perspective. These are manifested in particular in 
the ad hoc loose application by the EU of the principles of comparative 
advantage in trade (see agriculture) and freedom of establishment (see MODE 
4). That said, when we analyse the processes underpinning the ENP rather than 
merely relying on its stated objectives, we can safely conclude that the 
normative power paradigm is predominant, given the evidence for the ability of 
the EU to influence change. In this context, we must take into consideration 
Egyptian behaviour and its rationale.  
 
We have already discussed the implication of certain policy instruments and 
their further implications for the application of positive conditionality by the 
EU. Conversely, we must not forget that implementation of reforms rests on 
political will by the various actors involved. From an Egyptian perspective, we 
can say that reforms of the trade system and the modernisation of the economy 
are identified as the main cooperation priorities. Here, the concept of political 
will is an essential element for cooperation. Political will is usually articulated 
at ministerial level but is not always reflected through implementation 
(Personal communications, N. 5, N.9 and N.10, 2009). Ministries are expected to 
lobby for new legislation and/or decrees in order to fulfil their commitments to 
relevant sector reforms and their responsibilities vis-à-vis EU cooperation. 
However, EU priorities are not always supported financially and do not always 
reflect Egyptian priorities:   
 
“[T]he Commission is here to help reform the situation but we cannot support all 
of the AP... In some areas efforts have to made without any kind of assistance, it’s 
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about the reform of the country so in the interest of Egypt not the 
Commission….So maybe we need to focus on the high political priorities of  the 
government and the EEAP is a plan about priorities, but there are priorities 
within priorities […] (Personal communication, N.14, 2009).  
 
As pointed out, maybe the EU should prioritise sector assistance based on the 
evidence of political will from the Egyptian side. SBS could be seen as crucial in 
this regard since the instrument is conceptualised by EU practitioners as an 
incentive for reform in itself, serving as an incentive to influence political will:  
 
[F]or the neighbourhood and the neighbouring countries an SBS operation is a 
kind of incentive; it’s a contribution to the costs of reform…it’s about policies, an 
incentive to implement policies, to attract investment… and to create the legal 
and institutional framework that allows for such participation and so on […]  
Although [SBS] will not solve the financial problems of the Ministry of Transport, 
financial support is delivered in such a manner that all stakeholders need to sit 
around the table and discuss … [It] pressurises them to carry out the reform 
agenda… This is an incentive in itself…this is where we see the importance of SBS” 
(Personal communication, N.5, 2009). 
 
From this perspective then, SBS can be defined as a political instrument. In fact, 
structural asymmetries and economic dependence are an influencing factor in 
explaining both EU an Egyptian behaviour. Finally, we could also note that the 
analysis of the socio-economic pillar points to the limits of the EEAP in 
prioritising actions for implementation.  
 
THE ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL PILLAR  
The essence of the political pillar in the EEAP can be found under the following 
chapter: ‘Enhanced political dialogue and reform’ (European Commission, 
2007b, p.12). The areas of priority for action include:  democracy and the rule 
of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, co-operation on foreign and 
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security policy, combating terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. These priorities can be summarised as covering political dialogue 
and domestic reform, as well as political dialogue on regional and international 
issues.   
The political pillar is different from the previous two due to the lack of a 
substantial cooperation programmes and thus, lack of funds. In fact, an 
allocation of 10% of the total amount of the 2007-2010 NIP was earmarked for 
programmes under democracy and human rights but only 22% of this modest 
amount had been spent by 2013 (ECA, 2013). This, however, is a subject that 
will covered below. Rather, the analysis will emphasize concepts of ‘dialogue’, 
‘reforms’ and ‘communication’. 
  
Political dialogue is explicitly mentioned in a number of actions in the EEAP 
(e.g. political affairs and cooperation, human rights, fundamental freedoms, 
democracy and regional affairs). For the purpose of this study, we will 
conceptualise political dialogue as taking place in within the institutional 
framework of the ENP, including organizations such as the Association Council, 
Association Committee and sector specific Sub-Committees, the latter also 
including what could be termed as technical dialogue. Based on these meetings 
at the various levels, actions are taken and the relation is systematically 
evaluated. That said, dialogue could be also conceptualised as constantly taking 
place between the EU and Egyptian administrations across sectors, be it in the 
context of programming, implementation, monitoring or the evaluation of the 
EEAP. In this context, the analysis of the concept of dialogue will focus on the 
language of formal communications38 and will elaborate on meanings implied 
and perceived. The concept of dialogue must be perceived as always having 
political connotations, including, for instance, discussions on topics such as 
human rights or energy sector reforms.  
 
                                                          
38 Formal communications because it is in the context of the ENP institutional structure mentioned above, that ‘dialogue’ is 
formalised and minutes recorded. 
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Dialogue within the EU-Egypt Association Council  involves the highest 
institutional level of dialogue under the ENP structure. Association Council 
statements record formal positions, shortcomings and/or progress achieved. 
The nature of the language used in this context can be considered as significant 
with regards to the intentions and policy preferences of the EU and Egypt. 
Essentially, minutes of these meetings can tell us the perceptions of the EU with 
regards to reform processes, adherence to EU norms, values and principles 
under the ENP, as well as Egyptian reactions to EU activities and proposals. The 
Association Committee and Sub-committee meetings are technical and detailed 
affairs where the various positions are discussed and negotiated, while formal 
Association Council statements are understood as diplomatic instruments used 
to convey a position or a message, to reinforce the legitimacy of a partner or to 
undermine it.  
 
EU statements of the various EU-Egypt Association Councils from 2006 until 
2010 will provide the main source of data here, complemented with the other 
primary and secondary data. The language used by the EU is very important as 
it can be seen as granting a degree of legitimacy to Egypt through praise and 
encouragement or, on the other hand, it can be perceived as patronizing and 
paternalistic when expressing concern over areas where lack of progress is 
perceived, for instance democratization and fundamental freedoms. 
Importantly, the Association Council also outlines areas or issues of potential 
conflict between the EU and Egypt.   
 
Political reforms on the other hand, are never explicitly mentioned in the EEAP 
but rather implied:  
 
“[to] Further develop measures to increase the capacity and the efficiency of the 
judiciary (including prisons) and access to justice” and/or “ [to] support Egyptian 
government policies and programmes aiming at improving places of detention 
and prison conditions, especially the placement of minors” (European 
Commission, 2007b, p.12).  
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Reforms here can be conceptualised as comprising a number of issues 
including: the functioning of institutions, improving and protecting human 
rights and basic freedoms and, importantly, democratization. Considering the 
sensitivity of Egypt about its internal affairs, the term ‘support’ is often utilized 
by the EU to imply joint-ownership of the process and objectives.  
In which area is the EU pushing for reforms/norms transfer?  
Looking at the political chapter in the EEAP, the areas identified for priority 
actions are over-arching and include most sectors. As we have seen above, 
under this pillar the EU pursued a number of reforms in very sensitive areas, 
and seeks an open dialogue on those same issues. The actions identified under 
the political chapter of the EEAP include a broad list that combines some minor 
financial assistance for programs with a number of reforms (legislative and 
institutional) aimed at  deeper and increased political cooperation and 
dialogue, on the most salient domestic and geo-political issues (Commission, 
2007a, p.19). The EEAP states that the ENP has presented both the EU and 
Egypt with the opportunity to further develop their strategic partnership 
through an increasingly close and enhanced partnership envisaging an 
intensified political cooperation (Commission, 2007b, pp.1-2). 
 
According to the literature analysed in previous chapters, the rationale and 
implementing logic of the ENP rests on the concept of shared values. The 
concept and role of shared values under this pillar should be seen as crucial and 
at the same time as problematic. The concept and definition of shared values in 
the EEAP includes concepts such as democracy, human rights, rule of law and 
good governance. These are values and norms that the EU sets as benchmarks 
for cooperation under the ENP and which are often perceived as offensive 
interests. However, it is obvious that cooperation in the political domain is a 
sensitive issue, particularly with a difficult partner such as Egypt.  The 
statements of the Association Council do provide, to an extent, a glimpse of this 
evaluation process or, at least, EU perceptions of the matter.   
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The language of the Association Council in the 2006 (para, 12-16) statements 
refers to “alleged use of torture”, “the handing down of death sentences”, the 
“decision to delay the abolition of the state of emergency”. The statement is 
politically loaded with sentences such as “the EU calls on Egypt to take the 
necessary steps” with regards to the death penalty and torture and, “the EU 
urges Egypt to hold to undertakings made in 2005” regarding the emergency 
law. These issues were reiterated in the EU Association Council statements in 
2007. The following year the EU expanded its statement on the emergency law, 
stating:  
 
“[the EU] looked forward to the implementation of plans to end the state of 
emergency [and is] following with great interests developments concerning the 
new antiterrorism law which is expected to replace the emergency law before the 
current parliamentary session ends in July 2008” (Council of the European Union, 
2008, p.4, para.11).  
 
The issue of the new anti-terror law in Egypt has been one where the 
international community has placed much public pressure on the 
administration. Promises for new legislation failed to materialize. This 
produced strong international reactions, including from the EU, as High 
Representative Dame Catherine Ashton stated:  
“I strongly encourage the government to speed up the steps needed for the 
adoption of an anti-terrorism law compliant with international human rights 
standards as soon as possible, noting the government’s commitment to this goal 
in the EU/Egypt Action plan and in other forums” (Catherine Ashton, 2010). 
Other areas of concern articulated by the EU in the Association Council 
meetings have mainly been related to the restrictive nature of Egypt’s NGO Law 
which results in legal and administrative obstacles for CSOs to operate in the 
country, the arrest of journalists and bloggers (Council of the European Union, 
2008). Moreover, following the local elections of 2008 the Association Council 
noted that:  
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“[T]he EU encourages the Egyptian authorities to review the electoral framework 
with a view to bring into line international standards, including the right to stand 
as candidate” (2008, p.4, para.9). 
 
In the section on the relevance and importance of a flourishing civil society, the 
Association Council noted that the EU:  
 
“[E]ncourages the Egyptian authorities to ensure that their legislation, notably 
the NGO law, conforms with international human rights standards concerning 
freedom of association” (Council of the European Union, 2008, p.5, para.13).  
 
Staying within the themes of freedoms, the EU further called on Egypt to take 
more steps to improve the state of freedom of expression and press freedom in 
accordance with international standards and to abolish prison sentences for 
publication offences (ibid., p.5, para.14). 
 
Beyond the domestic environment, the EEAP explicitly states that Egypt’s 
geographical position and strategic role is crucial for the EU in the region. Egypt 
is seen as contributing to regional stability and security:  
 
“[T]he EU and partner countries should also work together on effective 
multilateralism, so as to reinforce global governance, strengthen coordination in 
combating security threats and address related development issues” 
(Commission, 2007b, p.4). 
 
This priority manifests the international dimension of political dialogue and the 
promotion by the EU of an effort to work through multilateral frameworks and 
in pursuit of comprehensive security. Importantly, it also promotes specific 
norms, rules and practices related to cooperation on international and 
humanitarian law.  Overall we could argue that promoting cooperation on 
regional issues, most notably in the MEPP, is in the interest of both Egypt and 
the. Not only does participation in the MEPP legitimise their respective regional 
and international role conceptions, but it also increases their respective 
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influence and thus, geo-strategic interests. The EU faces a number of security 
challenges both in terms of soft and hard security from the threat of terrorists 
and regional instability as a whole, to the specific circumstances of the MEPP 
where Brussels has been involved with an ESDP mission on the Rafah border 
(EU BAM)39, although since 2007 the border has been closed and the mission 
put on hold.  
 
For Egypt, keeping an influential and determining role in the region is not only 
in its national interest but also reflects national role conceptions of the local 
political elites despite a clear weakening in this role in recent decades 
(Personal Communication, N. 22, 2009). Since the advent of the Arab Spring, 
and maybe even before that, the MEPP seems to have evaporated, taking with it 
the one structure in which the EU could exert some influence. Considering the 
importance of Rafah, the role of Egypt in the MEPP remains particularly 
relevant. Peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict is interdependently linked to 
developments in the wider region and rests on a stable balance between the 
various regional actors. In this context the role of Egypt is central to the 
objectives of the EU. Cairo, in fact, has been directly involved and has 
immediate interest in contributing to a peaceful solution not only between 
Israel and the PA but also between Israel and Syria, Syria and Lebanon and 
particularly in having stable governments in Iraq and Sudan.   
 
Moreover, increased international exposure can also be seen as a providing 
some degree of legitimacy to the Egyptian government itself.  This was certainly 
the case under the Mubarak regime where Egypt’s summitry and regional 
profile contributed to legitimise domestic political repression against its 
national terrorist threat.  For instance, under the action of political dialogue the 
EEAP also envisages an increase in cooperation in combating terrorism. This 
priority was qualified in the document by stating that Egyptian national 
security considerations were to be taken into consideration (European 
Commission, 2007b, p.19). It could be argued for the Mubarak regime this also 
                                                          
39 The EU Border Assistance Mission was part of the Agreement on Movement and Access signed in 2005 between the Israeli 
government and the Palestinian Authority (Association Agreement 2006, para.24) 
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meant acknowledging the domestic-regional security nexus and, thus, the 
historical relationship between Hamas and the MB in Egypt. We can argue that 
such a sentence legitimises, to a degree, any potential repression of emerging 
political forces, Islamist and secular. It is no secret that the Egyptian 
government has been able to justify abuses of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, as well as the obstruction of a transition to democracy by persuading 
the international community, and the EU in particular, that a democratic 
alternative to the regime would bring to power an Islamic political force that is 
would be hostile to the West, the MB. In this context, the priority of combating 
terrorism can also be seen as an instrument that enabled the Mubarak regime 
to maintain a grip on power.  
 
We can summarise the above section by saying that the EU predominately 
attempts to promote political reforms in Egypt in the domains of 
democratisation, human rights, independence of the judiciary, and the rule of 
law, also classified in the EEAP as shared values. At the international and 
regional level, the EU promotes dialogue on a number of issues through 
diplomatic multilateralism and within the context of existing regimes (ENP, 
MEPP, UfM) in order to achieve comprehensive security. Despite the obvious 
tensions in areas of domestic political reforms, cooperation in the international 
and regional domain can be seen as characterized by mutual interests for both 
the credibility and legitimacy of the EU as well as Egypt and thus, highly 
thought by both actors.  
What is the response of the government of Egypt and what is the 
extent of political will manifested? What evidence is available?  
The reactions of the Egyptian administration with regards to the introduction 
of the ENP were less than positive. From personal communication with 
Egyptian and European policy-practitioners it emerged that the negotiations 
over the EEAP were long and difficult and primarily focused on the political 
chapter of the Action plan. The main issues revolved over some of the language 
and content in the political chapter.  
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According to a high-profile Egyptian official, one issue was the lack of 
consultation over the new policy and the seemingly changing nature of 
relations from ‘partners’ under the EMP, to ‘neighbours’ under the ENP. In his 
words, “You choose your partners but not your neighbours” (Personal 
Communication, N. 27, 2009).  The change in terminology was, in fact, 
perceived as a downgrading of the relationship, rather than an upgrade. The 
Egyptian administration also worked on a number of points that needed 
clarification with regards to the Action Plan: 1) the EEAP appeared as ‘one-size-
fits-all’ document and there was no specificity for the Egyptian context; 2) the 
Egyptian side insisted on the fact that any priority for action in the EEAP should 
be in line and reflect Egyptian national priorities. The Egyptian administration 
went a step further by trying to change the order of chapters to reflect socio-
economic development as the first priority (instead of the political chapter), but 
they were not successful; 3) the ENP needed to be presented as complementary 
to the EMP and not as a new policy; 4) the term ‘reward’ in the ENP literature 
proved to be a difficult obstacle to resolve since it was perceived by the 
Egyptian side as patronising and implying conditionality. As stated by an 
Egyptian official, “We are not students that you are going to distribute rewards 
to us” (Personal Communication, N.27, 2009).  
 
The perceptions of the ENP in Cairo were clearly negative and characterized by 
a sense that the policy would not satisfy Egyptian interests. According to 
another high level official in the Egyptian administration: “[T]he EU wanted to 
dictate their own priorities [in the Action Plan] and we cannot accept to be told 
what our priorities are” (Personal Communication, N. 20, 2009). Clearly the 
drafting of the EEAP and its adoption was not an easy task for the EU. Members 
of the Egyptian negotiating team felt, to a degree, as if they did not have an 
option on the content of the EEAP: “We tried to reach a compromise on the 
problems we identified here and there but it was not a real negotiation” 
(Personal Communication, N.7, 2009). The entire process of negotiations lasted 
around seven months and, like the EMAA beforehand, Egypt was again the last 
partner to sign the EEAP. Hence, we can say that the language and tone of the 
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document were the main issues of contention during the negotiations. As 
already mentioned, Egypt’s conception of its national role and image plays a 
crucial role in this regard, making its government a very sensitive and difficult 
one to deal with, in particular on issues related to political reforms.  
 
From a European perspective, this reluctance, verging on suspicion, manifested 
by the Egyptian side was perceived as normal (Personal Communication, N.22, 
2009), and therefore not to be of concern. According to an EU official at the 
Delegation in Cairo:  
 
“Egypt looked at the ENP with some concern and huge amount of curiosity. They 
saw this as something coming out of the enlargement philosophy sold as a Euro-
Mediterranean kind of annex […] There was an awareness that it was inevitable, 
that [the EEAP] was not bilaterally conceived. It was conceived on one side of the 
Mediterranean and imposed, proposed as a kind of fait accompli by the EU, which 
is the way we normally do things in many areas” (ibid.).  
 
According to EU officials, the main sticking point was not  the language of the 
EEAP but rather the text of the mandate of the political sub-committee. Here, 
Egypt strongly negotiated to have discussions only over principles of human 
rights, but not over individual cases, e.g. the detention of journalists and or the 
closing down of NGOs, thus keeping the scope of the sub-committee generic 
(Personal Communication, N.22, 2009). Again, the issue of language in EU 
official documentation remains a very important sticking point in the ENP. In 
particular, the Annual ENP reports have regularly produced negative reactions 
from the Egyptian administration due to the tone and language used resulting, 
at times, in a sort of self-censorship from Brussels in order not to upset Cairo 
too much.  
 
In the specific context of political dialogue, the EU welcomed in 2006 (Council 
of the European Union, 2006, para.5) the establishment of a sub-committee on 
political matters including human rights and democracy, international and 
regional issues. Within the context of democracy and human rights, the 
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statement notes that the EU “looks forward” to developing a dialogue on the 
above issues though the mechanisms of the sub-committees (ibid.). It is 
important to note that the simple fact that Egypt was willing to have a dialogue 
on political matters including democracy and human rights was seen as a 
success for the EU administration (Personal Communication, N.22, 2009). 
However, the quality and content of the political subcommittee remains 
questionable. From personal observations, it was noted that the political sub-
committee is a very formal affair in which, rather than having an open dialogue 
on specific issues, both administrations tended to state their respective 
positions vis-à-vis international standards and very seldom did the discussion 
revolve around potential practical support and reforms.  
 
At the onset of political dialogue the EU stated that:  
 
“[I]t will seek to identify with the Egyptian authorities areas where it may provide 
practical support for the furthering of Egypt’s own reform measures in the area of 
human rights, individual rights, the judiciary, civil society and police procedures” 
(Council of the European Union, 2006, para.9). 
 
In fact, far from intervening in legislative and procedural issues, the EU was 
only able to provide modest support to para-governmental bodies (Association 
Council, 2006, para. 10). The logic behind this approach was to have national 
bodies trickle funding to local CSOs. However, this method is contradictory in 
its essence since it implies that national bodies should support exactly those 
organisations that should provide checks and balances to the system and thus, 
that are critical of goverment. Moreover, without true legislative reforms, this 
funding tended to get dispersed within the system and/or not being fully 
utilised. As noted by a Delegation official:  
 
“I always find that our allocations end up supporting the National Council for 
Human Rights, the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood, the National 
Council for Women, which is fine to a certain extent but it does not get to the core 
of the issue” (Personal Communication, N.22, 2009).  
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By 2007 the language used by the EU was more positive following the signature 
of the EEAP, noting that the latter signalled a: 
 
“[S]ignificant upgrading of our relations, and offers the prospect of enhanced co-
operation in the political, economic and social spheres of our partnership” 
(Council of the European Union, 2007, para.1).  
 
The Association Council (2007, para.2) also highlighted the commitment 
showed by Egypt towards the common shared values set out in the EEAP and to 
the implementation of the measures contained in the document (ibid., para.2). 
In this context and within the framework of the political sub-committee, the 
Association Council statement noted that “[S]pecial attention will be given to 
the promotion and upholding of these values” (ibid., para.7). Thus, the EU 
welcomed the readiness of the Egyptian Government to dialogue on human 
rights and democracy issues (ibid., para.8). As stated above, the issues were not 
so much about the adherence to these values but the extent to which Egypt was 
willing to act upon them.  
 
By the fifth meeting of the Association Council in 2009, Egypt had proposed to 
‘enhance relations’ with the EU. The proposal had been endorsed and an ad-hoc 
group established in this regard. The EU clarified the fact that the structure of 
the sub-committees would nevertheless remain central in examining the 
content and scope for enhancing relations (ibid., p.3, para.9). The ad-hoc group 
established for the purpose of exploring areas for enhanced relations had met 
for the first time in Cairo in July 2009 for preliminary discussions and in the 
context of the political sub-committee. In January 2010, Egypt submitted a 
revised version of the proposal for enhancing political dialogue, which included 
an element of intensified interaction between Egyptian and EU authorities at 
the highest levels. These included EU-Egyptian summits, meetings between the 
Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs and his EU counterpart and meetings 
between Egyptian Ministers and their counterparts among the Commissioners 
on a number of different themes. At the second meeting of the ad-hoc group in 
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February 2010, the EU responded positively to the Egyptian proposals (2010, 
para.6). In March 2010 the Egyptian side proposed to extend the enhanced 
relations in a number of other areas that went beyond political dialogue and 
included trade, economic relations, energy, science and technology cooperation, 
agriculture and higher education and culture. It is important to note that the EU 
has reiterated that the although the ad-hoc group can propose ways and areas 
to enhance the relation, the main framework for the attainment of enhanced 
relations remains the ENP and the implementation of the AP: “[F]urther 
progress in areas related to human rights and democracy will be fundamental” 
(Association Council, 2010,para.8). The EU here was attempting to apply a 
degree of conditionality to the achievement of an enhanced relations status. 
Nevertheless, the first ad-hoc EU-Egypt Summit took place in Barcelona on June 
6th, 2010 legitimising the status of enhanced relations (2010, para.10). This 
point can be seen as a political decision by EU decision-makers to order to 
appease their Egyptian counterparts. After all, enhanced relations was merely 
an issue of status whereby Egypt wanted to be at the same level with other EU 
partners such as Morocco and Israel. Interestingly, a number of EU 
practitioners, both at the Delegation and in Brussels, expressed disappointment 
at the decision to grant Egypt the enhanced status against the lack of progress 
in the field of political reforms. In fact, in all ENP Annual Reports the status of 
progress under the political pillar has been reported as lacking. From personal 
observation it must be noted that the decision to grant Egypt enhanced status 
under the ENP was a political one taken in Brussels, against the opinion of 
practitioners on the ground. The Egyptian side had attempted to monopolise 
the forum of the political sub-committee to lobby for the enhanced status 
despite having demonstrated very little will and commitment to initiate 
political reforms in the priority sectors identified in the Action Plan. As 
articulated in the ECA report of 2013:  
 
“A key feature of the Association Agreement between the EU and Egypt is its 
insistence on the respect of democratic principles and fundamental rights. This 
reflects the EU’s long standing commitment to promoting human rights and 
democracy in its international relations as enshrined in article 21.1 of the Treaty 
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on the European Union. The main programme was beset by problems, many of 
which were due to the lack of commitment by the Egyptian Authorities” (ECA, 
2013).  
 
Hence, we could argue that the EU had failed on two grounds on the above 
issue. Firstly, by granting enhanced status against a lack of reforms in the 
political domain, the EU undermined its credibility and the modest leverage it 
might have in terms of conditionality. Secondly, the decision was one taken at a 
high level in Brussels against the best advice of practitioners on the ground. 
From a theoretical perspective this behaviour is clearly explained by Realist 
assumption of power- and interest-driven motives aimed at maintaining a 
degree of influence and political leverage, as opposed to adhering to the guiding 
principles and rationale of the policy. In fact, and as we have seen above, the 
Association Council repeatedly expressed ‘concern’ over the lack of progress in 
this area. One exception however, has been reforms in the field of women’s and 
children’s rights. Here the EU explicitly praised the government’s efforts in 
eradicating the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) and defined the 
official banning of the practice as a major step (2008, p.6,para.17). The rights of 
women as well as the rights of children were two areas where the EU expressed 
praise with regards to the developments achieved by Egypt and particularly 
with regards to adoption of a new law protecting the rights of the child in 2008 
(2009, p.5, para.21). 
 
Hence, we can argue that the political pillar the ENP is attempting to promote a 
number of issues simultaneously.  Shared values are central to the pillar, 
although the concept remains vague and difficult to quantify in reality. That 
said, the concept of shared values has opened a window of opportunity (for the 
EU mainly) to discuss issues related to human rights, democracy and rule of law 
with a partner like Egypt for the first time. This dialogue also has meant that 
much discussion and attention has been focused on the process of political 
reforms and, to an extent, Egyptian progress under the ENP has been 
monitored against these reforms and the objectives on the ENP. Additionally, 
the actions in the political pillar seem to reflect a comprehensive EU security 
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agenda in Egypt by linking regional security and dialogue to domestic reforms 
in the field of democratisation and human rights. We can safely say, however, 
that progress has been hard to identify under this pillar and that the Egyptian 
administration did not worry much about the language of concern expressed 
officially. 
What are the limitations of EU efforts and strategy in Egypt? 
The analysis of the political pillar points to a number of evident inconsistencies 
in terms of the EU approach to the sector. The question is what norms is the EU 
seeking/arguing to promote against as compared with what it actually is doing 
on the ground to support that process or, seems able to do. Moreover, the 
perception of the political pillar by the Egyptian administration can be said to 
be different (both in scope and content) from that of European personnel.  
Although the EU and Egypt have had a degree of success under the political 
chapter of the ENP (e.g. the signing of the EEAP, agreeing on initiating a 
dialogue on human rights and democratisation issues as well as on regional and 
geo-political issues, the situation and legal framework with regards to the role 
women and children in the country), this remains very modest. Some of the 
motives will be explored further below.  
 
As we have noted above, much resistance was manifested by Cairo to the text of 
the EEAP and of the political sub-committee. This was due in part to the lack of 
understanding about the rationale for the policy and an element of surprise. In 
terms of the ENP policy structure, the Action Plan adds to an already much 
overloaded EU policy structure in the Mediterranean. In fact, a very large part 
of the implementation of the EEAP rests of the provisions of the EMAA and, to 
an extent, on the structure introduced by the EMP. This overload has proven 
confusing for many stakeholders in Egypt and even for some EU practitioners.  
This stems from the fact that not every Egyptian stakeholder is deeply aware of 
EU policies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International 
Cooperation are the two Egyptian actors most familiar with EU policies and 
processes. Other than these, line ministries such as Agriculture, Education and 
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Health, just to name a few, have found the transition from EMP to the ENP 
difficult to adopt and even to understand. In fact, most Egyptian beneficiaries 
under the ENP were not fully aware of its institutional structure and policy 
objectives. Moreover, the newly introduced policy instruments of the ENP (SBS 
and technical assistance) were not fully understood due to the lack of 
knowledge about EU processes and procedures.   
More importantly maybe, a high degree of concern existed about the political 
dimension in the ENP which was something new in relations with the EU.  As 
one Egyptian practitioner noted: “[W]e had just ratified the EMAA and were 
surprised by the new policy considering that the last one [EMP] had not even 
been implemented” (Personal Communication, N.22, 2009). The confusion over 
the policy seemed to have generated a degree of suspicion amongst some 
Egyptian officials:  “[A]t the time of the negotiations on the EMAA we did not 
know that it would be followed by an Action Plan […] I am not sure if the 
European side knew this all along” (Personal Communication, N.7, 2009). The 
fact that the EU side did not know about the ENP at the time of the EMAA  is 
irrelevant, since what matters here is the perception of the Egyptian 
administration that this was the case. We can safely say, then, that the Egyptian 
side felt cornered with regards to the political dimension of the policy and had 
to fight line-by-line and negotiate extensively to arrive at an acceptable deal. 
From their perspective and interest, trade liberalisation in industrial goods and 
agriculture was the priority. Political reform was not what Cairo wanted. From 
the extent of the negotiations over the political pillar of the ENP and the terms 
of reference for the political sub-committee, it seems safe to argue that from an 
Egyptian perspective the ENP was imposed by the EU, rather than being an 
initiative which took place through a participatory and consultative process. As 
was noted above, the Egyptian side had no option to de-couple the economic 
from the political and thus, tried to protect its position by negotiating every 
single point in the EEAP.  
 
As we have seen, the concept of shared values is also problematic in its 
definition and understanding. The term ‘shared values’ has been overly used in 
the official literature of the ENP without having been really defined in terms of 
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the partner states, i.e. what do shared values mean for EU and Egyptian 
practitioners? The Association Council (2007, para.2) highlighted the fact that 
Egypt was committed to “common shared values” and added that special 
attention was to be given to the promotion and upholding of these values (ibid., 
para.7). What does this mean exactly? If we take the Commission’s definition, 
shared values include: “[D]emocracy, the respect of human rights and the rule 
of law, as set out within the EU in the Charter of Fundamental Rights” (2003, p. 
4). These three concepts imply a very long and complex reform process and one 
which is very difficult to monitor. As noted by an EU official at the Delegation in 
Cairo:  
 
“It is very difficult for us to say whether they (Egypt) share these values or not. 
Our line of thinking is that they have signed international conventions or they 
pledged internationally to obey by those values […] and so we believe that yes, 
basically they are shared because Egypt has on its own decided to sign these 
international conventions” (Personal Communication, N.1, 2008).  
 
In this regard, the role of the EU Delegation is to monitor progress and report 
on “[E]ach single bullet point in the Action Plan” (ibid.). Even from a European 
perspective this could seem rather ambitious and not in line with Egyptian 
expectations. In fact, the lack of agreement of what adherence to shared values 
really implies weakens substantially the monitoring and evaluation process by 
the EU in this regard.  
 
The issues of how the EU monitors and evaluates progress under the ENP is an 
interesting one, particularly with regard to the political pillar. Let us start by 
clarifying that the EU Delegation in Cairo produces four reports per year: three 
quarterly reports for internal purposes and one annual report that is a public 
document. The Political section at the EU Delegation takes the lead in that 
process. The section drafts the entire political chapter and then asks the 
different sections (Social, Trade and Economic) for inputs on progress as 
measured against the priorities set in the EEAP. Finally, the integration process 
is undertaken by the Political Section. The annual report then is sent to Brussels 
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(EEAS) for editing, which includes adjusting the language and tone before it is 
published. The Egyptian side is not consulted  on any draft of the report and can 
access it only after publication.  
 
During my time at the Delegation between 2008 and 2009 I was responsible for 
the drafting of the ENP report. Although the internal guidelines on the 
reporting process available at the time have since been updated, they then 
stated that the report should only provide facts and offer objective 
measurements against the benchmarks set in the Action Plan. The guidelines 
did not specifically mention any indicator to use in this regard, but rather called 
only for observations of progress achieved against new legislation and new 
institutions established. The first challenge here was to identify the existing 
legislation in a vast number of areas (terrorism, civil society law, electoral law, 
women’s law, child law, etc.) and to investigate the changes achieved or the 
progress attained at that time, if any. The EU Delegation at the time did not, 
however, develop a structured database of such legislation or baseline data to 
start from. Following consultations with Delegation colleagues on the 
methodology in this regard, I was told to collect material from various sources. 
For instance, with regard to human rights, references were to be found in 
publications and press releases by various NGOs, meetings with CSOs and 
information in the public domain (newspapers and interviews). Regarding 
more formal areas such as rule of law, good governance and political reforms, 
ad hoc meetings with relevant Egyptian counterparts provided the data 
required for the report (in essence these were meetings minutes).  
A number of problems and challenges can be identified in this process. Firstly, 
identifying the status of a piece of legislation was not such an easy task. For 
instance, the EU Delegation was aware that a new NGO law and an anti-terror 
law had been drafted, but we did not know whether the legislation had been 
presented to parliament and, if so, what the outcome was. This problem could 
be applied to the entire Egyptian legislative process since there was no clear 
channel of communication or focal point to be able to inform the Delegation on 
the status of the various laws. When deadlines were approaching, we often 
directly called high-level civil servants in relevant ministries or even organised 
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ad hoc meetings in order to obtain clarifications and information regarding any 
particular law. In this context, results were usually mixed: we left the meeting 
either more confused than before or without any substantial information. 
Hence, we could say that the process of data collection and understanding of 
the context and steps involved with regard to legislative reforms was often 
lacking at the EU Delegation level. The result was that the report was either 
vague on issues about which we lacked information, or the issues were simply 
not included.  
Secondly, and at the internal level, not all sections would report thoroughly on 
developments in their respective sectors. This was due to a number of reasons. 
New staff lacking the institutional memory of that sector would not be able to 
contribute with valuable inputs; in fact, all they could do was to report on 
developments reported in the previous report. Some members of staff would 
only report the achievements and superficially allude to the challenges. The 
reason for that, in my opinion, was that Delegation staff wanted not to upset 
their Egyptian counterparts once the report had been published.  
Once we had an entire first draft of the report, this would be shared with all 
Heads of Section at the Delegation (Political, Social, Economic and Trade) for 
final inputs and amendments.  
The political pillar being the most sensitive would receive a great deal of 
attention before being sent to Brussels. Once the report was in Brussels, the 
Desk Officer there would normally ask for clarifications and additional inputs 
on various points. Following the first draft, the Egypt Desk Officer at HQ in 
Brussels was responsible for the final version for publication. At the time we 
faced real challenges in obtaining information to address the ‘knowledge gaps’ 
in our report. According to one Delegation official, this was the normal 
procedure and a problem that the Delegation had faced regularly.  
With regard to the political chapter in the report, numerous highly confidential 
exchanges of communication took place and a lot of work went into adjusting 
the political tone and language of the report. As the deadline for the report 
approached, the exchanges with Brussels about the political chapter became 
more frequent. Tthe EU Delegation intended to be transparent and frank on the 
level of progress achieved  and ‘to tell it as it is’. However, the message coming 
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back from Brussels was quite different, with much emphasis placed on trying to 
have a final document that was not not too opinionated. The final step in the 
process was for the EU Delegation Ambassador to discuss the document with 
high-profile decision-makers in Brussels, including the Regional Director and 
the Commissioner.  
 
The interesting point here is that despite the ‘soft nature’ of the report the EU 
Delegation was eventually criticised by both CSOs and the Egyptian 
government. The EU received both formal letters of condemnation about the 
soft language and stance adopted in the report from CSOs, as well as direct 
accusations of collusion with the government. The usual line of defense for the 
EU Delegation was that the EU and Egypt were partners and that the document 
was ultimately a diplomatic document, so it had to be drafted in that spirit. 
With regard to the Egyptian government, the reaction of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was particularly strong. I recall receiving a phone call from a high official 
at the MFA hours after the report had been published expressing 
disappointment and concern over the language in the document. The Egyptian 
official noted that that the report was not what he had expected and that the 
tone of language was judgmental. In his opinion, the report was not a reflection 
of the progress made against the priorities set in the Action Plan, but rather an 
overall evaluation of the political situation in Egypt. The issue of the language in 
the report was something that kept coming up at every opportunity Egypt had. 
Prior to any important meeting being on programming or regional matters, the 
Egyptian side would make it known that were not happy with the document 
and that the Commission did not have the right to express itself in this way.  
 
In fact, on the issue of political reforms in the field of democracy, human rights, 
good governance and so on, the Egyptian side has often referred not only to 
unrealistic expectations from Brussels on what could be achieved in Egypt and 
at what pace, but also to a dogmatic approach by the EU on human rights. There 
is no doubt that the shortcomings in this area are many and the EU has 
systematically expressed concern in this regard. However, and as an Egyptian 
official noted:  
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“[W]e understand the worries of the EU thinking that they are the tutors of 
democracy in the world […] we know that we are coming from a background of a 
socialist country and are moving towards democracy […] we have our program 
for democracy and human rights and we will do that through the correct path 
without de-stabilizing Egypt […] we have many de-stabilizing factors in Egypt and 
we don’t want to lose our country, we don’t want a third revolution” (Personal 
Communication, N. 20, 2009).  
 
This statement is very telling, considering the events of January 2011, and 
reflects a very genuine concern by the Egyptian administration at that time that 
the EU road-map for political reforms under the ENP was ambitious and, to an 
extent, also dangerous. Interestingly, this view was also shared by a high profile 
official at the EU Delegation.  As noted in one of the interviews in 2009:  
 
“Human rights is a big obsession of the political pillar of the ENP […] Swedish 
human rights standards cannot be applied in Egypt. I would not impose 
something they don’t like […] one thing is to talk about human rights and another 
is to spend tax payer’s money. Problems [of cooperation in Egypt] are associated 
with political will and absorption capacity and sometimes, by Taliban human 
rights […] My priority is to spend money in the best way […] political priorities are 
too idealistic at times against the reality on the ground”  (Personal 
Communication, N.26, 2009). 
 
We can argue then that in addition to a different understanding of the concept 
of shared values there is also an expectation-gap in the field of political reforms. 
From the EU side, expectations are high and the monitoring process does not 
differentiate enough between what is practically possible and what is not (this 
will be covered more extensively in the next section). From an Egyptian 
perspective, we could argue that there was a feeling that a reform road-map 
had been dictated without a real understanding of the domestic context. 
Moreover, the high expectations against the actual timeframe needed on the 
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ground to formulate and implement those reforms were miles apart. As one 
Egyptian official noted:  
 
“The EU sometimes forgets that it [the Union] was not built over night. You [the 
EU] did not harmonize all your legislation in ten years, it took you fifty or sixty 
years and it will take us maybe that much […] You have to remember that we 
have behind us a history of 7,000 years […] to you ten years is not much, to us ten 
years is ten years” (Personal Communication, N. 7, 2009).  
 
We can say that beyond the systematically strong language from the EU, very 
little has actually been done either to support the process or, importantly, to 
sanction the lack of it. On the contrary, despite the rhetoric, Egypt was granted 
advanced status without really demonstrating any progress under the pillar. 
The EU itself has also been unable to articulate clearly how it would support the 
reform process in Egypt. Instead, it has been setting unrealistic goals and 
standards and in doing so, undermining to an extent the true meaning of these 
reforms. A quote by an Egyptian official is very telling in this regards:  
 
“You see, you [the EU] have to decide what you want. You want stability or you 
want ideal democracy? You want to try to achieve 100% democracy but you will 
not be satisfied” (Personal Communication, N.7, 2009).  
 
As with regards to political dialogue and interaction in the political 
subcommittee, it could be said that the structure has been perceived positively 
by both actors, even though for different reasons. From an EU perspective the 
political sub-committee has been able to structure dialogue and the 
relationship in general, emphasizing, to an extent, the link between political 
and socio-economic cooperation in the partnership, and has been perceived as 
a measure to build trust between actors.  In this context we can say that the 
concept of conditionality has been more of an EU concern and not at all for the 
Egyptian side. The latter, in fact, expressed a total rejection of the concept in all 
formal communications and in personal communication as well. As an EU 
official noted:  
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“[E]gypt has a very singular, rather stubborn approach to all those issues 
[political dialogue], so when it engages with us is not really from the perspective 
of trying to bring about change” (Personal Communication, N.22, 2009).  
 
For the Egyptian side the political sub-committee has been seen as an 
opportunity to enhance relations with the EU and for cementing Cairo’s role in 
a number of issues related to regional geo-politics. From personal observations, 
the political sub-committee has been utilised by the Egyptian administration to 
cement its regional position vis-à-vis Israel and Morocco and to maintain its 
role as a broker in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The centrality of Egypt in 
Arab affairs at the time and the central role of the Arab League have all been a 
priority for discussion in the subcommittees. Hence, we could argue that 
although dialogue did take place in a structured and systematic manner, the 
objective of this dialogue has been different for both actors. Egypt has 
systematically attempted to enhance its status with the EU vis-à-vis other ENP 
partners, reflecting its geo-political interests, while for the EU the issues of 
concern (such as shared values) have been difficult to openly discuss and 
approach. As noted by an EU official:  
 
“Political dialogue has always been a bit stylized so it’s always going to be 
presentational […] now whether this constitute dialogue or not is for the observer 
to judge” (Personal Communication, N. 22, 2009).  
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the political pillar above has shown the extent of divergent 
views and expectations both actors have with regards to political reforms and 
the nature of political dialogue in that context. The outcome of the analysis has 
pointed to a highly difficult area for the EU to operate in, both in terms of 
cooperation and dialogue as well as in terms of attaining change. Maybe the 
most positive result of the process during the period of interest for this study 
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has been the willingness (to an extent) of the Egyptian administration to 
discuss with the EU issues related to democracy and human rights. However, 
we have seen how these discussions have been hollow, lacking substance and 
real political will to address problems. Nevertheless, the Egyptian willingness 
to sit with its European partners and approach such issues has been seen as a 
major step forward for EU practitioners.  
 
Overall, the lack of political will from the Egyptian side to undertake political 
reforms can be seen as the main obstacle to the attainment of the political 
reforms and related objectives in the ENP. That said, Egyptian practitioners 
have been very willing to discuss regional geo-political issues and, in particular, 
have pressed the EU to upgrade the status of their relationship, one that reflects 
their perceived role in the region and that does not lessen Cairo’s status vis-à-
vis other major players. Egypt’s interests under this pillar have always been 
geo-political, aiming at legitimising Cairo’s role as a broker in the Arab-Israeli 
issue and at confirming its political weight in regional affairs. We could also 
argue that it was in the EU’s interest to have such an influential ally as Mubarak 
in the region in order to add credibility and to legitimise the Union’s role in 
regional affairs. The link between the regional/international and the domestic 
is quite important in this context. Through the ENP, Europe has been pushing 
for political reforms and the democratisation of the Egyptian political system. 
Simultaneously however, the EU has welcomed, if not encouraged, Egypt’s role 
as a broker in the region and has supported Cairo’s efforts and narrative on 
international terrorism. The Mubarak regime, in fact, has systematically used 
the argument of Islamic terrorism to justify the lack of political reforms in 
Egypt, the repressive measures adopted by internal security services against 
members of the MB and, in particular, for the need to maintain such draconian 
legislation as the emergency law and the NGO law.  
 
Hence, we could argue that the ENP objectives for political reforms in Egypt are 
hard to attain. The section above has in fact demonstrated how negatively 
Egyptian practitioners perceived political reforms and political liberalisation in 
Egypt.  To an extent, the lack of Egyptian identification with the political pillar 
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can be seen as one inherent weakness of the ENP. The second weakness is 
related to EU policy preferences and rationale for political reforms. There is no 
doubt that, in Brussels, European policy makers would like to see a degree of 
political pluralism and liberalisation of the Egyptian system. However, and as 
repeatedly stated by Mubarak, this would only lead to the rise of the MB. This 
could be said to have been borne out in the post 2011 period, when an Islamist 
government that was even more distant from European values took office. In 
essence, we could say that the EU objectives of political reforms and 
democratisation in Egypt are inherently contradictory to those related to 
security and stability in the region. This dilemma seems to be well 
acknowledged at the level of practitioners at the Delegation and it seems, in 
Brussels as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
215 
 
CONCLUSION 
The study of the ENP in Egypt has proven a complex and difficult exercise.  The 
complexity of the challenge has two main sources. Firstly, the all-encompassing 
nature of the policy in terms of its coverage and secondly, the numerous layers 
of interaction, actors and structures that characterise the various policy cycles. 
Throughout this study Egypt has been represented as a challenging and difficult 
partner for the EU. This is partly due to the national role conception and 
regional legacy of the Egyptian administration. The challenge of Egypt also 
stems from the nature of the domestic system and the limited space in which 
EU norms are promoted. Evaluating the implementation of the ENP in Egypt in 
its entirety is a mammoth task. On paper at least, the Action Plan can be 
compared to a comprehensive reform programme for partner states. In the 
case-study of Egypt therefore, this study has focused the analysis only on 
sectors identified as priority sectors in terms of EU engagement and funding 
allocations. Finally and most importantly, it has not been easy to address the 
subtle frictions that underline cooperation in this context, either at technical or 
political levels.  
 
The main questions addressed in this study were concerned with explanation 
of EU behaviour and with the nature of EU power in the context of the ENP in 
Egypt. Evidence collected have demonstrated that the application of the 
normative power thesis does not fit the reality on the ground. The normative 
power thesis has found strong supporting evidence in ENP official 
documentations and public speeches by EU leaders and therefore, in the 
articulation of the formulation cycle alone. Focusing the analysis on the 
implementation and monitoring cycles has provided alternative explanations 
for EU behaviour in this context. With regards to the nature of EU power, this 
study has demonstrated that the ENP holds the instruments for the promotion 
of norm transfer and thus, the potential to induce change in third countries. The 
study of delivery methods has supported the hypothesis that that normative 
transfer under the ENP can be identified. It is these processes and mechanisms, 
and through the application of socialisation and conditionality, that hold the 
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answer to the extent and quality of EU-induced transformation and change in 
Egypt. 
 
However, the successful implementation of these instruments has been 
different across sectors. For instance, in the trade and economic pillars this 
study has found strong evidence of norms adoption by the Egyptian side. This 
can be explained by the presence of shared interest in these sectors and by a 
shared understanding of the values promoted. Consequently, Egyptian political 
will to undertake a specific path of reforms in this sector was identified. In the 
political pillar however, the promotion of values such democracy, human right 
and good governance have met strong resistance. Here, the evidence collected 
confirmed the lack of shared understandings on the aims of the political pillar 
and confirmed the lack of political will by the Egyptian side.  Interestingly, the 
inability or unwillingness by the EU to exert any political conditionality in this 
regard, i.e. apply negative sanctions towards Egypt, raises important questions 
with regards to EU motives and the challenges faced.   
It is important to note that regarding the methodology, the ethnographic 
approach adopted and emphasizing the reflexivity of the researcher has added 
particular value to this study. Despite being firmly rooted in an International 
Relation tradition, this study has benefitted and added depth and value to the 
analysis by resting on an anthropological approach. The dual role of the 
researcher has gradually become more central to the analysis and less of a 
dilemma to be dealt with.  In fact, by fostering the sort of reflexivity advocated 
by Bourdieu (2003), it is exactly the researcher perspective that becomes all 
the more important. In particular, it is the interests of the researcher, his or 
her’s academic background, cognitive factors and personal and professional 
experience with the subject matter that ultimately influence the analysis (ibid., 
p.4). All of the above, combine to provide insightful observations on specific 
subject matter. According to Bourdieu:  
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“Nothing is more false, in my view, that the maxim almost universally accepted in 
the social sciences according to which a researcher must put nothing of himself 
into his research” (Bourdieu: 1996 quoted in Bourdieu 2003, p. 7). 
 
In this regard, it is my personal experience and knowledge of Egypt, the culture 
and the strong identification that I have with the country that has informed 
much of my interviews and logic of enquiry.  
 
This concluding chapter will start by highlighting the theoretical contributions 
offered and then turn to the series of empirical arguments advanced. Finally, 
the conclusion will propose potentially areas for further research and analysis.  
 
Theoretical contribution 
Theoretically, this study has demonstrated that one explanation does not 
suffice to account for the ENP in its entirety. No grand theory or one 
proposition alone can account for explanations in the policy cycles from 
formulation to implementation and monitoring. Policy cycles and motivation 
are crucial factors for the evaluation of EU international behaviour and hence, 
theoretical explanations on the subject matter have taken different forms. The 
application of an eclectic theoretical framework has been useful for 
accommodating these differences and divergence.  
 
This study has challenged the conventional explanation of the ENP as an 
instrument of EU normative power. It has demonstrated that different theories 
best explain the ENP at difference phases of the policy cycle and importantly, 
within different sectors. This has implied that EU behaviour is highly sector-
sensitive and differentiated. From an International Relations perspective, the 
EU can be said to behave in a prescriptive and normative manner 
predominantly in the formulation cycle.  The formulation process can be 
theorised as the articulation and projection of European values, ideas, 
principles and practices at the external and regional level and through official 
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policy documents.  Here the concepts of ‘soft’ and ‘normative’ power in foreign 
policy can be applied to the ENP and to the definition of EU external behaviour. 
From this perspective, values and identity are understood to be the shaping 
force and a constituent part of EU foreign policy and external relations.  
Focusing on the policy application in practice however, alternative explanations 
emerge. This study has demonstrated how little leverage the EU holds against a 
partner like Egypt on issues of democratisation, human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and good governance. These are fundamental EU values which are 
projected through the ENP and presented in official literature as the basis for 
bilateral relations. The relevance of these values for the EU can be said to be 
enshrined in Article. 2 of the EU-Egyptian Association Agreement which to date, 
has yet to be applied.  
According to this study, the lack of political will by the Egyptian administration 
to engage in a process of political reforms under the ENP has been coupled with 
the (apparent) unwillingness and/or inability of the EU to exert any leverage 
and/or conditionality in this area.  In particular, this study has confirmed that 
the EU and Egypt manifest a divergent understanding of the political pillar and 
of the meaning of its main objectives. In the context of political reforms the 
efforts of the ENP have been negligent and without any consequences incurred. 
We could argue that failure to exercise negative conditionality (stick) in the 
political sector, while simultaneously upgrading Egypt’s status and continuing 
to provide support in the trade and economic sectors (carrot), can be seen as an 
attempt not to shake the fragile foundations of perceived political stability in 
order to maintain the status quo. One could argue that EU political elites could 
not sustain the political costs of alienating and eventually (as it were) 
destabilising a regional player such as Egypt. This argument is particularly 
relevant in the context of regional dynamics and the respective roles of the EU 
and Egypt. There is also the counter balance effect of the U.S. relationship with 
Egypt to consider, which impacts upon both Cairo and Brussels.  
From this perspective then, Realist explanations have found strong evidence in 
EU behaviour that political and practical consideration take precedence over 
ethical ones. Despite the good intentions of the EU to promote a specific set of 
shared values through the ENP in Egypt, EU commitment in this area has been 
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weak and reforms have not happened, pointing to self-interests and geo-
political considerations as the main drivers of the EU behaviour.  
 
That said, the evident success in the promotion of neo-liberal values, ideas and 
practices cannot be denied. Reforms in this sector can be said to have been the 
most successful due to a high degree of shared understanding and interests. In 
the context of the trade and socio-economic pillar, evidence has demonstrated 
that Egypt not only was a willing partner in the reform processes but also that 
the neo-liberal and neo-liberal institutional logic of the ENP can explain much 
in this regard. Shared interests and cooperation have proved the main drivers 
for change in this pillar, resulting in substantial efforts of approximation and 
harmonisation. The benefits of this approach have allowed Egypt to protect its 
interests and negotiate cooperation measures with the EU through the shared 
language of free trade and neo-liberalism and despite the evident asymmetry in 
place. As a result, the Egyptian administration has been willing (and able at 
times) to undertake important legislative, regulatory and institutional reforms 
in order to integrate its sector policies into the regional institutional structure 
and in doing so, reap the benefits on offer. The developments in trade and 
energy are evidence of this argument. Thus, this explanation is very telling in 
terms of the driving force behind the policy implementation process beyond 
the official rhetoric.  Cooperation and interdependence in fact, can be said to be 
at the centre of neo-liberal explanations of the ENP as a policy for economic 
reforms and trade integration. Importantly, the successful implementation of 
the trade and socio-economic pillars have also manifested a high potential for 
socialisation through increased dialogue and cooperation, technical assistance 
and in general, quality interaction between the two sets of practitioners.  
 
The ENP has prioritised strategic sectors such energy, infrastructure and trade 
at the expense of more socially oriented ones such as poverty, employment and 
public services. The civil turmoil of 2011 and the eventual fall of the Mubarak 
regime can be said to have been rooted in the deficient socio-economic 
conditions and the shortcomings of the Egyptian system.  
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Throughout the analysis, the concept of Europeanisation has allowed us to de-
construct the process of norms-transfer and to identify the variables that 
influence its success or lack of it. A number of important indicators borrowed 
from the concept of Europeanisation have allowed us to evaluate the process of 
norm transfer in Egypt. Namely, this study has identified a number of factors 
that have been able to explain the lack of adoption of specific norms, in 
particular those related to the political system and the promotion of human 
rights. These have included domestic factors such as the costs of adaptation, the 
degree of democracy in Egypt, the lack of participation of non-state actors and 
the centrality of specific institutions such as the military and security 
apparatus. In this context, there is a clear lack of open political space for ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ to operate. External factors on the other hand, have included 
the political will, the credibility and legitimacy of the EU in Egypt. Additionally, 
other international players such as the U.S. can be said to have impacted 
Egyptian perceptions of the EU as a legitimate political actor in the region.  
From the evidence provided in this study, we can argue that that a degree of 
socialisation has taken place. This has mainly been sector sensitive and has 
taken place at the technical level and thorough institutional mechanisms such 
as Twinning and TAIEX and within the context of technical dialogue. To a 
degree, the same argument can be made in the context of conditionality 
whereby technical conditionality (positive) has been exercised. The 
implementation of SBS has provided much evidence in this regards. This study 
has thus traced the process of normative transfer through the concept of 
Europeanisation. Europeanisation has allowed us to identify the critical factors 
for successful transfer of norms and the mechanisms within this process. From 
the evidence collected, this study can confirm that in specific sectors and given 
certain conditions, Europeanisation can occur successfully.  
Empirical Contribution 
Empirically, this study has demonstrated how the policy works on the ground 
and how assistance is delivered in practice. Here the evidence has provide us 
with mixed results.  
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In the implementation cycle of the ENP, increased emphasis was placed by the 
Commission on adopting a comprehensive and complementary approach to 
assistance and a logic of positive conditionality through the application of 
demand-driven instruments such as SBS and technical assistance. These were 
aimed primarily at achieving institutional and procedural change. These 
instruments can also be seen as characterised by mechanisms conducive for the 
process of socialisation to take place though increased sector dialogue and 
interaction.  In this context, the ENP introduced the institutional structure of 
the sub-committees as a mean for monitoring but also as a forum for technical 
interaction and exchange of know-how. From the evidence collected, the 
function of sector sub-committees can be seen as having brought added value 
to the cooperation framework between the EU and Egypt. With the exception of 
the political sub-committee where dialogue was simply formal and 
presentational, in the more technical sub-committees such as transport, energy 
and environment or customs, dialogue has proved efficient and the sub-
committee have been seen to deliver on their function.  
 
Overall, ENP delivery methods have had different levels of success depending 
on the sectors in which they have been applied. This study has argued that 
policy tools such as Twinning, TAIEX and in particular SBS, have the potential 
for norms-transfer and EU induced change, promoting both technical 
conditionality (matrix and bench-marks) and socialisation (administrative 
procedure and institutional learning, sector-dialogue). Importantly, we could 
also argue that through the application of local ownership, the EU is able to 
apply positive conditionality in its relations with Egypt. Here, processes and 
mechanisms associated with SBS can be seen as increasing the opportunity for 
the EU to influence the Egyptian administration at institutional, legislative, 
procedural levels, and introduce norms related to better governance, 
transparency and a more intensified and participatory policy dialogue.  
 
The analysis has also pointed to a degree of inability by the EU to apply delivery 
tools correctly and hence, to exercise positive conditionality in an efficient 
manner.  In this context, delivery methods can be said to have been utilised 
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mainly as a political tool and incentive. Evidence for this argument can be found 
in the dynamic interpretation that the EU Delegations applied to the eligibility 
criteria for SBS in Egypt: an argument also reiterated by the European Court of 
Auditors report of 2013. The same argument can be made for the case of 
Twinning in Egypt. Once again, the lack of the prospect of accession has meant 
that the harmonisation component of Twinning projects has often been 
overlooked. That said, the main contribution of this research has been to 
sustain that when applied correctly, SBS, Twinning and TAIEX can indeed 
contribute to induce changes at the policy, legislative and institutional level of 
partner states. This argument holds important implications for the debate 
regarding the EU as an international actor and the nature of its power. The 
mechanisms for change and transformation therefore can be said to have been 
identified under the ENP, the problem being their effective application and the 
motives that explain failure to do so.  
An important factor in this context has been the uneven political commitment 
from the Egyptian side. From the analysis above is evident that the Egyptian 
administration was willing to cooperate in many sectors under the trade and 
socio-economic pillars, but that the same cannot be said about the political 
pillar. Hence, we can say that political will for the implementation of the ENP in 
Egypt, is sector-sensitive. In practice, this resulted in successful reforms and 
progress in the areas of trade liberalisation and in some economic reforms and 
infrastructure, but in a hollow and rhetoric-filled dialogue in the fields of 
democracy and human rights.  Hence, despite the ENP being a policy that could 
be described as euro-centric, the rate of its success can only be measured if 
partner countries are willing to cooperate and have the political weight needed 
to lobby domestically for change in a given sector. In this context, the leverage 
and incentive at the disposal of the EU are substantially weak.  
One area in which policy-level commitments have seemingly provided some 
progress according to EU officials at the Delegation is that of PFM and macro-
financial management. Here the eligibility criteria for SBS have been critical and 
have proved to be enough of an incentive for the Egyptian administration. The 
dynamic interpretation of these criteria by the EU Delegation has meant that 
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Egypt has been willing to undergo a PEFA exercise and work on sector reforms. 
The EU Delegation considers the PEFA exercise an important success in this 
regards, and evidence that the Egyptian administration was willing to 
cooperate. The link between these reforms and the disbursement of the SBS 
tranches through the matrix is a clear incentive for the Egyptian administration.  
However, in most SBS, the very ambitious targets set in the matrix have meant 
that despite Egyptian efforts, EU expectations were not often met. The 
European Court of Auditors’ report was quite critical regarding SBS and PFM, 
referring in particular to the lack of transparency and information about the 
Egyptian budget (ECA, 2013). Hence, we can say that the ECA report contradicts 
what has been the perception of EU officials in Cairo about the impact and 
effective applicability of SBS.  
 
We can conclude by noting that the nature of EU behaviour with regards to 
Egypt can be described as variable and characterised by the nature of the 
sectors for cooperation. We have seen how part of the ENP objectives were 
achieved in the trade and socio-economic pillar but not in the political one. In 
the latter, we have identified the dilemma that the EU faced with regards to 
security versus stability and have explained the resistance manifested by Egypt 
in terms of undertaking political reforms. Two important variables need to be 
mentioned here: one domestic and one international. Domestically, the aims of 
economic modernisation and reforms cannot be seen as taking place in a 
democratic system, hence any spill over effect is seen as negligent here. The 
Egyptian economy and state have been characterised by half a century of quasi-
military rule and a high degree of dependency (rent economy) and crony 
capitalism. Under these conditions, the prospect of economic and political 
liberalisation has always manifested domestic tensions and incompatibilities. 
Through the ENP in the Mediterranean, it seems that the EU wanted to replicate 
the successes of enlargement without the incentive of membership, and in a 
context fundamentally different than that of Eastern Europe. We could argue 
that the relative successful reforms in the trade and socio-economic pillar are 
the result of shared interests, and shared values and ideas on how the economy 
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should function. In terms of political reforms however, Egyptians practitioners 
and policy-makers were highly sensitive to the potential implication of that 
process and always resisted it. This study has argued that the Egyptian 
administration had a different understanding of cooperation under the political 
pillar as they have been very willing to discuss regional geo-political issues and, 
in particular, have pressed the EU to upgrade the status of their relationship, 
reflecting their perceived central role in the. Egypt’s interests under this pillar 
have always been geo-political, aiming at legitimising Cairo’s role as a broker in 
the Arab-Israeli issue and at confirming its political weight in regional affairs. 
Similarly, it was in the EU’s interest to have such an influential ally as Mubarak 
in the region in order to add credibility and to legitimise the Union’s role in 
regional affairs. In fact, the EU has welcomed and encouraged, Egypt’s role as a 
broker in the region and has supported Cairo’s efforts and narrative on 
international terrorism.  
The analysis of the political pillar has emphasised the democracy-security 
dilemma in Egypt. From this perspective, the events of January 2011 and the 
advent of Morsi at the presidency of Egypt, the first civilian president in years, 
do not constitute the triumph of political liberalism but rather the emergence of 
political Islam as the alternative conservative force to that of the military in 
Egypt. The election of El Sisi as the President of Egypt has further reinforced 
this dilemma for the EU in term of its relation with Egypt. Despite the lack of 
shared values on the political notions that govern the two partners (liberal vs 
authoritarian), we could say that after all, the EU and Egypt share a relatively 
similar notion security.  Internationally, one important variable to mention 
here is that of the U.S. Washington in fact, is still perceived as the main political 
actor in Egypt due to its central role in the Arab-Israeli issue and the military 
supports it provides to Cairo.  Moreover, the U.S. remains a strong Egyptian ally 
and a political ‘heavy-weight’ in the regional balance of power. The EU on the 
other hand, despite being the largest donor in terms of development and 
cooperation, does not hold the same political weight and is primarily perceived 
as a key economic actor. Hence, it could be argued that in the context of the 
research questions of this study, the traditional role of the U.S. contributes to 
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the weakening of the EU normative power thesis and relegates the role of 
Brussels to that of an economic bloc.   
 
The study of the implementation of the ENP in Egypt has allowed us to advance 
various propositions with regards to the behaviour of the EU in international 
relations, and with regards to the nature of EU power. The application of 
theoretical eclecticism has proven useful in allowing the explanations to reflect 
differently on concepts such as norms, normative transfer, power, interests and 
cooperation. This has allowed the study to construct a diversified but holistic 
picture of the subject matter. EU behaviour and hence, the application of EU 
power have been seen as sensitive to both domestic and international variable.  
We can conclude, that the study of the ENP in Egypt points to an environment 
where the study of actors behaviour has to factor for additional structural and 
agency dynamics.  
 
Areas for further research 
The investigation conducted in this thesis opens up a number of areas for further 
study. Indeed, further exploration of the research outlined in this thesis would 
allow for the examination of other factors affecting the EU agenda and policy in 
the Mediterranean. Moreover, the role of the EU as a promoter of change and 
transformation in the region needs to be further analysed in more depth. This 
would allow for a comparative approach to be undertaken in the context of the 
implementation of the ENP in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the two avenues of 
future research suggested in this final section are: 1) The role and relation of the 
U.S. with Egypt; 2) The role of the EU as norms entrepreneur and agent for 
change.  
 
Firstly and adopting a structural perspective, further research is needed to 
assess the impact of other relevant actors in the region with regards to the 
realisation of the objectives of the ENP. In this context, the role of U.S. has been 
briefly outlined but not fully elaborated upon. In particular, the historical legacy 
of Washington in regional security structures such as MEPP, as well as the 
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central role played by Cairo as a stabilising force, provide a great opportunity for 
research to understand the dynamics that underpin trilateral security 
cooperation in this context. Egypt was in fact, the first a pole of stability in the 
Arab Israeli question post the US brokered 1979 peace treaty, and an important 
ally in the reconstruction of regional stability after the Arab Spring. Importantly, 
further research in this area would allow for an evaluation of the impact of these 
dynamics on the EU agenda and security interests. Barry Buzan (1998) has 
elaborated on the concept of security complexes which could be appropriately 
applied in the region.  
 
Secondly and adopting an agency approach, further empirical research on the 
role of the EU as a norms entrepreneur could address more specifically the 
questions that emerge in relations to EU power and its mechanisms.  By adopting 
a comparative study approach, we could enlarge the scope of the analysis to 
other regional partners in order to assess and gauge more accurately the 
capacity of the EU in this regards. Indeed, further research could shed light on 
the condition needed to promote certain norms, the credibility of the EU as an 
agent of change, the indicators for successful transformation and importantly, 
the role of domestic actors in different scenarios.  
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ANNEX 1: 
 
EU-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS OVER TIME: NORMS AND 
VALUES UNDER THE GLOBAL MEDITERRANEAN 
POLICY (GMP) AND THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN 
PARTNERSHIP (EMP) 
 
Chapter two has focused on the ENP and outlined the changes and similarities 
that the policy manifested vis-à-vis its predecessors. This annex aims to 
contribute to the understanding of the ENP by providing a contextual 
background to the EU agenda in the Mediterranean. It will demonstrate how the 
EU has consistently promoted norms and values associated with a neo-liberal 
economic orthodoxy and how over time, political values and norms have 
gradually became more explicitly articulated. This has been particularly the case 
of the EMP.  
Looking at the engagement of the EU in the Mediterranean over time implies 
unpacking the rational and tenets of the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) and 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Policy (EMP). Contextualising the ENP from a 
historical and regional perspective allows us to better the understanding of the 
driving and motivational factors influencing the formulation process. It also 
provides the study with evidence that the development of a comprehensive 
approach to security in the region by EU, has been ongoing and changing over 
time.  
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THE EU IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE CONTEXT FOR 
EU-EGYPTIAN COOPERATION  
The Mediterranean has been one of the first regions to witness the extension, so 
to speak, of the EU’s institutional structure and cooperation agreements with 
third countries. Following a first contractual engagement with the region in the 
1970s, the EU policy approach to the Mediterranean has increasingly become the 
central dimension of the Union’s Southern foreign policy. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union in the early nineties and the wave of democratisation that followed 
allowed the EU to develop a more pivotal role in regional relations and coincided 
with the EU working towards a more coherent and unified foreign policy. The 
success of Enlargement policy reinforced the role of Brussels as a regional actor, 
particularly with regards to its capacity to act and be perceived as an anchor able 
to foster socio-economic development and growth. The EU has also been seen as 
able to promote and foster political reforms including democracy and human 
rights in third countries. The experience in the Mediterranean has naturally been 
different from Enlargement due to the lack of a clear, short term and substantive 
incentive.   
The first attempt at contractual relations of the EU in the Mediterranean was the 
Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in the 1970s. The GMP was followed by the 
establishment the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Barcelona 
Process in 1995 and later the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. 
Currently, EU contractual relations with Mediterranean partners are 
underpinned by Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) which 
form the legal basis for cooperation with EU partners. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty 
(2009) these type of agreements fell under the category of mixed-agreements as 
they include areas where the Community competences overlapped with the 
competences of member states on issues as the Common Foreign Security Policy 
(CFSP) and Cooperation in Police and Judicial Criminal matters (Smith, 2004, 
p.7). The ENP was thus considered a ‘cross-pillar’ policy in so far that 
competences cut across the (old) EU pillar structure. Mediterranean can be said 
to have become one of two crucial dimensions of the  EU foreign policy, the other 
being the Eastern dimension of the Union. In 2000 the Council explicitly set the 
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strategic direction of the EU in the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean 
stating:  
 
“The European Union's goal is to help secure peace, stability and prosperity in the 
region. Its objectives also include promotion of core values such as human rights, 
democracy, good governance, transparency and the rule of law. Social, cultural and 
human affairs also play a role in promoting mutual understanding. Free trade, 
closer cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, greater security through 
cooperation to promote peace and dialogue to combat intolerance, racism and 
xenophobia are further objectives” (Council of the European Union, 2000, para.3).  
The EU agenda in Mediterranean has not always been that explicit with regards 
to the promotion of its interests and of political values and norms in its external 
relations. The following section will trace the prioritisation of objectives and 
perceptions of challenges by the EU in the Mediterranean. It will do so in a 
chronological manner focusing on the various policy frameworks from the Global 
Mediterranean Policy (GMP) and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).   
The Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP)  
The Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) formally acknowledged the importance 
of the Mediterranean for the EU in both political and economic terms. It was also 
an attempt to bring greater policy-coherence in the region (Gomez and Christou, 
2004, pp. 187-8). Up to that point, the EU did not consider the Mediterranean as 
a homogenous region (Bicchi, 2003, p.12).  The main concerns for Europe were 
related to the spill over of terrorism form the Arab-Israeli conflict on the 
continent, best exemplified at the time by the tragic events at the Olympic Games 
in Munich in September 1972 and, by the difficult economic relations with Arab 
partners. Regional politics at the time where characterised by the phenomena of 
nationalism and oil crisis,  culminating with the nationalisation of the oil industry 
in Libya in the 1970s and the oil shock of 1973 (Bicchi, 2003, p.13). Relations 
with Mediterranean partners at the time could be summarised as contrasted by 
post-colonial aspirations of independence with the realities of economic 
interdependence and exchange (ibid.).   
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Under the GMP and for the first time in relations with third countries, the new 
EU Cooperation Agreements (CA) included provisions for financial, social and 
technical matters and, the inclusion of small amounts of aid alongside trade 
(Gomez and Christou, 2004, pp. 187-8).  The Fourth Protocol of the Cooperation 
Agreements for example aimed at supporting the IMF’s and the World Bank’s 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The objectives of SAPs consisted of 
promoting economic reforms and development, job creation and attracting 
investment, containment of population growth and to a lesser extent, political 
liberalisation (Parfitt, 1997, p.869). According to Parfitt (1997, p.870) the 
rationale of the EU was to foster economic development and liberalisation in the 
region, by securing the commitment of Mediterranean partners to the same 
politico-economic values which underpinned the EU itself. This indicates a first 
European attempt in the Mediterranean at linking socio-economic development 
with the stability of the region.  
EU-Egypt Cooperation under the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) 
 
In 1976 Egypt signed a Cooperation Agreement (CA) with the EU under the 
framework of the GMP. The agreement was complemented by four additional 
financial protocols which regulated the aid framework40: (I) 1978-1981; (II) 
1981-1986; (III) 1986-1991 and (IV) 1991-1996 (Licari, 1997, p.25). The CA 
gave Egypt preferential treatment and free access to the EU markets for raw 
materials and industrial exports, albeit with exceptions for the most sensitive 
sectors such as textile and clothing (Licari, 1997, p.23). This was a non-reciprocal 
agreement with regards to EU exports to Egypt. In agriculture, one of the key 
sectors for the Egyptian economy, Egyptian exports benefited from 40% to 80% 
tariff concessions of the common external tariff. Once again however, quotas and 
calendar restrictions were imposed. Moreover and due to measures in the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), tariff reductions applied for part of the year 
                                                          
40The aid frameworks compromises European Investment Bank (EIB) loans, soft loans, non-refundable aid and venture capital 
(Licari, 1997, p.25).  
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and reference pricing was applied to fruits and vegetables in order to protect the 
EU market (Licari, 1997, p.23).  
In the context of aid, the four Protocols of the CA provided different 
arrangements and focused on different policy sectors. The first and second 
protocols (1978-1981 and 1981-1986) allowed aid to be invested in economic 
infrastructure and direct production, while the modernisation of the agricultural 
sector and industrialisation had to be negotiated separately as special targets 
(Licari, 1997, p.25). The third and fourth protocols (1986-1991 and 1991-1996) 
prioritised venture capital in an attempt to help Egyptian public and private 
firms (Licari, 1997, p.26). The fourth protocol in particular, highlighted 
agricultural projects as part of a pluri-annual strategy and addressed the 
challenges faced by small and medium enterprise (SME). Under this protocol, 
Community grants for the Mediterranean dedicated to the promotion of 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were provided to Egypt (Licari, 1997, 
p.26).  
Under the GMP, Egypt became the largest recipient of EU aid in the 
Mediterranean (Licari, 1997, p.25; Parfitt, 1997, p.866). Its geographical position 
meant that Cairo was seen as a bridge between Europe, Africa and the Middle 
East. Egypt’s relation and proximity with Israel was another important factors 
for considering Egypt as central geo-political actor for EU relations and interests 
in the entire region (Parfitt, 1997, p.866).  Moreover, Egypt’s own 
rapprochement towards the West and Israel made it rationale and consistent 
with EU interests to support Cairo’s efforts towards economic and political 
liberalism (Parfitt, 1997, p.866).   
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)  
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)41 emerged as a result of a European 
Commission proposal in 1992 which envisaged the creation of a free-trade area 
(FTA) in the Maghreb region (Gomez and Christou, 2004, p.191). Building on the 
                                                          
41 The EMP includes all 27 EU MS plus 10 Mediterranean partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian 
Territories, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey (Lannon and van Elsuwege, 2004, p.39). 
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GMP rationale, the objectives of the initiative were to achieve prosperity and 
stability in the Mediterranean and, to enhance political dialogue and confidence 
amongst Mediterranean non-member countries (MNMC). The rationale of the 
EMP was based on a neo-liberal market-logic which emphasised free-trade, 
private investment and macro-economic reforms as a stimulus for socio-
economic development (Gomez and Christou, 2004, p.191). Even though 
economic interests seemed to underpin the rationale of the proposal, the end of 
the Cold War meant that the EU now had a new window of opportunity to 
enhance its political role in the immediate neighbourhood. Security concerns 
also began to be perceived differently, both in terms of increased migration flows 
and the rise of political Islam. Southern member states in particular were 
concerned to limit the flows of illegal migration by restricting entries and 
revising the provisions for granting asylum (Bicchi, 2003,p.15). In 1994 the 
Foreign Affairs Council asked the Commission to submit short and medium-term 
guidelines for a Mediterranean policy (Parfitt, 1997, p.871.  
At the Corfu, Essen (1994) and Cannes (1995) European Councils the decision to 
establish the EMP was adopted and a draft Barcelona Declaration was submitted 
to the twelve Mediterranean partners for discussion and eventual adoption the 
following year (Lannon and van Elsuwege, 2004, p.35; Parfitt, 1997, p.872). The 
Barcelona Declaration was a comprehensive initiative articulated through the 
‘three baskets’ approach: 1) a security and political partnership, 2) an economic 
partnership which envisaged the creation of a FTA in the Mediterranean by 
2010, and 3) a social cultural and human partnership (European Commission, 
The Barcelona Declaration, 1995). The three related objectives of the EMP were: 
1) to achieve an area of peace and stability in the region based on the respect for 
fundamental human rights and the principles of democratisation, 2) to create an 
area of shared prosperity based on the gradual integration of regional economies 
into an area of free trade and increased harmonisation with the acquis 
communitare and finally, 3) to enhance mutual understanding between people 
and culture on both shore of the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2002, 
p.4).  
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The EMP relied on two policy instruments: 1) the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements (EMAAs) and 2) financial aid packages (MEDA). The 
EMAAs set the legal basis for a gradual process of trade liberalisation covering 
rights of establishment, movement of trade and capital, technical cooperation 
and research and development (Gomez and Christou, 2004, p.191). It could be 
argued that the EMP model combined security with commercial priorities and 
interests, all made more ethically plausible by adding a normative and human 
face to the initiative. In terms of the liberalization of trade, the EMP set the basis 
for the ENP to build on.  
 
The first basket of the EMP was concerned with political issues and aimed at 
building confidence measures between partners (European Commission, 1995, 
p.3). The promotion of political reforms reinforces the thesis of an EU as a force 
for good and displaying characteristics of a normative power. In fact, a number of 
points in the Barcelona Declaration committed the signatories to: 
“[D]evelop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while 
recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely 
develop its own political, sociocultural, economic and judicial system […] respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate 
exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of 
association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any 
discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex […]” 
(European Commission, 1995, p. 3).  
All of the EMAAs have provision for the exercise of political conditionality 
through the essential element clause, i.e. Article 2 (European Commission, 
2003b, p.8) which stipulates that:   
“Relations between the Parties as well as the provisions of the Agreement itself, 
shall be based on respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights 
as set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which guides their 
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internal and international policies and constitute an essential element of this 
Agreement” (EU-Egypt Association Agreement, 2001, p. 5).   
This basket was thus intended to provide a forum for dialogue on political and 
security issues but also to include and emphasise principles such as fundamental 
human rights and democracy as guiding principles for relations even though 
these were seen as sensitive issues for the majority of MNMC.  
 
The second basket was aimed at establishing an economic and financial 
partnership through economic cooperation with the objectives of creating a 
Mediterranean free trade area (FTA): together these objectives formed the main 
body and essence of the Barcelona Declaration (Parfitt, 1997, p.872).  Three 
objectives were identified under the second basket: socio-economic 
development, poverty reduction and regional cooperation and integration 
(European Commission, 1995, p.4). This basket was seen as the most important 
since it reflected both the EU’s and partners’ main shared interests under the 
initiative. From an EU perspective, this basket explicitly addressed the 
commercial interests of the Union and its partners but also linked the priorities 
identified under the ‘new security’ agenda with socio-economic conditions in 
partner states.  The provisions of the economic basket in fact, implied an 
eventual removal of trade barriers across all sectors in the Mediterranean with 
potentially serious implications and disruptions for MNMC. These reforms 
therefore could create potential political back-clashes back in those member 
states which would suffer from the increased competition (e.g. the agricultural 
and textile sectors), as well as in partner states resulting in increased illegal 
migration and radicalisation (Gomez and Christou, 2004, p.191). From a 
theoretical perspective the EMP can also be explained through the maximisation 
by the EU power asymmetries that characterised relations with Mediterranean 
partners. Moreover, the dominance of a cultural and economic ideology which 
seemed to legitimise the rationale for development along capitalist lines and 
importantly, void of an alternative orthodoxy, reinforces critical structural 
explanations which fall under a neo-Gramsciam paradimg.  
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Finally, the third basket emphasised a social and human dimension. It was 
envisaged to promote dialogue, cultural understanding, educational exchanges, 
networks and the promotion of basic social rights. It also emphasised the 
importance of social development and identified related areas of concern such as 
migration and organised crime. The third basket clearly highlighted the central 
and indispensable role that a vibrant civil society is expected to play for the 
socio-economic and democratic development of MNMC (European Commission, 
1995, pp.7-8).  
 
The difficulties in negotiating the EMAAs saw the introduction of financial aid 
packages as a supporting instrument. MEDA aimed primarily at supporting 
structural reforms and socio-economic development with an initial modest 
budget of €3.4 million (1995-1999) (Gomez and Christou, 2004, p.192). Parfitt 
(1997, p. 874) notes that with the introduction of MEDA the EU aid regime 
changed. Instead of allocating a set amount to each regional country for a period 
of five years, MEDA introduced an element of competitiveness whereby money 
would be disbursed according to the merits of the various proposals presented 
by MNMC. This was intended to achieve greater efficiency in the use of aid. 
Parfitt  (1997, p.874) argues that by not guaranteeing a set amount of aid for any 
country, the EU did increase its capacity to better control aid allocation in a 
unilateral fashion (Parfitt, 1997, p.874).42  
EU-Egypt cooperation under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)  
For the Egyptian administration, the provisions in the EMAA reflected the broad 
aims envisioned under the national economic reform strategy. Signing the EMAA 
and embarking on a policy of trade liberalisation and harmonisation with the EU 
was understood by Egyptian negotiators at the time, to be the best method of 
attracting FDI. In terms of political developments under the EMP, the political 
basket and the confidence building measures envisaged at the time were 
                                                          
42 Parfitt (1997, pp.874-5) identify two problems with this approach: a) how to define efficient spending and what criteria have 
been used in this regard and, b) by using this allocation method would aid reach the poorest in the region  as intended and 
outlined in the EU Treaty? How do these questions explain the apparent shift of responsibilities witnessed though the financing 
method of budget support?  
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favoured by the Egyptian administration who carefully worked on reinforcing its 
role as a mediator and stabiliser in the region. In hindsight, it could be said that 
confidence building measures were perceived by some officials in Cairo as 
having been successful. According to an Egyptian official involved in the EMP at 
the time, the dialogue between partners eventually resulted in fruitful talk over 
cooperation: “People [Arab and Israelis] were sitting together blaming each 
other, but they were sitting together” (Personal communication, N. 20, 2009). 
Negotiations concerning trade with Egypt under the EMP framework, 
particularly over market access for industrial and agricultural products, proved 
difficult and long (Parfitt, 1997, p.878). Initially, Egyptian negotiators seemed 
worried about the impact of European industrial products on their own market. 
Although liberalisation of the publicly owned industrial sector was agreed with 
the IMF and the World Bank in 1991, this process proved slow and eventually 
unattainable. The main obstacles had been the  lack of political will to see it 
thorough and the strong resistance applied by Egyptian lobbies (Parfitt, 1997, 
p.878; Licari, 1997, p.31). Parfitt (1997, p.878) notes that the Egyptian 
government was worried about the impact that liberalisation would have on 
unemployment and thus, the implications related to the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in the country. In fact, economic factors are seen by some as 
only one element of potential domestic instability, even more so today. Coupled 
with little civic awareness and political diversity, socio-economic conditions are 
seen to play favourably in the hands of radical political Islam and in the 
promotion of a stream of thought that, according to an Egyptian official, “could 
offset everything we have done thus far” in the field of democracy and human 
rights (Personal communication, N. 20, 2009). Having said that, the Egyptian 
administration was aware that in order to be competitive vis-à-vis the EU, it 
needed to restructure its highly bureaucratic and large public industry. The 
solution appeared to be in the 12-years gradual liberalisation process (phasing) 
enshrined in the EMAA. This was seen to give the Egyptians a grace period in 
which to embark on economic restructuring and prepare its industries for free 
trade (Gomez and Christou, 2004, p. 193; Parfitt, 1997, p.879). One area of 
concern for the Egyptians has been related to the EU rules of origins which 
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stipulate that in order to benefit from tariff-free entry into European markets, 
products needs to have been produced in the exporting country. The minimum 
value-added in any commodity stipulated by the EU is 40%, a figure which Egypt 
found hard to achieve (Parfitt, 1997, p.879). Even though the high local 
content/percentage was envisaged to discourage non-EU firms to invest in the 
Mediterranean (Licari, 1997, p.28), Egyptian concerns were also justified on the 
grounds that the measure would discourage FDI in general.  
The real sticking point in the negotiations however, has been Egyptian concerns 
with agricultural products. Negotiations started in 1996 but quickly stalled over 
market accession of products such as oranges, potatoes, cut flowers and rice 
(Gomez and Christou, 2004, p. 193). The Egyptians argued that the principle of 
comparative advantage lay within agriculture and in the free access to EU 
markets for such products even though the Commission has seen this position as 
a maximalist one (Parfitt, 1997, p.879). For the EU, the Egyptian requests of 
easier access to the market for the key products mentioned above was seen as 
potentially  disrupting and non-conforming with the principle of traditional 
flows which for example, limit Egyptian exports in the sectors vis-à-vis 
competitors such as Tunisia and Morocco (Licari, 1997, p.29). The negotiations 
over agriculture produced little progress under the EMP and arguably, impacted 
on Egypt’s aid receipts on the basis of the lack of capacity to propose enough 
viable projects (Parfitt, 1997, p.880). As far as other areas such as the 
liberalisation of services and right of establishment, these were at an 
evolutionary stage at that time (Licari, 1997, p.30).  
It could be argued that the Mediterranean region has witnessed an incremental 
process of institutionalisation both in terms of policy-sectors (deepening) and in 
terms of the degree of institutional interdependence between these sectors 
(widening). This is evident in matters of trade and commerce where the EU 
agenda is seen as willing to harmonise norms, practices and standards. Despite 
these efforts, the impact of the EMP was not very positive, particularly with 
regards to the field of political reform. This indicates either the inability or the 
unwillingness of the EU to apply political conditionality in its relations with 
Mediterranean partners. Based on the evidence of the EMP alone, the normative 
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power thesis seems quite strong in its formulation of intentions but, rather weak 
in its application. In fact, considering that the EU aims to promote certain 
constitutive norms, values and practices, it has failed to achieve its objectives on 
the ground. Moreover, we could argue that even though the EU has increasingly 
emphasized the role of political values and norms such as democracy and human 
rights under the EMP, it is yet to apply Art. 2 of the various Association 
Agreements with any partner state.  
CONCLUSION:  
The aims of this annex has been to attempt to trace the driving motives and the 
distinguishing features of the EU agenda in the Mediterranean over time, with 
specific focus on Egypt. Importantly, this chapter has maintained the focus on the 
role of norms and values in the formulation and design of these policy 
frameworks while at the same time, trying to trace their articulation on the 
ground through cooperation and implementation modalities with Egypt.  
As we have seen, the GMP signalled the first contractual engagement of the EU 
with the Mediterranean region. The policy appears to have been formulated on 
the basis of self-interest and realist assumption with a degree of economic 
liberalisation advocated. With the advent of the EMP and of the Barcelona 
Process in the mid-1990s the promotion of a neo-liberal economic orthodoxy 
was made much more explicit in the three-basket approach of the EMP, 
providing the core element of the partnership. Economic integration and the 
creation of a FTA were envisaged as clear and attainable objectives to be 
achieved through economic reforms, the facilitation of FDI, market liberalisation 
and privatisation. Together with a stronger promotion of specific economic 
values and norms and thus, a stronger emphasis on the economic dimension of 
EU agenda in the Mediterranean, the EMP also emphasised in an unprecedented 
manner, the relevance of political reforms and values such as democracy and 
human rights. The inclusion of political reforms in the three-basked approach 
could be interpreted from two perspectives. Firstly, that the EU was in fact 
promoting and making conditional to its contractual relations (see Art. 2 EMAA) 
the respect of certain values and norms related to the political arena thus, 
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reinforcing the projection of its image (and thus perception) in the region as a 
normative, benevolent power. Secondly and maybe more importantly, the strong 
emphasis on political reforms also signalled the conviction that EU security was 
seen as attainable through a comprehensive framework linking directly socio-
economic development in partners states to the security of EU citizens. 
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ANNEX 2: 
 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
- EEAS/Commission – EU Delegation - Political section – Policy Officer, 
Cairo, 29/09/2008 
- European Commission - EU Delegation – Social Section - Programme 
Manager/1 – Cairo, 09/07/2009 
- European Commission - EU Delegation – Trade Section – Policy 
Officer, Cairo, 12/07/2009 
- European Commission – EU Delegation –Social Section – Programme 
Manager/2, Cairo, 15/07/2009 
- European Commission – EU Delegation –Economic Section – 
Programme Manager/1, Cairo, 18/07/2009 
- European Commission – EU Delegation –Social Section – Official/1, 
Cairo, 20/07/2009 
- Government of Egypt – Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Association 
Agreement Steering Bureau - Second Councillor, Cairo, 22/07/2009 
- European Commission – EU Delegation –Economic Section – 
Programme Manager/2, Cairo, 26/07/2009 
- European Commission – EU Delegation –Economic Section – 
Programme Manager/3, Cairo, 27/07/2009 
- European Commission – EU Delegation –Economic Section – 
Programme Manager/4, Cairo, 28/07/2009 
- Civil Society Organisation – (European Foundation) - Deputy Director- 
Cairo, 28/07/2009 
- Civil Society Organisation – (Egyptian NGO) - Director- Cairo, 
31/07/2009 
- Al-Azhar University – Prof. Ahmed El-Tayyeb – 03/08/2009 
- European Commission – EU Delegation –Economic Section –Official, 
Cairo, 04/08/2009 
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- European Commission – EU Delegation –Social Section – Official/2, 
Cairo, 06/08/2009 
- Civil Society Organisation – (Egyptian NGO) - Deputy Director- Cairo, 
06/08/2009 
- European Commission – EU Delegation –Social Section – Programme 
Manager/3, Cairo, 08/08/2009 
- Civil Society Organisation – (Egyptian NGO) - Director- Cairo, 
09/08/2009 
- European Commission – EU Delegation –Finance and Contract Section 
–Official, Cairo, 12/08/2009 
- Government of Egypt – Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of 
Egypt – Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Association Agreement Steering 
Bureau - Ambassador, Cairo, 19/07/2009 
- Civil Society Organisation – (Egyptian NGO)- Director- Cairo, 
20/08/2009 
- Civil Society Organisation – (International Foundation) - Director- 
Cairo, 03/09/2009 
- EEAS/Commission – EU Delegation - Political section – Official, Cairo, 
23/09/2009 
- Government of Egypt – Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of 
Egypt – Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Association Agreement Steering 
Bureau –Second Councillor, Cairo, 02/09/2009 
- European Commission – EU Delegation – Official, Cairo, 07/09/2009 
- European Commission – EU Delegation –Trade Section –Official, Cairo, 
06/09/2009 
- Government of Egypt – Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Government of 
Egypt – Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Association Agreement Steering 
Bureau - Ambassador, Cairo, 10/09/2009 
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ANNEX THREE: 
LIST OF DATA SET  
 
  -SCM 2007-1: Sub-committee minutes on Custom Cooperation 
  -SCM 2007-3: Sub-committee minutes on Transport, Energy and Environment 
  -SCM 2007-4: Sub-committee minutes on Health 
  -SCM 2008-1: Sub-committee minutes on Agriculture and Fisheries 
  -SCM 2008-1.2: Sub-committee minutes on Industry, Trade and Investment 
  -SCM 2008-2: Sub-committee minutes on Internal Market  
  -SCM 2008-3: Sub-committee minutes on Transport, Energy and Environment 
  -SCM 2009-4: Sub-committee minutes on Health 
  -ACT 2008-1.2: Association Committee Internal Notes 
  -ACT 2008-1.3: Association Committee Internal Notes 
  -ACT 2008-1.4: Association Committee Internal Notes 
  -ACT 2008-1.5: Association Committee Internal Notes 
  -ACT 2009-1.1: Association Committee Internal Notes 
  -MR 2008-1: Mission report – Internal – Custom Cooperation 
  -Dataset – TA, 2009: Data set – Internal – Technical Assistance  
- Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Partnership on Energy with Egypt 
– Internal  
 - Note to File-H1: Internal Communication 
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ANNEX FOUR: 
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[See overleaf] 
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ANNEX FIVE: 
 
UPR16 ETHICAL CONDUCT FORM 
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